The Aeroplane in War

Produced by James Simmons.

This file was produced from page images at the Internet Archive.

Transcriber’s Note

This book was transcribed from scans of the original found at the Internet Archive. I have rotated some images. The name Blériot in the original book has the accented e only in captions to illustrations. I have used the accented version in the rest of the text as well. There are several variant spellings in the text which I have left alone.

[Illustration: CLAUDE GRAHAME-WHITE. Winner of the Gordon-Bennett Aviation Cup, 1910; author of "The Story of the Aeroplane"; and joint author, with Harry Harper, of "The Aeroplane: Past, Present, and Future," "Heroes of the Air," and "The Aeroplane in War."]

The Aeroplane

In War

By

Claude Grahame-White

And

Harry Harper

Authors Of "The Aeroplane: Past, Present, And Future"

Philadelphia

J. B. Lippincott Company

London: T. Werner Laurie

Preface

Although it is still a crude machine—in view of the perfected apparatus which is the aim of thoughtful designers—the aeroplane has demonstrated, in a conclusive way, its value as an instrument of war.

In peace manœuvres in France and Germany, and under actual war conditions in Tripoli, scouting machines have proved their ability to pierce most effectually what is known as "the fog of war." Air-scouts have, indeed, revealed the dispositions of an enemy so precisely as to make it necessary to alter—at a moment’s notice—an entire plan of campaign.

Ceasing to be fair-weather craft, powerful, modern-type aeroplanes can combat high and gusty winds, and are already capable of being used, for reconnoitring flights, on at least 80 per cent of the days of the year. No longer unreliable, they have become practical weapons.

A squadron of war aeroplanes, carrying pilots and observers, can, as has been shown again and again, lay bare the disposition of a widespread battle-front. In one hour, they can perform the reconnoitring work which has hitherto been carried out in a day, and in a necessarily hit-or-miss fashion, by cavalry and other scouts.

The use of well-trained corps of military airmen will revolutionise the tactics of war. No longer will two Commanders-in-Chief grope in the dark. They will sit, so to speak, on either side of a chess-board, which will represent the battlefield. Each will watch the other’s moves; nothing will be concealed. From a blundering, scrambling moving about of masses of men, modern warfare will become—through the advent of the aeroplane—an intellectual process.

The Commander-in-Chief who has no proper air-corps, in the next great war, will be in a hopeless position. He will have lost a battle practically before it begins. Whereas his opponent will know exactly what _he_ is doing, he will be able to obtain nothing but vague and confusing tidings as to the movements of the enemy. Imagine two armed men approaching each other, one being blindfolded. The Commander-in-Chief without aeroplanes will be like a blindfolded man.

One nation stands head-and-shoulders above all others in the matter of her aerial equipment and experience. That nation is France. So far ahead is she that it will be a long time before other countries will be able to come up with her; but Germany is now making desperate efforts to do so.

Until recently, it must be said, England lagged inactively not only behind France and Germany, in the organising of an air-corps, but even behind such countries as Austria, Italy, and Spain.

Now, however, there are promises of a change. For this, mainly, we must thank the energy and enthusiasm of Colonel Seely, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for War. When these lines are being read, British aeroplane manufacturers will be preparing for an important military trial of aeroplanes, which is to be held in England during the summer.

The War Office has begun to buy aeroplanes, although on a small scale. We now have a Royal Flying Corps; a body of skilled airmen is being trained. But money is spent very sparingly. Our equipment, compared with that of France, is still a negligible quantity. In machines, and men, and, above all, in training, we are very far behind.

Only by persistent and intelligently directed work, by the spending of more money, by the practical encouragement of manufacturers, and by the appointing of executive officers who are experts in their field of work, can we hope even to approach the organisation of the air-corps of France.

But a beginning has certainly been made. By the end of the forthcoming flying season, we should have in England a small, but well-equipped air service. And the work of this corps will be its own advertisement. Once the potentialities of the war aeroplane are realised adequately, a stinting policy will be impossible.

It is our aim, in this book, to show what the war aeroplane has done, and can do. At present, its work has been confined to scouting. But it has other, and grimmer possibilities. It can, and without doubt will, be used as an engine of destruction—not by means of the bomb-dropping attacks of a few aeroplanes, but by the organised onslaught of large squadrons of weight-lifting machines, which will be able to rain down tons of missiles over any given spot.

And there is another possibility, also. Machines are carrying heavier loads every day. Soon the practicability of aeroplanes to transport troops—particularly in regard to hurrying up reinforcements in an emergency—will be demonstrated.

When two opposing armies both have large fleets of war aeroplanes, and these machines take the air in squadrons, prior to a battle, what will happen when they come in contact with each other?

The question is one which the greatest military experts are discussing. Obviously, there will be an aerial battle, each aeroplane corps seeking to cripple the other. Each Commander-in-Chief will in fact desire, above all else, to obtain supremacy of the air. If he can do so, it will have the effect of seriously handicapping his opponent.

Thus—probably waged with light guns firing explosive shells—the next great war will begin, not on earth, but several thousand feet in the air.

Claude Grahame-White.

Harry Harper.

London, 1912.

*Contents*

PREFACE ........................................................... FIRST SECTION REVIEW OF PROGRESS PRIOR TO THE FIRST MILITARY TESTS OF AEROPLANES ..................................................... I. Dawn of flight—Encouragement in Europe and America—England’s lost opportunities—The pioneers. ................................ II. First practical flights—The Wright brothers; the Voisins; Farman—The cross-Channel flight. ................................ III. Aeroplanes at Rheims, 1909—Wright, Voisin, Farman, Blériot, Antoinette—The Gnome engine—First military orders. .............. IV. The human factor—Growing skill of airmen—Feats of 1910, as compared with those of 1909—Cross-country flying. ............... SECOND SECTION FIRST EXPERIMENTS WITH AEROPLANES IN THE FRENCH AUTUMN MANOEUVRES, 1910. .......................................... I. The historic Picardy tests—First official report upon movements of troops, as gleaned by aeroplane. ............................. II. Second conclusive test—Detecting an army in retreat—France’s determination to possess an air-fleet. .......................... THIRD SECTION THE GROWING AIR-FLEETS OF FOREIGN NATIONS ........... I. Activity in France—Two hundred machines at the end of 1911; a thousand promised by the year 1914. ............................. II. The great French tests of military aeroplanes—Striking results obtained—Era of fast, "air-worthy," weight-carrying machines. ... III. Germany’s aerial policy—Secret energies in creating a fleet of war aeroplanes—Rivalry with France. .......................... IV. Progress in Russia, America, and other countries-England’s position in the autumn of 1911. ................................. FOURTH SECTION IMPORTANCE OF ORGANISATION IN THE USE OF WAR AEROPLANES ........................................................ I. French plans for the concerted use of squadrons of machines in time of war. .................................................... II. Value of air-stations—Selection of landing-grounds—Preparing air-maps. ....................................................... FIFTH SECTION ENGLAND’S POSITION IN REGARDS TO MILITARY FLYING .... I. Lessons which were ignored—Work of the Parliamentary Aerial Defence Committee. .............................................. II. Policy of "moving cautiously"—Peril of lagging behind in aerial armament. ................................................ III. The financial aspect—Money England is spending—The airship policy—Insufficient provision for aeroplanes. ................... IV. Dangers of a policy of "drift"—Experience which money cannot buy—Trained men, not so much as machines, the criterion of strength. ....................................................... V. England’s official awakening—The training of 100 airmen—The forthcoming trials of military machines. ........................ SIXTH SECTION WAR AEROPLANES AT THE PARIS AERONAUTICAL EXHIBITION, DECEMBER, 1911 .................................................... I. Latest-type military monoplanes—Two-seated, reconnoitring machines—Single-seated, high-speed aircraft. .................... II. Latest developments in biplane construction—The engine-in-front, weight-carrying machine. ....................... III. Healthy position of the French industry—What England has lacked—Danger of neglecting home builders. ...................... SEVENTH SECTION WHAT EXISTING WAR AEROPLANES CAN ACTUALLY ACCOMPLISH I. Plight of a Commander-in-Chief without an aeroplane corps—The work of cavalry reconnaissance. ................................. II. Work of a squadron of air-scouts described—Tasks of the pilot and observer—Combined reconnaissance by many machines—Effect of aeroplanes upon tactics. ........................................ III. Other uses of the war aeroplane—Surveying—Dispatch-carrying—Directing gun-fire—Transport of staff officers. .............................................. EIGHTH SECTION WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY AND PHOTOGRAPHY AS AIDS TO AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE .................................................... I. First tests and successes with wireless telegraphy—Difficulty of equipping an aeroplane with transmitting plant. .............. II. French triumphs with wireless telegraphy—Messages sent over a distance of thirty-five miles. .................................. III. Practical uses of wireless upon aeroplanes—England’s lack of effort. ......................................................... IV. Photography from a war aeroplane—The use of special automatic cameras. ........................................................ NINTH SECTION DEVELOPMENT OF ALL-WEATHER WAR AEROPLANES ........... I. Flights in thirty-five-mile-an-hour winds—Arguments of sceptics—What the great contests of 1911 proved. ................ II. Value of high speed, when combating a wind—Constructional difficulties of a hundred-mile-an-hour machine. ................. III. Variable-speed aeroplane—Plans for constructing aircraft of this type—Advantages of such a machine. ......................... IV. Power-plant of aeroplanes—Fitting two engines to obviate involuntary descents. ........................................... TENTH SECTION THE TRAINING OF ARMY AIRMEN ......................... I. French thoroughness—An expert’s tribute—Sound training all-important. .................................................. II. How the military airman is "schooled"—His course of instruction described. .......................................... III. Rules for training—Dummy aeroplanes—A pupil’s first "hops." . IV. Cross-country flights—The _vol plané_—Difficulty of first observation tests from an aeroplane. ............................ V. Finishing work at French schools—Practical tests—German thoroughness—Energy of English officers. ........................ ELEVENTH SECTION THE COST OF WAR AEROPLANES ....................... I. Why manufacturers charge high prices—Cost of experimental work—Building of trial machines. ................................ II. Economy of a large military order for machines—The incidental expenses. ....................................................... III. Question of renewals—General cheapness of an air-corps, as compared with other forms of armament. .......................... OUR AERIAL PROGRAMME FOR 1912-13 .................................. TWELFTH SECTION PROBLEM OF ARTILLERY FIRE AND THE AEROPLANE ....... I. Conflicting opinions as to an aeroplane’s vulnerability—Experiments which have been carried out. .......... II. Shrapnel shell—Question of hitting a vital part of the aeroplane—Difficulty of identifying friend or foe. .............. THIRTEENTH SECTION DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIALITIES OF WEIGHT-CARRYING AEROPLANES ........................................................ I. What a modern-type machine can raise—Load of two men, and explosives. ..................................................... II. Effect of aerial bombardment upon cities and troops—German tests. .......................................................... FOURTEENTH SECTION WAR IN THE AIR BETWEEN HOSTILE AEROPLANES ...... I. Certainty of a combat between aeroplanes in actual warfare—Air-scouts protected by aerial "cruisers." .............. II. An encounter in the air—Importance to an army of an aerial victory. ........................................................ FIFTEENTH SECTION VALUE OF THE AEROPLANE IN NAVAL WARFARE ......... I. Machines for coastal and high-seas work—Question of flying in winds. .......................................................... II. Interesting tests—Machines for rising from water, and landing on a ship’s deck. ............................................... SIXTEENTH SECTION AERIAL WORK IN THE FRENCH AND GERMAN AUTUMN MANOEUVRES, 1911 .................................................. I. French successes—Proof of the value of organisation—Flights in high winds. ..................................................... II. Work in the German manœuvres—An instance of the utility of air-scouts—Reconnoitring from high altitudes. ................... III. Aeroplanes in actual warfare—What Italian airmen accomplished in Tripoli—Scouting and bomb-dropping under service conditions. . IV. A final word—Conclusions to be arrived at—Problems outstanding. ....................................................

*Illustrations*

CLAUDE GRAHAME-WHITE. Winner of the Gordon-Bennett Aviation Cup, 1910; author of "The Story of the Aeroplane"; and joint author, with Harry Harper, of "The Aeroplane: Past, Present, and Future," "Heroes of the Air," and "The Aeroplane in War." .......................... THE NIEUPORT MONOPLANE. Photo, M. Branger. This exceedingly interesting machine, which won the great French Military Trials, is generally admitted to be one of the most efficient flying machines in existence. A similar machine can be seen at work in Hendon, where it is piloted by Mr. Grahame-White. ............................... BRITISH-BUILT SCOUTING MONOPLANE. This aircraft, an exceedingly fast, single-seated machine, represents the type of machine now favoured by French authorities for urgent, rapid, general reconnaissance. Its constructors are Messrs. Short Brothers. ...... READY FOR A SCOUTING FLIGHT. Here a latest-type reconnoitring monoplane, with its observer in the front seat and the pilot behind him, is seen just about to start upon an aerial voyage. The machine is a British-built Bristol, such as will be used in the forthcoming military trials. .................................................. TWO-SEATED, BRITISH-BUILT WAR MACHINE. The Blackburn military-type monoplane, with accomodation for pilot and observer, has already made many successful flights; and it is expected to perform meritoriously in the War Office trials. In some respects it resembles the graceful Antoinette. ................................ THE ENGINE-IN-FRONT BIPLANE. With the above machine—a type increasingly used for Service work—the Naval officers now experimenting at Eastchurch, Isle of Sheppy, have been carrying out recent tests. It was designed, and built, by Messrs. Short Brothers, who are now constructing special aeroplanes for Naval use. ........ MILITARY BIPLANE WITH TWO ENGINES. This exceedingly interesting machine, which possesses especial significance from the military point of view, is equipped with two Gnome motors. One drives two propellers placed in front of the main-planes, and the other actuates a single rear propeller. Normally, both engines run at easy speed; but, should one fail in flight, the other, by being accelerated, will maintain the machine in the air. Its designers and builders are Messrs. Short Brothers. .............................. BUILDING WAR AEROPLANES. In this picture—taken in the Bristol works—skilled artizans are seen busy with the building of the bodies of a consignment of military-type monoplanes. Although apparently frail, these frameworks are—owing to their method of construction—immensely strong. .................................... WEIGHT-CARRYING WAR BIPLANE. By Fitting "extensions" to the upper main-plane of the machine, as seen above, it is possible to achieve sustained flight with two, or even three occupants—or, should necessity arise, with a pilot and an appreciable load of explosives! The actual machine photographed is a Bristol, flying over the Brooklands aerodrome. ............................................. WAR MONOPLANES "VOL PLANE." In the above picture, a two-seated, military type Bristol monoplane is seen descending, with engine stopped and propeller motionless, from a reconnoitring flight. Pilot and passenger are plainly discernable. ............................ MAPS FOR MILITARY AIRMEN. Photo, M. Roe. The French authorities are busy with the preparation of a complete set of "air maps" for the use of the military pilots, when flying from point to point. A section of one of these maps—which are coloured—is illustrated above. ............................................................ THE PILOT’S SEAT. Photo, M. Branger. In the illustration above is seen the driving seat of a military-type Blériot monoplane, with the airman’s map, in its case, fixed immediately before him. .......... PILOT AND "OBSERVER." Photo, M. Roe. The above photograph shows a military-type Breguet biplane, as used in the French manœuvres, with pilot and observer in their places. ............................... MILITARY AIRMAN’S REPORT. Photo, M. Branger. After descending from a reconnoitring flight on a Blériot monoplane, in the French manœuvres, the pilot seen above is imparting details of what he has observed to another officer. ...................................... TRANSPORT OF WAR AEROPLANES Photo, M. Roe. In the manner depicted above—and also by means of motor lorries—were military aeroplanes transported from point to point during the French manœuvres. ...... MOTOR TRANSPORT. Photo, M. Branger. This picture shows how a Breguet military biplane, with its main-planes folded by the sides of its body, can be towed from point to point behind a motor-lorry. ...... TRAVELLING WORKSHOP. Photo, M. Branger. In the French manœuvres, a completely-equipped aeroplane repair shop, in the form of a motor-wagon, followed the military airmen as they moved from point to point. One of these invaluable "ateliers" is pictured above. ...

FIRST SECTION REVIEW OF PROGRESS PRIOR TO THE FIRST MILITARY TESTS OF AEROPLANES

I. Dawn of flight—Encouragement in Europe and America—England’s lost opportunities—The pioneers.

In order to pave the way for a description of what the war aeroplane, as we know it to-day, can accomplish, it is necessary to trace—although only briefly—the development of the heavier-than-air machine during recent years.

One fact immediately claims the attention of any student of this question. He sees that England might to-day, had she not shown initial apathy, be the first nation in the world in the fostering, and development, of aerial navigation.

Instead of holding such a proud position, however—and any nation may well be proud of having encouraged this new art—we suffer for having displayed a lack of interest in the conquest of the air, and for having given practically no help to far-seeing enthusiasts who first devoted themselves to the great problem.

There was no lack of pioneers in England; but, instead of giving them assistance, we discouraged them, with the result that such countries as France and Germany—wide awake to all forms of progress—have moved forward from one triumph to another.

More than a hundred years ago, for instance, England had an opportunity of displaying a definite interest in flying. Sir George Cayley, a remarkably clever engineer, turned his attention to the design of a flying machine, and actually produced, in the year 1809, plans of a machine which anticipated many constructional features of the monoplane as it is built to-day. Of course there was not, in those days, any such efficient motive power as is now supplied by the petrol engine; but Sir George Cayley lectured upon his ideas, and sought to interest people in them. Had his deductions been greeted with enthusiasm, it is not probable that any successful flying machine would immediately have been produced; the difficulty of finding a reliable propelling medium would have prevented this. But what a ready and encouraging acceptance of Sir George Cayley’s pioneer work would inevitably have done, would have been to turn the minds of other inventors towards the problem, and so pave the way for a series of discoveries, each more important than its predecessor.

The imaginations of those who might have exercised a great influence upon future progress were not fired, however; and the same remark applies to the efforts of those who followed in Sir George Cayley’s footsteps, and endeavoured to give his ideas more practical shape.

Stringfellow and Henson, for example, pored over the great engineer’s drawings, and produced working models of a flying machine. Their apparatus was crude, it is true; but this toil represented so many steps forward along the path of progress. It had been man’s ambition, for centuries, to fly; success could not be expected without infinite labour. Nothing definite came of the work of these pioneers, however. They had little encouragement; they were regarded as "cranks." The importance of the work they were engaged upon was not, indeed, realised.

Now, as a striking contrast, let us turn to the reception which early enthusiasts received in other countries. Let us take France, for example. Ader, an electrical engineer, devised, in 1896, a very ingenious, bat-like aeroplane. With it, having fitted a small steam-engine, he actually achieved a short flight—or, rather, a brief "hop" from the ground.

Instead of being greeted apathetically, or having his sanity doubted, Ader was promptly called to appear before the military authorities. They, after hearing his theories expounded, cheerfully voted him £20,000 in order that he might continue his experiments upon an adequate scale. Thus, even at this early stage, France revealed her keen interest in aerial navigation. Ader, lacking the petrol motor, could not carry his investigations much further. But the encouragement he received gave heart to other inventors. And so France went forward to success.

America offers another example of a sane, far-seeing policy. Professor Langley, an eminent scientist, was making a series of wonderfully interesting model aeroplanes at about the time Ader was experimenting in France. To further his work, the American authorities very promptly came forward with a grant of £10,000.

He, like Ader, was unable to carry his individual experiments to a successful issue; but further investigation, on the part of other workers, was greatly stimulated. It is interesting to note what position these two countries, which first encouraged flying, afterwards took when the aeroplane became a reality.

To America, in the work of the Wright brothers, has gone the honour of the first practical flights with a heavier-than-air machine, while France is to-day the premier nation in the world in the development of airmanship.

Thus it is legitimate to pass to a consideration of the first machines that flew, and consider their capabilities from the military point of view. The Wright biplane, naturally, is the first to attract attention, because it was as long ago as 1903 that these two quiet, determined Americans made their first successful flights. From a military aspect, this aeroplane had many drawbacks; and to cite them is instructive, seeing that, by this means, a reader will be better able to judge, later on, what vast strides towards perfection the aeroplane has already made.

The first Wright biplane would, indeed, just fly; that was all. Its pilot only dared to leave the ground when an absolutely dead calm prevailed; he feared the overturning influence of even the smallest gust of wind. His engine, being then a novelty as applied to the aeroplane, required the most patient "tuning up" before even a brief flight could be essayed; and, when it was aloft, the machine only passed through the air quite close to the ground.

Each flight had to be started by sliding the aeroplane forward along a rail; away from this rail, the machine was helpless. From the point of view of a military expert, indeed, this early machine could have been condemned upon several counts. It was unreliable. It could not fly in gusty winds; it was not portable; it could only take the air when launched from its rail.

But the true expert is far-seeing. He makes light of present imperfections if, in any idea, he can see future developments of undoubted importance. Such an expert, for instance, was the late Captain Ferber, of the French Army. He was the first military officer to whom the task fell of reporting, for his Government, upon the capabilities of a military aeroplane.

Representations were made by the Wright brothers to the French Government in the year 1905—two years after their first flights. They had improved their machine considerably; they were now ready to carry a passenger; and they wished to sell their secret. So Captain Ferber was instructed to go to America and investigate their claims.

The Wrights were anxious to sell their secret for a lump sum of money. They had begun their experiments in the humblest possible way, being small cycle-makers at Dayton, Ohio; and they were unable to protect, by patents, the machine which they had evolved by so vast an amount of patient work.

Thus they sought to enter into negotiations with some Government. They asked for a guarantee that their machine would be bought, for a certain price, were it to perform a series of stipulated flights. Their position was, as a matter of fact, a somewhat awkward one. Even a brief examination of their aeroplane, by an expert, would have revealed its principle.

In this quandary, they were led to approach the French Government. They chose France for a very good reason. Already, as has been indicated, this country was keenly alive to the possibilities of flying. The two brothers imagined, therefore, that they would be able to make their best bargain with the French Government.

The practical interest which the French authorities took in the question of military flying was evidenced by their action when they received a communication from the Wright brothers. Although reports of the Wrights’ experiments had been greeted, in Europe, with great scepticism, and there was reason, in view of the failure of other inventors, to doubt their claims, the French Government at once detailed Captain Ferber to make the long journey to Ohio, so as to go into the matter in a business-like way.

Captain Ferber, who was one of the first officers in France to become actively interested in airmanship, duly visited America, and interviewed the Wright brothers. They could not show him their machine. Had they done so, their secret would have been revealed. Regarding the flights which they had made, up to this time, Captain Ferber had to rely, for testimony, upon the statements of certain responsible men living in Dayton, who had witnessed them.

The position, so far as he was concerned, was rather an unsatisfactory one. It was like buying "a pig in a poke." But this officer, being a student of character, and an enthusiast regarding flight, saw what manner of men these two brothers were. He did not doubt their word, nor the statements of those who had seen them fly. So, when he returned to France, he recommended his Government to enter into negotiations with the Wrights, and buy their invention before any other nation took steps to secure it.

It was a tribute to his foresight that he should have done this; but, for the time being, the negotiations fell through. The Wrights, for one thing, wanted a very considerable sum of money; and there was difficulty, also, in arranging what the series of tests of their aeroplane should be. Thus it was that, after many communications had passed between the interested parties, the matter stood in abeyance.

In the meantime, however, other inventors were striving with the great problem. In France, in 1906, Santos-Dumont effected "hops" with a machine like an exaggerated box-kite; and this led the way to the remarkable achievements of two particularly clever brothers, Charles and Gabriel Voisin. They busied themselves with a biplane which, at the end of 1907, they asked Henry Farman, a well-known racing motorist, to test for them.

This led to the first famous flights of the Voisin machine at the military parade-ground of Issy-les-Moulineaux, outside Paris. France went wild with enthusiasm when this big, clumsy machine, piloted by the quick, agile Farman, succeeded in flying for a mile, and in making a turn while in the air.

The Voisin aeroplane needed to run along the ground for quite a hundred yards before it could gain sufficient support from the air to enable it to rise. When it did so, it was only just able to skim along above the ground. Compared with present-day aeroplanes, it was an unwieldly, unsatisfactory machine; and, to make matters worse, its motor became overheated after only a minute or so’s running.

As a machine for military purposes, it would have been useless. But it represented a definite stage in the progress of aeroplaning. From this machine of the Voisin brothers, which Farman first flew, developed the great school of biplane construction in France.

Also experimenting in France, at the same time as the Voisin brothers, was another great master of flight—M. Louis Blériot. His methods were original. He pinned his faith to the monoplane.

II. First practical flights—The Wright brothers; the Voisins; Farman—The cross-Channel flight.

Hastening our review, in order to reach matters of more definite interest from the military point of view, we find that, in 1908, the Wright brothers made aerial history by a series of magnificent flights which were, however, unfortunately marred by a tragedy.

Coming to France, Wilbur Wright flew for a couple of hours, without descending, at Le Mans. At about the same time, in America, Orville Wright was carrying out a series of demonstrations before the military authorities. He achieved remarkable success, particularly from a war point of view, by carrying a passenger in his machine for quite a long flight.

[Illustration: THE NIEUPORT MONOPLANE. Photo, M. Branger. This exceedingly interesting machine, which won the great French Military Trials, is generally admitted to be one of the most efficient flying machines in existence. A similar machine can be seen at work in Hendon, where it is piloted by Mr. Grahame-White.]

Then, when taking up Lieutenant Selfridge, of the American army, he met with disaster. One of the propellers of his machine broke; it crashed to the ground from a height of about 100 feet. Lieutenant Selfridge was killed, being the first victim of the aeroplane, and Orville Wright broke his thigh. The accident, as may be imagined, cast a gloom over flying in America for a long time.

Longer flights by Henry Farman, on an improved Voisin biplane, were also to be noted in the year 1908; and thus the way is cleared for a description of the wonders achieved in 1909, when it may be said that the importance of the aeroplane, from a military point of view, was first demonstrated, and the attention of nations seriously directed towards the possibilities of this new "arm."

Early in the summer of 1909, after innumerable disappointments, and the breaking-up of many experimental machines, Blériot began to achieve success with a simply-constructed monoplane, driven by an equally simple three-cylinder petrol motor; and, at the same time, another French monoplane, the Antoinette, larger than Blériot’s, and having an eight-cylinder motor developing sixty horse-power, was also flying surprisingly well.

It was in July, 1909, that these two machines, representing a distinct type, when compared with the biplane, were brought down to the French coast at Calais with the intention of invading England by air, and winning a prize of £1000 offered by the _Daily Mail_. Piloting his small monoplane was M. Blériot himself, while the Antoinette was flown by Mr Hubert Latham, an airman already famed for his daring.

The method of Blériot’s arrival at Calais gave promise of the eventual utility of his machine from the military point of view. The two wings of his monoplane could easily be detached. They were then folded on either side of the body of the machine; and, thus dismantled, it could be placed for transport upon an ordinary railway truck.

In this fashion it reached Calais, greatly to the surprise of those who had, hitherto, only been familiar with the huge cases needed for the transport of biplanes. When taken from the railway van, the monoplane was tied with ropes behind a motor-car, and ran upon its own pneumatic-tyred wheels to the shelter prepared for it near the sand-hills of Les Baraques, a mile or so from Calais.

Blériot, as history records, won the £1000 prize by flying across the Channel from France to England, just after the dawn on 25th July, 1909. He landed near Dover Castle, after a flight of thirty-seven minutes. Latham, unfortunate with his engine, made two attempts at the crossing, but fell into the sea on both occasions.

Blériot’s feat made a deep impression upon all thoughtful men, and particularly upon the military authorities in France. If such a flight could be achieved with a small, crude machine, what might not be possible with a perfected apparatus? This, naturally, was the question which was asked.

In the next important demonstration of the possibilities of flight, which was made at the Rheims flying meeting, held in August, 1909, the French Government took a very active interest. They sent special representatives to this meeting—the first of its kind—to study the various types of flying machines which took part in the contests organised. As a further instance of the practical ideas already being displayed by military men in France, it may be mentioned that one of the competitors at this memorable flying meeting was the French officer whose work has previously been mentioned—Captain Ferber. He flew a Voisin biplane. It was not, unfortunately, very long after the Rheims meeting that this enthusiastic military airman met with his death at Boulogne, his loss being sincerely mourned by the French Government. His biplane overturned in a ditch, and he was killed by the heavy motor, which was torn from its bed, and fell upon him.

III. Aeroplanes at Rheims, 1909—Wright, Voisin, Farman, Blériot, Antoinette—The Gnome engine—First military orders.

Seeing that the Rheims meeting of 1909 was the first occasion upon which a definite military inspection of aeroplanes was made, it should be interesting to describe the machines which were then available. Let us take, for example, the Wright biplane, of which we have previously spoken. This machine, as piloted at Rheims by Lefevre, Tissandier, and the Comte de Lambert, undoubtedly proved itself one of the best all-round machines then in existence.

The aeroplane represented the usual biplane form of building, having one sustaining plane fixed above another, the two being held apart by wooden struts, made taut by cross-wiring.

In front of these main-planes, upon outriggers, was a small double-plane elevator. At the rear of the main-planes, also carried upon outriggers, was a double-plane vertical rudder. The engine of the machine, set upon a wooden bed on the lower plane, actuated two wooden propellers, which—driven by chains—revolved in opposite directions behind the main-planes.

The pilot’s seat was on the front edge of the lower main-plane, and his control of the aeroplane, when in flight, was effected by means of two levers. One, moved forward and backward, actuated the elevating planes, and the other was given a dual motion. Moved to and fro, it operated the rudder of the aeroplane. Shifted from side to side, it warped the rear extremities of the main-planes, and so controlled the lateral stability of the aeroplane.

This wing-warping mechanism was, as a matter of fact, one of the salient features of the Wright biplane. The system is considered to be the most efficacious method of combating the effect of wind-gusts when an aeroplane is in flight.

In operation, this wing-warping device was simple. When the airman discovered that his machine was tilting over one side, owing to a sudden inequality in wind pressure, he quickly warped down the plane-ends on the side of the biplane that was depressed. The result was that there was increased wind-pressure under the plane-ends warped down, thus tending to force the machine back again upon an even keel.

The pilot who distinguished himself greatly at Rheims, when flying the Wright biplane, was Lefevre; but this daring airman was, unfortunately, killed shortly afterwards at Juvisy, when testing a new machine. At Rheims he circled in the air, and effected sharp turns, in an altogether remarkable way, demonstrating an absolutely complete control over his machine. So impressed were the representatives of the French Government by the performance of the Wright biplane, that they ordered several machines for military use. This represented their first definite order for aeroplanes for war purposes.

The chief drawback of the Wright biplane, in comparison with other machines flown at this time, was that it needed to make a start into the air from a launching rail, as has previously been mentioned.

The advantage of this system of starting—in which a weight, dropped from a derrick, gave the aeroplane its initial impetus along the rail—was that the machine could be fitted with a lower-powered engine.

But the disadvantages were obvious. Were an involuntary descent made at a point some distance away from the machine’s rail, it had to be carted back to the starting-point, or a rail and derrick brought to the place where it lay. However, the French Government did not regard any aeroplanes at this time as representing serviceable war weapons. They took the wise view that they were purely instructional craft, upon which military airmen could gain experience, and so fit themselves for the use of the more perfect machines which were likely to be evolved as time went on.

After describing the Wright biplane, we may now consider the Voisin machine. This aeroplane represented an improvement upon the type first piloted by Farman at Issy-les-Moulineaux. It had two main supporting planes, like those of the Wright biplane, fitted one above another. In front of the main-planes was a single horizontal elevating plane. At the rear of the biplane was a large cellular stabilising tail, made up of horizontal and vertical planes, and resembling a box-kite. In the centre of this cellular tail was the rudder, a single vertical plane.

Instead of adopting a wing-warping device, for maintaining lateral stability, the Voisin brothers fitted vertical planes, or curtains as they were called, between their main-planes. These, when the machine was in flight, resisted any sideway roll and, in conjunction with movements of the rudder, gave the aeroplane a certain amount of automatic stability.

The biplane rested upon a chassis made of hollow metal tubing. It had pneumatic-tyred bicycle wheels, mounted in connection with heavy springs, to resist the shock of landing after a flight. Small wheels bore the weight of the tail when the aeroplane was running along the ground.

An engine of sixty horse-power, fitted upon the lower plane, drove a two-bladed metal propeller, placed behind the main-planes. The pilot, seated midway between the planes, operated a wheel like that of a motor-car. He pushed it away from him, or drew it back, to operate the elevating plane, and turned it sideways to actuate the rudder.

This machine had the advantage over the Wright biplane that it was not dependent upon a starting rail. But, in general comparison with the Wright machine, it was heavy and sluggish. It required a long run before it would lift into the air, and its engine-power, although twice that of the Wright biplane, was only just sufficient to make it fly. In a side wind, owing to the influence which the gusts exerted upon the vertical panels which were fitted between the main-planes, it made an appreciable amount of "lee-way," which rendered steering difficult.

Altogether, regarded from the point of view of experts to-day, it was a heavy, awkward machine. But it flew, and flew steadily. And anything that flew, in the year 1909, represented a triumph. Several famous airmen were piloting the Voisin biplane at the Rheims meeting, notably M. Louis Paulhan and M. Rougier.

From a military aspect, the Voisin biplane had many drawbacks. It was not at all portable; it could not rise quickly; it was slow-flying. But, with the very laudable intention of encouraging such ardent pioneers as the Voisin brothers, the French Government gave orders for certain military machines of this type.

Now we may turn to what was undoubtedly the most successful biplane at the great Rheims carnival—that designed and flown by Mr Henry Farman. This famous airman had, it will be remembered, first learned to fly upon a Voisin biplane. After piloting this machine in 1908, he turned his attention, early in 1909, to the design of a biplane which should be lighter and more efficient.

In this endeavour, he certainly succeeded. The biplane which he first flew in public at the Rheims meeting represented a distinct step forward in the development of this type of machine. In general construction, it was lighter than the Voisin machine, and it had other excellent features as well. Instead of the heavy, cellular tail, as fitted to the Voisin biplane, it had a lightly-constructed tail made up of two horizontal planes, with a vertical rudder fitted between them. In front of the main-planes, upon light wooden outriggers, was placed the horizontal elevating plane.

One of the features of this machine, was its method of obtaining lateral stability. Farman recognised the disadvantages of the vertical planes, as used in the Voisin machine. So he fitted small flaps, or horizontal planes, at the rear extremities of his mainplanes. These were hinged to the main-planes, and were termed "ailerons."

Their operation produced the same result as in the application of the wing-warping device of the Wright brothers. When the biplane tilted sideways in flight, the "ailerons" were drawn down, by means of controlling wires, on the side that was depressed. The air pressure, acting upon the surfaces of the "ailerons," forced the aeroplane back upon an even keel. When not in operation, the "ailerons" flew out straight in the wind, on a level with the main-planes.

The control of the Farman biplane was effected by means of a hand and foot lever. The hand lever, when moved forward or backward, operated the elevating plane. When shifted from side to side, it actuated the "ailerons." The pilot’s feet rested upon a pivoted bar, which he swung from side to side to move the rudder of the machine.

[Illustration: BRITISH-BUILT SCOUTING MONOPLANE. This aircraft, an exceedingly fast, single-seated machine, represents the type of machine now favoured by French authorities for urgent, rapid, general reconnaissance. Its constructors are Messrs. Short Brothers.]

Another constructional feature of this first Farman biplane was notable. This was the landing chassis. Appreciating the disadvantages of the Wright launching rail, and recognising that the Voisin chassis was heavy, Farman aimed at something lighter, and at the same time more efficient.

Again he succeeded. He devised a chassis which was a combination of wooden skids and bicycle wheels. Below his biplane, upon wooden uprights, were fitted two long wooden skids. On either side of each skid, were two little pneumatic-tyred bicycle wheels, connected by a short axle. The wheels were held in position on the skid by stout rubber bands, which passed over the axle.

Normally, the skids were raised off the ground by the wheels, upon which the biplane actually ran. But, in the case of a rather abrupt descent, the chassis was so designed that the wheels were forced up against their rubber bands, thus allowing the skids of the machine to come into contact with the ground. Then, when the force of the shock had been absorbed, the wheels came into play again. With this biplane, Farman achieved fine flights at Rheims.

Apart from its constructional excellence, the biplane was fitted with a motor which was destined to have a remarkable influence upon the development of flying—and upon military aviation in particular. This was the seven-cylinder, revolving "Gnome." To-day, the application of this wonderful engine is practically universal. In August, 1909, it was regarded quite as a freak, and was seen for the first time upon Henry Farman’s biplane.

Up to the time when this motor was introduced, makers had, in designing aeroplane engines, followed very largely upon motor-car design, constructing motors with fixed cylinders, either upright, or in "V" shape, and with their parts lightened wherever possible. Some were water-cooled; others air-cooled. But with both systems, and particularly with the latter, the tendency—owing to the high speeds at which the engines had to turn—was to overheat, and either lose power, or stop altogether.

The specially-lightened water-cooling systems which were devised gave a great deal of trouble; and, in the case of air-cooled engines, it was usually found almost impossible to prevent overheating, after the engines had been running for ten minutes or a quarter of an hour.

In the case of the "Gnome," the designer struck out in a new line. Instead of making his cylinders fixed, and his crank-shaft revolving, as was the method with other engines, he set his seven cylinders revolving around the crank-shaft. Petrol and oil he fed to the cylinders by way of the stationary hollow crank-shaft.

The internal complications of this engine, in the opinion of experts who first saw it, were such that it could not be expected to achieve reliability.

But it did, nevertheless; and it ran so well, in fact, that, at the Rheims meeting, Henry Farman remained in the air, while using it, for more than three hours, and won the prize for the longest flight.

The advantages of this remarkable engine proved to be many. In the first instance, its method of construction enabled it to be built remarkably light; and the fact that the seven cylinders revolved, generally at a speed of 1000 revolutions a minute, effectually disposed of cooling difficulties. In fact, the engine automatically cooled itself; and its fly-wheel effect, as it flew round, gave a smooth, even thrust to the propeller.

From the very day of its first introduction, the "Gnome" motor gained overwhelming success. It represented a piece of mechanism made specially for the work in hand, and not a motor-car engine adapted to aerial purposes. This fact was the secret of its success.

As rapidly as they could acquire them, other aeroplane makers fitted "Gnomes" to their machines. It proved all-conquering. Fixed-cylinder engines did not languish completely, however. Some of them were steadily improved, and performed reliable work. But the "Gnome" was then, and is now, regarded as _the_ aeroplane engine.

The Farman biplane, being so good a machine in itself, and being equipped, in addition, with so excellent a motor, naturally aroused keen military interest; and it was not long before the inventor received Government orders for his machine. At this time, before the monoplane had assumed the commanding position which it now holds, the Farman biplane certainly represented the premier aeroplane of the day.

Two more machines, which were flown at the first carnival of flight at Rheims, merit careful description. These were the Blériot and Antoinette monoplanes. Blériot’s machine, of the type upon which he crossed the Channel, was especially interesting.

Its simplicity was, as has been stated, its great recommendation. Upon either side of a tubular body, built up of light woodwork, and partly covered in with fabric, were the two supporting planes, outstretched like the wings of a bird, and supported by wires, above and below.

In the front of the body was the engine, which developed about twenty-five horse-power, and had three air-cooled cylinders. At the rear extremity of the body, which projected some little distance behind the lifting planes, was a small stabilising and weight-carrying plane, the end portions of which, on either side, were capable of being moved up and down. Behind this plane, fitted to the end of the body, was a small vertical rudder.

The pilot sat in the body of the machine, a little behind the engine, and on a level with the rear extremities of his wings. His method of control was extremely simple. Rising up between his knees was a metal _cloche_, or lever. This he shifted forward or backward to make his machine rise or fall, the movement of the lever actuating the extremities of the rear stabilising plane.

For maintaining the lateral stability of the monoplane, he moved the same lever from side to side. This action drew down, or warped, the rear portion of the supporting planes—effecting the same action, in fact, as produced in the case of the Wright biplane. When wishing to make a turn, the pilot pushed from side to side a bar upon which his feet rested. This moved the rudder at the rear of the body.

Already, as can be seen, the control of an aeroplane in flight had become more or less standardised. One lever was usually employed for elevating and lowering the machine, and also for controlling lateral movements. Steering was effected, as a rule, by movements of the pilot’s feet.

Another machine, representing these first types, which it will be necessary to describe, is the Antoinette monoplane. This machine had, and has still, many original features. It was, to begin with, a very ambitiously-designed machine. It had very large and strongly-built wings. These were set at a dihedral angle, so as to increase the machine’s stability. The engine, developing sixty horse-power, was fixed in the bow. The body of the machine, which was appreciably longer than that of the Blériot monoplane, ended in fixed horizontal and vertical planes, or "fins," rather resembling the feathering of an arrow. Hinged horizontal planes, at the extremity of the tail, provided means for elevating or lowering the machine. Vertical rudders were also fitted.

The controlling mechanism was original. On either side of the pilot, as he sat well back in the body of the monoplane, was a wheel. These wheels he turned when he wished to rise or descend, or correct the lateral stability of the monoplane.

By means of this wheel control, which locked the planes in any desired position, a very fine adjustment was possible. But the manipulation of the wheels, with which separate movements had to be made with each hand, was declared by many airmen to be difficult to learn. On the first of the Antoinette machines, it should be mentioned, "ailerons," or balancing flaps, were used to control lateral stability. Afterwards, however, wing-warping was adopted, and adhered to.

Such were the first aeroplanes, as seen at Rheims in the year 1909. Other more experimental machines there were, too, which did not figure prominently at the time, but which were destined to play a prominent part in future work. In this regard should be mentioned the R.E.P. monoplane, designed and built by M. Esnault Pelterie, and the Breguet biplane, designed, built, and flown by M. Louis Breguet.

IV. The human factor—Growing skill of airmen—Feats of 1910, as compared with those of 1909—Cross-country flying.

What the aeroplanes which we have been describing could not do was to combat a wind. No flight was essayed, indeed, unless weather conditions were quite favourable. A notable exception must, however, be made in the favour of the Antoinette monoplane. This aircraft, owing to its weight and stability, and the skilful and daring handling of Mr Latham was, on several occasions in 1909, and notably at the Blackpool flying meeting, able to remain aloft in very high and gusty winds.

Apart from the question of wind-flying, which was, of course, all-important, there were grave structural drawbacks in connection with many of these early machines. Some were too light; others too heavy. Save with those upon which the "Gnome" engine was fitted, there was almost constant engine trouble.

Above all, however, the human factor entered into the question. Men were _learning_ to fly. Apart from any consideration of the good or bad points of their machines, they were invading a new element. As one shrewd observer, at this time, remarked: "The men who fly now are like those who first ventured upon the sea in frail cockle-shells. They tremble at their own daring."

More might have been accomplished in 1909, in fact, had men possessed greater confidence.

Take, for example, the attempts which were made, at the Rheims meeting, to win the altitude prize. To the amazement of spectators, one pilot rose until he flew slightly more than 500 feet high. This feat was, in 1909, considered a marvellous one. In 1911, only two years later, a man rose to an altitude of nearly two-and-a-half miles! The heights attained in 1909 could, indeed, have been appreciably increased had men possessed the necessary confidence in themselves, and in their machines, to force them higher.

But, in these pioneer days, a height of 150 feet or 200 feet from the ground was considered quite an appreciable altitude. Nowadays, when carrying out a long cross-country flight, an airman will fly several thousand feet high. Thus it can be seen what definite progress has been made in this aspect of flying alone.

High-flying has considerable importance. The airman who does not soar high, when going across country, meets the worst of whatever wind is blowing. It eddies from hill-tops, and around woods. The higher he flies, therefore, the steadier the wind blows, because it is unaffected by any inequalities of the ground. This is why the great cross-country flyers invariably ascend to a considerable altitude.

In the year 1909, it may truly be said, men were really learning to fly. Their machines were crude, and they were invading a new element. Therefore they made comparatively short flights, and confined nearly all their operations to aerodromes, where there was always a smooth place of descent below them, should the failure of their engines compel a hasty landing.

But, in 1910, a new and more daring spirit developed. With growing confidence, airmen soared higher and higher. Breezes no longer made them hasten to descend; and, with this new spirit of adventure, came the desire for cross-country flying, instead of monotonous circling round the aerodrome.

With the commencement of long flights across country from point to point, came the first practical opportunity for applying the aeroplane to military reconnoitring work. The first cross-country flights marked, indeed, a very definite stage in the development of the aeroplane; and it was in 1910 that the possibilities of the flying machine, in this regard, were demonstrated, on a convincing scale, by such aerial contests as the flight from London to Manchester, and the Circuit de L’Est in France—the first taking place early in the flying season of 1910, and the latter towards its end.

Two machines had, by this time, emerged as representing the best of their type. One was the Farman biplane, with the invincible "Gnome" motor; the other was the Blériot monoplane, now also equipped with the "Gnome." So far as distinction can be made, the Farman machine stood for ease of manipulation and general "air-worthiness"; while the Blériot represented the development of a small, portable, high-speed machine.

It was on the Farman biplane that M. Louis Paulhan flew, with one halt, the 183-miles aerial journey from London to Manchester; and Mr Grahame-White (one of the joint authors of this book), who also piloted a Farman, had the distinction of competing against him in what is now regarded as an historic contest.

In the Circuit de L’Est in France, Leblanc, the winner, flew some 400 miles on his Blériot monoplane, passing over all sorts of country, and finding his way accurately from point to point by means of his map and a special compass. He made frequent landings, without damaging his machine, and demonstrated its reliability in a most convincing way.

One question naturally arises, in any consideration of such flights as these, seeing that they were so greatly superior to anything that had been done in 1909. Had the aeroplanes which these pilots used been improved to any remarkable extent? In reply, it is certainly accurate to say that they had not. The "Gnome" engines with which they were fitted had, it is true, been strengthened in small ways, and perfected in the manufacture of certain delicate parts, the result being an even greater reliability in running than had first been attained.

As regards the aeroplanes, they were, in essentials, the same which had been flown in 1909. Their controlling mechanism was, for instance, unaltered. Their method of construction was practically the same, although experience had taught manufacturers the need of strengthening certain parts. Landing devices had been slightly improved, from the point of view of everyday wear.

Although aeroplanes and engines had both been improved a little, neither had been altered sufficiently to account for such a vast stride forward as was made in 1910. It was not to the machines, indeed, so much as to the men, that this striking progress was due.

Practice had begun to make perfect. Pilots now felt more comfortable when they were in the air. They had growing confidence in their aeroplanes. They had learned how to maintain stability when assailed by wind-gusts. Thus, they were ready to attempt far more ambitious flights.

SECOND SECTION FIRST EXPERIMENTS WITH AEROPLANES IN THE FRENCH AUTUMN MANOEUVRES, 1910.

I. The historic Picardy tests—First official report upon movements of troops, as gleaned by aeroplane.

After these introductory notes, intentionally brief, we are led to a consideration of the first practical tests to which aeroplanes were put, so far as their military use is concerned.

During the summer of 1910, the French authorities were instructing officers in the handling of machines. They had purchased several Voisin, Wright, and Farman biplanes, and possessed also a few monoplanes, including Blériots and Antoinettes.

For the autumn army manœuvres of 1910, which were due to take place in Picardy, it was decided to make as complete a test as possible of the value of the aeroplane as a scout in time of war. Ten or fifteen machines were requisitioned for the experiments, some being stationed with each of the manoeuvring forces.

To augment the military pilots, several civilian airmen readily gave their services, notably Mr Hubert Latham with his Antoinette, and M. Louis Paulhan, flying a Farman.

Although this was the first time aeroplanes had been used in mimic warfare, and although the airmen themselves, and the military authorities, were naturally unacquainted with the best methods of utilising the new "arm," astonishing results were nevertheless obtained.

Two French officers. Lieutenant Sido and Adjutant Menard, were highly successful in their work. This was due to the fact they had gone through a careful course of training and were, in consequence, familiar with the task of compiling precise and informing reports of all that they saw when upon a reconnoitring flight.

Lieutenant Sido acted as observer upon the Farman biplane which they were using, and Adjutant Menard undertook the work of pilot. The former carried maps with him, and made frequent notes as the machine flew from point to point.

The value of the work these two officers were able to perform, is best indicated by setting forth the actual result of two of their reconnoitring flights. On the first occasion, acting under definite instructions, they left a place named Poix at 6 a.m., and flew over a sixty-kilometre course, being an hour and five minutes in the air, before returning to their starting-point.

This is the form in which they presented their report to Headquarters:—

6.5 A.M.— At Thieuloy, three squadrons of _chasseurs-a-cheval_, hidden behind the southern edge of the village on the road from Thieuloy to St Maur.

6.30 A.M.— At Feuquieres, a brigade of infantry on the march eastward on the road from Feuquieres to Brombos. Head of main body just leaving Feuquieres. Six batteries of artillery parked south of Feuquieres.

6.32 A.M.— At point 1800 metres north of Feuquieres, two companies on outpost, one facing north and the other northeast, astride the Feuquieres-Sarcus road. One company has dug rifle-pits to the west, and the other company section trenches to the east of the road. A Blériot monoplane has just landed behind the company west of the road. We followed its flight for three minutes.

6.40 A.M.— Agneres—A company in column of route marching from Agneres towards Mereaucourt along the Saint Martin-de-Ponsis ravine.

The completeness and detail of this statement certainly surprised the officers who received it. No one, save a well-trained military observer, could have presented such a report. Its value was self-evident. It revealed, indeed, in a manner that was undeniable, the extremely useful work which could be done, in time of war, by a well-handled scouting aeroplane.

II. Second conclusive test—Detecting an army in retreat—France’s determination to possess an air-fleet.

On another early-morning flight, during these same Picardy manœuvres, Lieutenant Sido and Adjutant Menard made a second important aerial reconnaissance, surveying a specified tract of country occupied by the "enemy."

This was how they presented their report:—

5.56 A.M.— At Halloy, a cyclist company.

5.59 A.M.— Thieuloy—Sixteen squadrons of cavalry and six batteries at the southwest entrance to the village.

6.5 A.M.— South-west of Rothois—At the north point of Malmifet wood, a company and two batteries of artillery on the march towards Marseille-le-Petit.

6.7 A.M.— Haute-Epine—Northern entrance to the village, one company of infantry to the right and one to the left of the road. One company at point 188. One company in the village of Haute-Epine.

6.9 A.M.— At the cross-road to Lihus, a squadron of dragoons concealed behind the edge of the wood.

6.14 A.M.— On the road Cievecoeur-Marseille south of Lihus, a squadron on the march towards Marseille-le-Petit, and a troop in the village of Lihus.

6.16 A.M.— On the Lihus-Potangy road, a squadron and two machine-guns marching towards Marseille-le-Petit.

6.19 A.M.— South-west entrance to Cieve-coeur, three regiments of cavalry, including cuirassiers, and six batteries of artillery, in assembly formation.

"The value of these two reports," declared one of the chief French military experts, "cannot be overestimated. Each one exposed the dispositions of the enemy, and the information was obtained in a remarkably short space of time."

As regards the second report of the two air-scouts, it provided one remarkable instance of the practical value of the aeroplane in time of war. Upon the night before the airmen carried out their reconnaissance, the troops they were observing had been heavily attacked, and the Commander-in-Chief for whom they were acting was particularly anxious to know whether his enemy intended to hold its ground, or was about to fall back.

The aerial report, when received, threw a clear light upon this point. Mainly cavalry and rear-guards had been detected during the flight. It was obvious, therefore, that the enemy was in retreat. Such results as these convinced the military experts who were studying the manœuvres that the future of the aeroplane, at any rate from the reconnoitring point of view, was practically assured.

For the splendid work which he had accomplished, Lieutenant Sido received promotion, and his pilot, Adjutant Menard, was presented with the Cross of the Legion of Honour. Lieutenant Sido, explaining afterwards how he succeeded in setting out such terse and informing reports, made several interesting observations regarding the work of a military observer.

At first, he said, the man who attempted aerial scouting could not distinguish things below him with sufficient clearness. He himself had found that quite a number of flights were necessary before he could make anything like satisfactory or accurate observations. But practice, he added, was everything. Granted plenty of this, and sharp eyesight, he considered that an aerial observer should make few mistakes in reporting what he saw when in an aeroplane.

A military correspondent of _The Times_, who went through these manœuvres in Picardy, and thus had ample opportunity of studying the work of the air-scouts, declared afterwards: "In my belief the aeroplane, given a trained pilot, and a skilled observer, must revolutionise the whole service of reconnaissance." No statement could be more definite.

This, as has been said, was the first practical revelation of what an air-scout might accomplish in time of war. France was not slow to profit by the lesson. Without delay, she began to create an efficient aeroplane fleet. If feats such as those recorded in the Picardy manœuvres could be carried out with a few aeroplanes, what could not be achieved with highly-organised squadrons of machines? This, in effect, was the question which France asked herself.

[Illustration: READY FOR A SCOUTING FLIGHT. Here a latest-type reconnoitring monoplane, with its observer in the front seat and the pilot behind him, is seen just about to start upon an aerial voyage. The machine is a British-built Bristol, such as will be used in the forthcoming military trials.]

Third Section The Growing Air-Fleets Of Foreign Nations

I. Activity in France—Two hundred machines at the end of 1911; a thousand promised by the year 1914.

Practically all leading nations, with the exception of Great Britain, are now equipping themselves, on an adequate scale, with the war aeroplane.

At the time of the autumn manœuvres in 1910, France possessed about a dozen aeroplanes. But she soon increased this number, being full of enthusiasm, and determined upon a strong aerial policy.

Thus, an official report, which was presented at the end of 1910, showed that the French authorities had increased their fleet of machines, in two or three months, from a dozen to thirty-two. The list of the French war aeroplanes at this time was, it is interesting to note, made up as follows:—

───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Wright biplanes 5 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Blériot monoplanes 4 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── H. Farman biplanes 11 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── M. Farman biplanes 4 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Breguet biplanes 2 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Sommer biplanes 4 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Antoinette monoplanes 2 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

To pilot these thirty-two aeroplanes, there were, at this time, thirty-four fully-qualified military airmen.

The activity which prevailed, at the end of 1910, among the aeroplane manufacturers in France, is revealed in the report of one well-known maker, Mr Henry Farman.

He stated, on 6th December, 1910, that he had received orders for military machines as follows:—

───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── French Government 35 aeroplanes ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Russian " 20 " ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Spanish " 3 " ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Italian " 2 " ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Belgian " 1 " ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Japanese " 1 " ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── British " 1 " ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

The commanding position of France, in this one list, as compared with the single order of Great Britain, forms an illustration of the attitude of the two countries, at this time, towards military airmanship.

At M. Blériot’s flying school at Pau, early in February, 1911, the French Government had more than twenty officers learning to become airmen. No more striking indication could be found of the determination of this country to be in the forefront in aviation.

Early in the summer of 1911, the French War Minister authorised the purchase of close upon a hundred and fifty aeroplanes. Of these machines nearly a hundred were, at this time, actually in the possession of the military authorities. Among the orders placed with French manufacturers was one for eighty monoplanes. This was secured by M. Louis Blériot. Two types of machine were resented in this large commission, one being a two-seated machine, and the other a single-seated craft, capable of high speed.

To Mr Henry Farman, whose biplane had performed so meritoriously in the 1910 Picardy manœuvres, an order was placed for forty war machines; and the French Government’s large order was made up of a number of other machines.

With her energetic method of sending officers in squads to learn flying at the various schools, it was not long before France found herself in possession of a corps of at least a hundred fully-qualified airmen. These, as a matter of fact, she possessed quite early in the summer of 1911.

The business-like way in which she set herself the task of becoming the premier nation in the development of flying was especially notable at this time. Military commissions were appointed to visit the various aerodromes throughout France, and inspect all aeroplanes built. In the case where a machine had been purchased, one of these military commissions came to the flying ground on a specified date, and passed the aircraft through a series of tests, These experiments had to be carried out by the constructor of the aeroplane before the Government would take delivery of his machine.

One instance of this excellent policy is sufficient. In April, 1911, a military commission of several officers made a journey to the Brayelle aerodrome. Here, awaiting their inspection, were a couple of Breguet biplanes which the French authorities had decided to buy.

After the officers had examined the machines, the professional pilots of the flying school carried out a series of manœuvres. The officers noted, for example, how long it took a machine to ascend to an altitude of 1000 feet. A specified load had to be lifted by each aeroplane. It was also necessary that it should attain a stipulated speed. When these conditions were fulfilled, and not before, the officers formally took over the aeroplanes on behalf of their Government.

With what determination this task of increasing the aerial armament of France was pressed forward may be gauged by the work of one of these military commissions, which visited the Pau aerodrome during the summer of 1911. No fewer than eight two-seated war monoplanes were waiting for their inspection; and all eight machines were tested and passed in the course of a day’s flying.

The spirit which animated France, in regard to this question of military aviation, is evidenced by the words of M. Clementel, when placing an official report before the French Chamber. He declared: "The aeroplane has proved that it is a marvellous instrument of war—a new arm in our military organisation. We now possess an incontestable superiority in aviation, and this we hope to continue for a long period. We must maintain this advance. The sacrifices imposed on us in this matter are as useful as they are necessary."

This, indeed, supplies the keynote to the enthusiasm of the French for war aeroplanes. By the end of the year 1911 the War Minister possessed a fleet of more than 200 war aeroplanes and a corps of officers fully trained to pilot them, and act as observers.

After French tests of military aeroplanes in October, 1911—which will be described in the next section—there was a generous distribution of orders for machines.

Early in 1912, the French military authorities had 234 war aeroplanes at their disposal; and the financial grant for the year placed £920,000 for the purposes of military flying. In addition, there was a scheme on foot to augment the number of war machines. By the aid of public subscription this, quite soon, approached a sum of £100,000.

The latest plan of the French Government is to form a large regiment of military airmen, and in this connection more than 300 new aeroplanes have been ordered for delivery before the end of 1912. Sheds, to accommodate machines, are springing up all over the country. Quite early in 1912, nearly 300 officers had obtained pilot’s certificates from the French Aero Club.

So far as can be ascertained, the military aeroplanes in France will number appreciably more than 400 at the end of this year; and it must be remembered that, in time of war, this country could call upon nearly a thousand privately-owned machines.

The policy in France may be summarised in the statement that the Government aim to create an air-fleet of at least 1000 machines by the end of the year 1914. In 1917, it is anticipated, the French air-fleet will approach, in numbers, several thousand machines. Eventualities, of course, govern such a programme. It may, for example—should any remarkable development of aviation take place—be appreciably augmented.

What the limit of utility of an air-fleet may be, only the practical work of war will show. For reconnoitring, it is clear that very large squadrons of machines, divided amongst the various sections of an army, will be employed.

Then there is the question of using aeroplanes for dispatch-carrying, and for directing artillery fire, to say nothing of their probable employment for destructive work, and perhaps in the transport of troops.

Another crucial point must also be borne in mind, to which detailed reference will be made later. If, as is practically certain, a conflict takes place between the aerial forces of two armies, it is likely to be the larger of two fleets of machines—other things being equal—which will emerge victorious.

Therefore, it is impossible at present to lay down any rule as to limiting the number of war aeroplanes. No country can stay its hand. The wise policy, surely, is to be well armed in view of eventualities. If a great war comes—then, and only then, can the strength of an air-fleet be tested adequately.

II. The great French tests of military aeroplanes—Striking results obtained—Era of fast, "air-worthy," weight-carrying machines.

Any account of the splendid progress in military flying, which has been made in France, would not be complete without a reference to the trials of war aeroplanes which were carried out at Rheims in October, 1911.

In prizes, and prospective orders for machines, more than £50,000 had been set aside; and an astonishingly large number of French makers—bearing striking testimony to the progress of aviation in that country—brought their machines together. Despite bad weather, a series of tests which were highly instructive and important were carried out.

One of the French aims, in the organisation of these contests, was to encourage the construction of a speedy, "air-worthy" machine, capable of carrying a pilot and passenger, and flying long distances when fully loaded.

The tests were most interesting, as showing the high state of efficiency to which aeroplanes had attained. Quite a number of machines, for example, were able to effect a regular series of non-stop flights of 300 kilometres (187.5 miles), when carrying a pilot and observer.

A surprising number, also, were able to ascend to a height of 1640 feet in fifteen minutes—a remarkable indication of the reserve of power they possessed.

One difficult feat was set the competing machines. This was that they should rise, when fully loaded, from a ploughed field. Hitherto, of course, only smooth ground had been considered suitable for the ascent of a machine. An appreciable number passed even this test successfully. Their ability to do so was due to the fitting of exceptionally-strong landing devices of the wheel and skid type, and to ample engine-power.

In all, seven aeroplanes emerged triumphantly from all the trials imposed. The winning machine, which owed its final triumph to its high speed, was the Nieuport monoplane. Even when heavily laden with pilot, passenger, and fuel, it flew across country at the rate of more than seventy miles an hour.

One of the most impressive features of the trials was the reliability shown by the competing machines. They made voyage after voyage with the regularity of express trains. The striking aspect of the tests, indeed, was the practical demonstration of the fact that not one French builder, but dozens, could make a thoroughly-efficient war aeroplane.

It was shown conclusively, also, that it is no longer necessary to wait for calm weather before embarking upon aeroplane flights. In astonishingly high winds—blowing, in some cases, at a velocity of approximately forty miles an hour—the large military machines went out and, ascending 1000 or 1500 feet, battled triumphantly against vicious gusts.

A striking point in connection with the competition was the big horse-power of the engines employed. There was a vivid contrast, indeed, between the motors now used and the little three-cylindered, twenty-five horse-power engine with which Blériot crossed the Channel in 1909.

Many of the machines taking part in the contest were fitted with fourteen-cylinder hundred horsepower "Gnome" motors; and some employed even higher power than this, being equipped with engines developing a hundred and forty horse-power. Such big power was, of course, necessary in view of the loads which were carried, and the arduous nature of some of the tests.

To indicate the weights raised, it may be mentioned that the Breguet biplane, which was driven by a hundred and forty horse-power "Gnome," weighed, with pilot, two passengers, and fuel aboard, 2420 lb.

Representatives from all the great countries in the world, including Great Britain, visited Rheims to witness these military tests, and the French manufacturers who produced successful machines were quickly supplied with sufficient orders to keep their factories busy for a long time to come.

The value of the flying work accomplished in these trials, and the obvious practicability of military machines, stimulated interest not only in France, but in Russia, Germany, and other countries. It was, undoubtedly, the means of determining our War Office to make a move. In view of what was achieved at Rheims, in fact, there no longer remained any possible excuse for refraining from a constructive policy in military aviation.

III. Germany’s aerial policy—Secret energies in creating a fleet of war aeroplanes—Rivalry with France.

Leaving France for the moment, we may now turn to a consideration of Germany’s advance in the matter of military flying. Here, first of all, we shall need to consider an interesting question. It concerns the relative merits of the dirigible balloon and the aeroplane. Although, in this book, we are concerned exclusively with the heavier-than-air machine, it is certainly necessary to mention the dirigible at this point, in explanation of the fact that Germany almost abandoned her airship policy, after the French manœuvres in the autumn of 1910, in favour of the aeroplane.

She was not led to take this step, after spending many thousands of pounds upon dirigibles, without mature consideration. Among her advisers in matters of aviation, Germany possessed many particularly-staunch and even obstinate supporters of the airship. These refused at first to admit the enormous strides which the aeroplane was making. But soon it was impossible to turn a blind eye towards them; and so came a reversal of German policy.

The facts of the case could not, indeed, be controverted. While the aeroplane leaped to the front during 1910, the airship made practically no forward strides at all. In comparison with the aeroplane, it was ruinously costly. It required large crews of men to handle it. It needed huge garages dotted about the country at all strategic points. It was slow-flying, as compared with the aeroplane. It offered a far easier target to artillery fire from below. The advantages which were claimed for it, over the aeroplane, were that it could remain in the air longer, and that observations could be carried out from it in a more leisurely fashion than from the heavier-than-air machine.

But the German War Office is notoriously shrewd in all matters appertaining to modern warfare. When it was seen that a mistaken policy was being pursued in spending large sums upon unwieldy dirigibles, a new plan was quickly evolved—and that was to overtake France in the creation of a fleet of war aeroplanes.

It was in November, 1910, that the German military authorities began to purchase machines. They then placed orders for five or six aeroplanes, mostly biplanes. This was quickly followed, a month later, by an order for nearly twenty Etrich monoplanes—strongly-built, extremely-efficient machines, constructed in Austria.

Military experts in Germany had, by this time, arrived at an approximate estimate of what should be the salient features of an aeroplane for war purposes. They stated that machines should be of as simple a construction as possible, and very strong. They declared high speed to be an essential, and they demanded, also, that machines should be able to carry appreciable weights.

It was characteristic of Germany that she should make steady progress, once a decision had been arrived at to develop the aeroplane. Thus, in February, 1911, it became known that seven military airmen had, in one week, obtained their certificates of proficiency at the Johannisthal and Bork aerodromes. Three of these pilots were using Wright biplanes. It was just about this time, too, that Germany placed an order in France for several Farman biplanes.

By the spring of 1911, the German War Office had assembled a fleet of close upon fifty aeroplanes. Nearly half of them were Etrich monoplanes, of the type previously mentioned. Metal now entered very largely into the framework of these machines. They were heavily-engined, and fast in flight, and could easily raise a reconnoitring officer, in addition to the pilot, and an engineer to attend to the motor as well.

In March, 1911, so as to hasten forward the work of training officers to fly, the German Minister of War sent fifty or sixty unmarried lieutenants to the Doebritz military aviation camp. Here, while they were learning to fly, these officers received a special allowance. The military authorities also came to the conclusion, at this time, that it would be wise to arrange for an aviation section at all the garrisons in Germany which had suitable parade-grounds attached to them.

It was decided in May, 1911, to spend large sums of money upon the purchase of new types of military aeroplanes; and the officers who had already learned to fly were encouraged to design machines, embodying ideas formed during their period of tuition. At the same time, in order to encourage a general study of flying in Germany, the War Office made up its mind to contribute special prizes to the various cross-country contests then in process of arrangement.

Going ahead with such determination, it was not surprising to find that, in August, 1911, Germany had established a fleet of nearly eighty aeroplanes; and the total of her officer-airmen, a month later, approached the same figure.

The Kaiser himself had, by this time, become greatly interested in the development of heavier-than-air machines for war purposes, and he thoroughly approved of the forward policy which had been initiated. At the end of the summer of 1911 Germany had quite a hundred aeroplanes either on hand, or in order; and her list of army airmen had grown appreciably.

Recently, however, development in Germany, so far as aeroplanes are concerned, has been kept more or less secret. Information regarding tests which have been carried out has been carefully withheld. The results of several carefully-organised reconnoitring flights have not, for instance, been allowed to leak out.

But this much is known. During 191 2, Germany will spend a sum of £640,000 upon the development of her aeroplane service. The Kaiser himself now offers a prize of £2500 for the best aeroplane motor of German construction.

It seems fairly clear, indeed, that Germany has now set herself the task of keeping pace with France in the development of military airmanship. A great point is made by the German War Office of encouraging the production of entirely German-built aeroplanes, and much experimental work is now being conducted.

This much is certain: there is the greatest activity in Germany in regard to military aeroplaning. No stone is being left unturned, indeed, to produce a thoroughly-efficient military machine; and the training of army airmen is steadily pursued.

Many estimates have recently been made as to the strength of the German air-fleet. One credits Germany with 300 war aeroplanes; another with nearly 200. The most reliable figure would appear to be a little in excess of 100 machines.

Dirigible balloon work, also, still continues. It has been reported, in fact, that German military experts have overcome some of the difficulties of the rigid type, and that heights of over 6000 feet are now attained with them. It was, indeed, only in January that France was warned, by a well-known advocate of dirigible balloons, to beware of the secret development of lighter-than-air craft in Germany. The destructive possibilities of a fleet of hostile dirigibles, sailing across the German frontier into France, and raining down missiles, were pictured; but, in this regard, it is certainly pertinent to inquire what the French fleet of aeroplanes would be doing while such an attack was in progress.

IV. Progress in Russia, America, and other countries-England’s position in the autumn of 1911.

The country which next merits attention, as a keen, observant student of the value of the aeroplane for war purposes, is Russia. The Russian military authorities recognised the importance of this new weapon early in 1911, and the steps taken to deal with the question were eminently practical. The Duma Committee of National Defence approved an expenditure of nearly £1,000,000 upon military aviation.

Since then, Russia has been acquiring aeroplanes, and training airmen, at a great rate. A sum of £25,000 a year, for three years, was voted exclusively for the building of experimental machines of a military type, in order that aircraft on original lines might be evolved. It was also decided to spend £2500 a year in employing skilled instructors. Military air-stations were, at the same time, established at Keiff, Odessa, Sebastopol, and Tiflis.

Having thus made the first move towards creating an efficient air-corps, the Russian Government sent a commission of military officers on a tour of the French flying grounds, in order that they might see the best work being produced by the aeroplane manufacturers.

While in France, this commission purchased a number of machines of various types. They visited England, also, and after inspecting the biplanes built by the British and Colonial Aeroplane Company at Bristol, ordered several military-type machines of this make.

By May, 1911, Russia had acquired forty machines, and was using them to teach a large number of officers to fly. A determination has been expressed to have a fleet of several hundred aeroplanes by the forthcoming flying season.

The activities of other nations also present an interesting study. Take America, for example. In this country, despite the wonderful example set by the Wright brothers, military flying languished until towards the end of 1910. Then came a somewhat tardy vote for the purchase of a few machines, and general development.

In the beginning of 1911, Mr Dickinson, the United States War Secretary, returned from a visit to France, where he had seen what the French war aeroplanes were accomplishing, and had enjoyed a flight upon a military machine at Chalons. He promptly recommended a more generous money grant, and the result has been that machines have been bought, while officers are now learning to fly.

In a recent speech, Brigadier-General James Allen, of the American Signal Corps—in connection with which the Air Corps is operated—said: "It is the ultimate intention, I believe, to teach aviation to several thousand Army men."

For the year ending June, 1912, a sum of 125,000 dollars was voted for the aeronautical work of the American Army.

Austrian military experts have been very energetic in their study of flying. In November, 1910, war aeroplanes were ordered, and it was then specified that each machine must fly for two hours without descending, at the rate of forty-four miles an hour. It was also stipulated that the aeroplanes should be dismantled in an hour, and rebuilt in two hours. During 1911, Austria operated two military air-stations, and now possesses an excellent fleet of war aeroplanes.

Italian interest in military aviation has been keen from the outset. In the summer of 1911, at the Centocelle military aerodrome, a number of officers were training, and a variety of machines were in use. Since then, also, definite progress has been made, and Italy quickly reaped the reward of her aeronautical labours in the war with Turkey. A reference to the work of aeroplanes in Tripoli will, however, be found in a later section.

In March, 1911, Japan placed orders in France for nearly twenty war aeroplanes. This was in addition to a previous purchase, in Berlin, of a number of Wright biplanes. Japanese officers have been learning to fly in large numbers lately, both in France and Germany.

Spain must not be forgotten. She has bought a number of machines in France, and is now training a corps of officer-airmen.

[Illustration: TWO-SEATED, BRITISH-BUILT WAR MACHINE. The Blackburn military-type monoplane, with accomodation for pilot and observer, has already made many successful flights; and it is expected to perform meritoriously in the War Office trials. In some respects it resembles the graceful Antoinette.]

And what about England? It is sufficient to say, for purposes of direct comparison in this section, that for the autumn manœuvres of 1911—which were abandoned owing to the drought—the War Office had only half a dozen qualified army aeroplanists, in comparison with the well-trained squadrons of France and Germany. As regards machines, we possessed at this time about a dozen—most of them obsolete—being hopelessly out-matched by France, Germany, and Russia.

Fourth Section Importance Of Organisation In The Use Of War Aeroplanes

I. French plans for the concerted use of squadrons of machines in time of war.

After describing the air-fleets with which far-seeing nations are now arming themselves, another point arises—and a point which is of supreme importance. This concerns the organisation of the military air service.

In organisation, it is clear, will lie the secret of success when aeroplanes are used in time of actual war.

France has certainly more right to speak on this subject than any other country, because she _knows_. Her experience has, indeed, been unique. She has bought machines, trained men, and has already dissected the results obtained from many experiments. And her greatest authorities affirm, definitely, that it is not sufficient to have a large number of machines, or a big corps of men. What any nation must possess, they say, in order to make its air-fleet really efficient, is faultless organisation.

Aeroplanes, either for scouting or destructive work, cannot be operated in haphazard style. Combination is essential. Every requisite of the air service must be in its place, and ready to hand; and everyone must know his work, and do it with precision, from the aeroplane pilot to the humble mechanic.

It is upon this question of organisation that the French authorities have been concentrating themselves. They see its vital importance, and are determined to formulate definite, practical schemes for the employment of large squadrons of machines. In this work, M. Milleraud, the French Minister of War, has been most active.

It is held that a fleet of aeroplanes should be divided up into separate aviation squadrons, each complete in itself, and that these depots should be attached to the various Army Corps.

Thus each squadron would act with its own Army Corps, performing its scouting and other work, and moving from place to place with the Corps.

In command of an aviation squadron, without doubt, should be an officer of great experience. Already, as a matter of fact, such men are being produced. They are officers who have gone through the whole routine of flying, and know every practical detail of the work, besides possessing a general knowledge of tactical operations.

Such a Commander of Aeroplanes should be constantly in touch with the officer in charge of the whole Army Corps. When military operations reach a stage that demands a rapid aerial reconnaissance, this officer in charge of aeroplanes will be called into conference, and told exactly what is required. He, in his turn, will indicate how his airmen can go to work; and he will then transmit orders to the pilots and observers, and also summarise their reports, for the benefit of Headquarters, after a reconnaissance has been carried out.

The value of such an officer, possessing complete practical experience, would be very great. The question might arise, for example, as to whether the wind was too high to allow a scouting expedition to be made. The Commanding Officer would, in such circumstances, promptly consult the Commander of Aeroplanes, who would come to an expert decision without any misunderstanding or delay.

Operating with the Commander of Aeroplanes should be other officers, all experienced men, and each specialising in one branch of aerial work. There should be an officer immediately in charge of the airmen. To this officer would fall the task of seeing that each scout thoroughly understood the work that he had in hand, that he was adequately equipped, and that his reports were presented in proper form.

Then should come an officer in command of the engineers. His would be important work. The engineers in charge of aeroplanes represent highly-skilled men, whose work is vital to the success of aerial operations. Several of them are usually detailed to each machine.

When aeroplanes are on active service, replacements and repairs will need constantly to be made; and the officer in charge of engineers will be called upon to superintend this work, and to see that all machines in the corps are in first-class condition. An aeroplane, at any rate as at present constructed, is a machine that needs unremitting attention in a variety of small ways. The use of a fleet of machines in time of war will mean that a very highly-organised staff of mechanics, under the supervision of a thoroughly-competent officer, will be required.

Then there may be a third officer, whose duty will be to take charge of all the baggage, supplies, and transport of the air service. His task will, it is clear, be no light one. There should be a number of motor repair-cars in connection with each aeroplane squadron, ready to move out, at a moment’s notice, and succour an airman who may have come down through mechanical defects. These break-down gangs will form a very important adjunct to the work of the aeroplane in war-time.

The question of transport is very important. As an army marches from point to point, so the aeroplanes attached to it will have to move also. Airmen will, in many cases no doubt, fly their machines from point to point; but there will probably be occasions when machines will need to be dismantled, and transported by road or rail.

In such circumstances the transport officer will be a busy man. In his hands, also, will lie the work of bringing up the supplies of petrol and oil which the aeroplanes will need.

The French organisation already strives to be as perfect as is possible, seeing that active service conditions are yet to be encountered. Motor waggons are provided for the transport of aeroplanes. Other, and slower waggons, bring up portable hangars. Then come heavier lorries carrying spare parts, and similar equipment. Bringing up the rear are motor waggons in the form of portable workshops.

The mere detailing of any such scheme as that outlined above, affords an indication of the necessity for perfect organisation in the use of war aeroplanes.

With machines improperly employed, with airmen carelessly instructed, and with repair-depots badly equipped, no nation can hope to make a success of its air service.

The determination of France, in this regard, is beyond all praise. Aeroplanes are being allocated to frontier forts. Practical discussions are taking place, frequently, at the Ministry of War. It is intended to establish an annual overhaul of war aeroplanes, so that obsolete machines may be removed from the active list, and relegated to the flying schools.

In all this, France is finding things out for herself. She has no precedent to guide her. This makes the work she has already accomplished all the more valuable. How far advanced the French air service is, and how admirably arranged is its scheme of operation, only the practical work of war will reveal.

II. Value of air-stations—Selection of landing-grounds—Preparing air-maps.

A very important feature of the organisation of an air-corps, especially in times of peace, is the permanent air-station. Here one finds machines, men, and the whole equipment of military aviation work. Of such stations, France now possesses quite a number.

An essential of such an air-station is a good manoeuvring ground for aeroplanes. Then comes the need to erect a number of sheds for the machines.

Also necessary is a completely-equipped repair-shop, in which damages, generally brought about by experimenting with machines, may be repaired. At one or two of the chief French air-stations, the equipment is so complete that there are commodious shops for the building of aeroplanes, in addition to any repair work undertaken.

Another and very important feature of a well-organised air-station is the school for military pupils, under the charge of an officer of experience.

Another detail of aerial organisation, regarding which both France and Germany are concerning themselves, is the selection of a number of landing-places for aeroplanes, preferably in the vicinity of large towns. Military authorities in France are enlisting municipal aid in this matter.

The idea is to fix upon an aerodrome, or suitable landing-place, outside all cities or towns of importance. Once chosen, the ground will be set aside for the arrival and departure of aircraft; and, in connection with it, there will be a small, permanent repair-shop.

Apart from their use for military flying, and particularly in connection with long reconnoitring flights, such landing-places, scattered all over the country, should, it is contended, do a great deal towards popularising touring by air, seeing that an aerial voyager would have some definite alighting point in view, when flying from point to point.

Besides such general aspects of organisation as have already been touched upon, France has foreseen the need for providing her air-corps with suitable maps to use when flying across country, and particularly when on reconnoitring work. The officers who flew in the autumn manœuvres of 1910 were able to report the need for such maps—a clear indication of the value of practical flying in revealing exactly what is required.

The Geographical Department of the French Army went to work with characteristic promptitude. The result is that special air-maps are being prepared so as to cover, in sections, the whole of France. In connection with these maps, the plan is to eliminate all unnecessary detail. When flying fast and high, an airman sees only the bold outline of what lies below him; and so, when glancing quickly at a map, he seeks to find on it some prominent landmark which will tell him where he is.

On French military maps the roads—which an airman always sees well—are coloured white. Woods are green; and railway lines, which always form an excellent aerial guide, are prominently marked. So are such landmarks as spires and towers. Good alighting grounds and air-stations are shown; and the presence of telegraph wires, a menace when making a descent, are also indicated.

With the help of such maps as these, French military airmen are now making long cross-country flights almost daily, without fear of losing their way. It is now possible, also, to fit a reliable compass to aeroplanes. The result is that, with a special map and a good compass, an airman can fly with accuracy from point to point, even over strange country.

Fifth Section England’S Position In Regards To Military Flying

I. Lessons which were ignored—Work of the Parliamentary Aerial Defence Committee.

So far as the position, at the present time, is concerned, England is far behind other great nations in the matter of aerial armament, and our deficiency is open to the greatest criticism. But it is, in all things, necessary to be fair. Therefore, it must be remembered that the War Office has pledged itself to a definite move.

A scheme, to which further reference will be made, has been brought forward to obtain the services of a hundred army airmen. More aeroplanes have recently been bought; and a sum of £11,000 is to be spent upon a military competition in England, which will probably be held in July next.

Thus, although our present position is perilously weak, we have the promise of a firmer, more reasonable policy. By the end of the forthcoming flying season, if the War Office maintains its new attitude, we should have laid the corner-stone, at least, of an efficient air-corps.

Therefore, in the criticisms of Government policy which it is, of course, impossible to avoid, the fact must be remembered that at last something is to be done—nothing very ambitious, it is true, nothing that will put us on a level say with France, but, at any rate, something. A very unpretentious policy is better than no policy at all.

In this section, we propose to deal with those circumstances, and representations, which have led to the dispelling of official apathy in England.

Compared with the work being done in France and Germany, we have still practically no organisation; and yet such organisation as has been described will spell all the difference between success and failure, when aeroplanes are actually used in war.

All that has been definitely established in England, so far, is the Air Battalion, which is not in a position to give all its time and attention to the development of the war aeroplane. Within its scheme of duties, in addition to aeroplaning, comes the manipulation or dirigible balloons, and also of ordinary balloons, and kites.

It was in April, 1911, that the Air Battalion came into existence. One or two aeroplanes had, by this time, been purchased. A flying school was opened on Salisbury Plain; and there was much talk, in the House of Commons, as to the start which this country had begun to make in regard to military aviation. This, as has been said, was in April.

Four months later, however, there were only half a dozen officers of the Air Battalion who were competent to handle aeroplanes in reconnoitring work; the remainder had been either without machines, or had been engaged upon airship or balloon duties.

Thus, despite repeated demonstrations of the value of the aeroplane for war purposes, and in face of the activity in France and Germany, we found ourselves, in September, 1911, with half a dozen military airmen who were ready to take part in the autumn manœuvres. As it happened, the manœuvres were cancelled; but, had they not been, six air-scouts would have been altogether insufficient to make any adequate test of the value of aerial reconnoitring.

In sharp contrast to our lethargy, France was, at this time, ready to put thirty aeroplanes, with highly-skilled pilots and observers, at the disposal of the troops in her autumn manœuvres. More could have been obtained, if necessary; but this number was considered sufficient.

It must not be thought that our military airmen lack either initiative or experience: they do not. In the limited opportunities they have had of showing what they can do, their performances have been highly meritorious. They are enthusiastic, and full of aptitude for their work. But they have lacked facilities, and also encouragement. Instead of there being purpose, and a genuine spirit of progress behind them, they have found neither energy nor interest, to say nothing of a persistent stinting of money.

A question inevitably arises. It is this: why has England lagged behind such alert nations as France and Germany in the matter of aerial armament? The answer lies in the fact that, until recently, the importance of the aeroplane in warfare was denied.

Enlightened views have been expressed, it is true; many men, even in official positions, have pronounced progressive opinions. But results are all-important; and it is a fact that no really satisfactory step has yet been taken to place this country on an equality with other nations in regard to an air-fleet.

Lessons have been ignored. The whole subject has been neglected, and it has only been as the result of determined agitation that anything at all has been done.

In view of the apathy prevailing, it was in May, 1911, that the Parliamentary Aerial Defence Committee, a body comprising members of Parliament of all political views, organised, at the Hendon aerodrome—which had been placed at their disposal by the courtesy of Mr Claude Grahame-White—a special display of airmanship, to which they invited military experts.

So far as it was possible to do so, in a one-day programme, a most convincing demonstration was given, both of the reliability and controllability of the modern aeroplane. Many famous people were present; a long programme of flying was carried out. Dispatches were borne across country; reconnoitring flights were made; aeroplanes were quickly dismantled, and speedily reassembled. In every possible way, in fact, the practicability of the new "arm" was demonstrated.

II. Policy of "moving cautiously"—Peril of lagging behind in aerial armament.

After this display, the Parliamentary Aerial Defence Committee, feeling that the lesson taught should be pushed home, sought an interview with Lord Haldane, at the War Office. He readily saw the members of the Committee; but his reply to their representations—which were that we should keep abreast of other nations—indicated the spirit which then existed regarding the war aeroplane.

The chief point made by the Secretary for War was that it was "desirable to move cautiously." The War Office should not, in his opinion, "commit itself to an idea which, in the present rapid development of aviation, might become obsolete in a few months."

This statement was made to explain the fact that England’s supply of war aeroplanes was inadequate. But the argument was not tenable. Naturally there has been, and will be, improvement in aeroplane construction from year to year. Such will always be the case. It is the same, for instance, in regard to battleships. Yet warships, despite their enormous cost, are built from year to year, in the full knowledge that they will be superseded by more modern types, and may even become obsolete while they are being constructed.

As regards aeroplanes, the machines which France bought, early in 1911, are most certainly made to appear somewhat out-of-date by more perfect craft now obtainable. But these earlier machines will still be serviceable; and France will, above all, have acquired an immense amount of experience while using them.

In this connection, it may be mentioned that, so far as can be ascertained at present, the aeroplane is likely to proceed along fairly steady lines of development—at any rate for the next year or so. There may be some revolutionary idea brought forward, of course; but, generally speaking, the immediate future seems to indicate a slow but sure improvement.

There is no excuse for a country to hold back upon the argument that aeroplanes may become obsolete soon after they are built. In the first place, the cost of such machines, when compared with any other form of armament, is ridiculously low.

To "scrap" a fleet of fifty or sixty aeroplanes would be an insignificant item in our general expenditure upon warlike instruments. But, as a matter of fact, there would be no need to abandon any type purchased. Out-of-date machines could still be employed, and made thoroughly useful, too, by being converted into "school" craft.

Lord Haldane gave the impression, in his conversation with the members of the Parliamentary Aerial Defence Committee, that the War Office was holding back from the expenditure of money upon war aeroplanes until some fixed type of military machine was introduced. But it is not likely that any such machine will be designed—at any rate for some time to come. It is probable that progress will be represented by a succession of improving types, development taking place, chiefly, in regard to speed and stability.

During this period of progress, there is no possible excuse for Great Britain to lag behind other countries. To-morrow, if a war broke out, France and Germany would have the full use of their adequate squadrons of machines. And what would our position be? We should have no proper fleet of machines, because we had been waiting for some ideal type to be evolved.

As a matter of fact, neither France nor Germany consider that the aeroplanes they are at present using are anything but purely experimental machines. But they certainly represent the best obtainable at the moment; and, recognising the vital importance of keeping abreast of this new science, these two countries buy such machines, and will be quite ready to purchase more, as the process of improvement continues.

In 1909, Lord Haldane said in the House of Commons:—

"In war there is little use for anything unless it can be applied with some certainty that it would do what we want it to do, and unless you have some exactness in results. Now that stage (referring to aeroplanes) has not been reached."

That, as has been said, was in 1909. At this time, certainly, aeroplanes were unreliable, although the promise of their practicability was such that there was no excuse for ignoring them, from the military point of view.

But now let us turn to matters as they stand today. The modern aeroplane, with its engine as reliable as that in a motor-car, can be used with the greatest certainty for military work, and can fly long distances—heavily laden—without descending, besides attaining a speed through the air exceeding that of an express train.

III. The financial aspect—Money England is spending—The airship policy—Insufficient provision for aeroplanes.

In the year ending 31st March, 1912, a sum of £113,000 will have been expended by our authorities upon military aeronautics. Of this sum, an appreciable amount is devoted to establishment charges, and such items; and a sum of £28,000 was earmarked for building a new dirigible balloon shed at Farnborough, and in making improvements to the one at Wormwood Scrubs.

This leaves £85,000; and this sum of money, quite inadequate as it is, is free to be spent upon airships and aeroplanes. Quite an active airship policy is pursued, and a large percentage of this money remaining is dribbled away upon these costly machines—in building new ones, and in repairing old ones.

[Illustration: THE ENGINE-IN-FRONT BIPLANE. With the above machine—a type increasingly used for Service work—the Naval officers now experimenting at Eastchurch, Isle of Sheppy, have been carrying out recent tests. It was designed, and built, by Messrs. Short Brothers, who are now constructing special aeroplanes for Naval use.]

Criticising this policy trenchantly, soon after the announcement of the manner in which the War Office proposed to spend its money, Mr Arthur du Cros, M.P., the Hon. Secretary of the Parliamentary Aerial Defence Committee, remarked: "We, almost alone among nations, are developing the lighter-than-air type of machine to the exclusion of aeroplanes. France and Germany, formerly two of the staunchest advocates of the dirigible balloon, have almost ceased its development, in favour of the aeroplane.

"In a year, in regard to these two machines, the tables have been turned," added Mr du Cros. "Now the aeroplane, which costs so much less than the dirigible, is infinitely its superior. One aeroplane, costing say £1000, would, in the case of actual aerial warfare, have completely at its mercy a dirigible balloon costing perhaps £50,000."

Defending their policy, soon after Mr du Cros’ attacks, and responding to the definite statement that "aeroplanes have become immeasurably superior to airships for military purposes," War Office experts advanced the argument: "There would be work in war-time, such as very detailed reconnaissance, that an airship could perform better than an aeroplane. Both types should, therefore, be developed."

It may be agreed, in this connection, that the airship would, in a number of cases, allow of a more detailed reconnaissance being made than from an aeroplane; its slower speed, and the fact that it could hover over one spot, would give it this advantage. But, to set against this, there is one very obvious disadvantage. The size of the airship, and the fact that it is moving slowly, makes it an admirable target for artillery. In actual warfare, it would, without doubt, very soon be hit.

In this connection, too, the fact must be remembered that, whereas a wrecked aeroplane would represent a comparatively small financial loss, the destruction of a dirigible would be as great a calamity as the loss of a whole aeroplane fleet.

The expenses entailed in organising a dirigible balloon fleet are enormous, and altogether out of proportion to the useful work which these vessels could accomplish in time of war.

If an airship service is to be of practical value, monster sheds must be erected all over the country, so that a vessel may be able to run to one or other of them for shelter, when caught in a high wind. Apart from the expenditure which these sheds entail, the need arises to spend other large amounts upon the crews of trained men necessary to handle the aircraft when they leave the ground, or return from a flight.

There is another formidable item—the cost of the hydrogen gas necessary to inflate the huge envelopes; and, added to this, there is constant expenditure in effecting repairs, caused by the trifling accidents which are always occurring in handling these aerial monsters. Thus, a ruinous bill of cost is quickly arrived at.

And, as against all these disadvantages, the airship, as has been shown, has few, if any, definite advantages over the aeroplane. It can remain in the air longer, it is true; and it can, at the moment at any rate, carry heavier loads. But the great size of its envelope has, so far, made it the plaything of any high wind; and its bulk, in addition, renders it apparently impossible to force it through the air at anything like the speed attained by the aeroplane. Under favourable conditions, airship speeds of from thirty to thirty-five miles an hour seem to represent the best results yet attained.

Practical comparisons, between dirigible balloons and aeroplanes, were possible in the famous French manœuvres, in the autumn of 1910, which have been previously referred to. On this occasion, the aeroplanes were out, and at work in gusty winds, when the dirigibles were compelled to remain in their sheds.

And, when the airships did emerge, it was a subject of comment that, in comparison with the aeroplanes, they offered quite an easy mark for gun-fire.

This fact must be remembered, also. In actual warfare, the dirigible balloon would, inevitably, fall a prey to an attack by aeroplane. Aided by their greater speed, and by the fact that they could probably approach quite near to a dirigible without being seen, aeroplanes would be able to rise above its gas-containing envelope, and wreck the craft by dropping a destructive bomb.

Such points as these have, of course, weighed with the experts of Germany and France. Neither country has abandoned research work in regard to dirigibles. It is quite likely, in fact, that further improvements may be made with these machines, which will better fit them for use in warfare. But, at the present time, when any contrast of utility is made, the aeroplane is immeasurably the more practical weapon; and, whereas a limited expenditure upon experimental work with lighter-than-air machines is not to be questioned, it is to the aeroplane corps that any War Department must look for reliable, everyday service in war-time.

IV. Dangers of a policy of "drift"—Experience which money cannot buy—Trained men, not so much as machines, the criterion of strength.

In connection with military airmanship, there is no policy more dangerous than that which may be summed up in the word, "drift."

It must be admitted that, until quite recently, the official policy in England, as regards the war aeroplane, could thus be summarised:

There is no danger in shirking the responsibility of a definite aerial programme—despite the strides made abroad—because a fleet of war aeroplanes can be bought or constructed at any time, should urgent need arise.

It was not a policy such as this that the Admiralty pursued in connection with submarines. Here was a new and untried addition to naval armament Without hesitating, or waiting while some other country proved its value in actual tests, the Admiralty used common sense, and spent money willingly upon a fleet of submarines. A full test of their use, in actual naval warfare, has yet to be made; but the experimental nature of the machines has not deterred the Admiralty from making definite advancement with them.

Had the War Office pursued such a policy as this in regard to aeroplanes, we should now have a fleet of aircraft as large as that of any other nation.

It is an undignified attitude to watch other nations at work upon the aeroplane problem, without spending money, and then to step in at the last moment, and profit by their experience.

From the point of view of strict economy, and setting all other considerations aside, such a policy might find acceptance, were it not for circumstances over which those who advocate it have no control.

At any moment, for instance, while one country is waiting for another to evolve an ideal aeroplane, a war may break out. In such an event, a cheese-paring policy would place its advocates in an awkward position. Even granting that they were using experimental machines, the nation which actually possessed a well-equipped aerial fleet, at the outbreak of hostilities, would have an immense advantage over the country which did not.

Wars, when they do break out, generally come quickly. There would be little opportunity for a laggard nation to rush together an aerial fleet at the last moment; or, even if it could do so, lack of organisation would render such an air-force practically inoperative.

Even setting aside the danger of war suddenly arising, and assuming that a waiting policy has no immediate risks, the negative programme has another fatal drawback. Even if, at the last moment, large sums of money were expended upon an air-fleet, and there was time to provide both machines and men, the nation which had neglected aviation would still be lacking in the one essential for success.

That essential is experience. No money, however lavishly spent, can buy the experience which France and Germany are obtaining, day by day, in their pioneer work in handling war aeroplanes.

Any form of aerial work is new to man; and at first, when he attempts it, he is a fumbler. He has no confidence in himself, and so he makes mistakes. But, if he is given an opportunity of being in the air a good deal, and has a chance of handling aircraft, not once or twice, but practically all day long, for months on end, he becomes, gradually, quite accustomed to his work.

Instead of being anxious, and inclined to get into trouble through an excess of caution, he acquires a cool, firm judgment, and soon astonishes even himself by his feeling of security when in the air.

This is the opinion of all skilled airmen; an ounce of practice is worth a ton of theory. How was it that the quiet, unassuming French naval officer, Lieutenant Conneau, was able to win all the great flying prizes during the season of 1911? There is only one answer: he was more experienced than his rivals.

With absolute thoroughness, this man began at the very beginning. He studied the laws of the air first of all; then he made himself acquainted with the construction of machines, and of motors. Afterwards he began to fly. He progressed from stage to stage, with no impatience, or haste.

He undertook cross-country flights to note exactly what climatic conditions prevailed. He studied maps very closely, and tested compasses. He grew accustomed to being in the air; and he learned how to combat adverse winds. He acquired the skill necessary to steer a straight course across country, and to make landings upon all sorts of ground.

And then, so equipped, he entered for the principal long-distance races. Because he was absolutely competent in every way, he astonished everyone by the perfection of his flying. He made no mistakes. He flew correctly from one control to another. He did not fear gusty winds. He did not damage his machine. And so he won.

There are, in the air service of France, many such men as this. Neither France nor Germany, for the matter of that, are content with buying and building machines. These they regard as being experimental, and likely to be superseded by faster, stronger aircraft. What they do consider of vital importance is the steady, irresistible growth in the number of their airmen, and the fact that, every day, these men are becoming more expert in the handling of their machines, and in the carrying out of their duties as pilots and observers.

The lead which France and Germany have obtained in military airmanship should not, indeed, be reckoned so much in machines, as in men; and England’s backwardness should be gauged in a similar way.

In considering the danger of a laggard position in regard to men, rather than machines, a point of great importance arises. It concerns the length of time required to make a military airman thoroughly proficient.

The experience of France and Germany has now proved, fairly definitely, that a completely competent military flyer can only be produced after an arduous period of tuition, and practical tests. It has been laid down, in fact, that to produce a military airman who thoroughly understands his work, a year or eighteen months’ hard training is required. The importance of this point is self-evident. Apathy may place a nation years behind.

A great deal, when the international relations of Europe are concerned, can happen in a year; and it is a perilous thing for any country to be far behind in regard to what is, admittedly, a vitally-important weapon.

Thus it is clear that England cannot hope to make up for a laggard policy even by the expensive method of acquiring aeroplanes, post-haste, at the last moment. We might buy machines, it is true, but we could not buy airmen of the type that France and Germany are rapidly training, in well-organised squadrons.

It has been assumed that machines might be bought in a hurry; but there is some doubt even on this score. Little encouragement has been given to home manufacturers. They would scarcely have facilities for producing machines in large numbers, even if it were a matter of urgency. On the other hand, the makers in France and Germany, always well supported by Government orders, have most complete workshops.

It might easily happen, in a case of urgent need, that we should be compelled to go abroad in an endeavour to obtain machines. In such a case, we might obtain them; or, on the other hand, we might not. Whatever the result, it would be highly unsatisfactory for a country to be dependent upon foreign makers for its war aeroplanes.

In the matter of aeroplane engines, the fact that we have no motor in England to equal the "Gnome" is because no financial support has been forthcoming, in this country, for aviation. To construct a successful engine, means the laying down of a large sum of money in preliminary tests. A number of experimental motors have to be made, and then "scrapped" again. As much as £10,000 may be spent, before success is attained.

In France, with a Government eager to encourage progress, by the practical method of buying machines, men with capital have been found to finance the constructor who has ideas. This is why France has the best motors and the best aeroplanes, and why we have to buy French-built engines and machines.

Instances such as this throw into clear relief the fact that Government apathy, concerning such a new industry as that of building aeroplanes and engines, has an evil effect which is widespread, and lasting.

V. England’s official awakening—The training of 100 airmen—The forthcoming trials of military machines.

Having dealt with England’s backwardness, it is now only fair that the authorities should be given credit for their recent promise of a changed programme.

In the first place, attention may be directed to the official scheme for training a corps of 100 military airmen. This, announced towards the end of last year by Colonel Seely, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War, has already been put into operation in a limited degree.

The officers chosen for aerial work are picked from various regiments. They are allowed to attend any flying school they select, and the authorities pay their tuition fees. When they have passed the tests for their certificates as airmen, they are taken in hand at the military flying school on Salisbury Plain, and are given instruction as military pilots or observers.

When they have attained proficiency in this direction, they return to their regiments, and are afterwards called upon, from time to time, to undergo "refresher" courses of military flying.

The criticism which is levelled against this scheme is that officers should be permanently attached to the air-corps, and should never be allowed to relinquish their flying duties. Experts who hold this view affirm that "refresher" courses are not sufficient to keep a man thoroughly _au fait_ with such special work as military aviation.

As a matter of fact, the relief which has been expressed at the taking up by the War Office of any definite programme, has had the effect of robbing such criticisms as these of their sting. If the plan described were to be adopted as a permanent policy there would, indeed, be grave cause for complaint. French and German military pilots are placed once and for all in the air-corps, and are not withdrawn.

But the scheme of our authorities must only be regarded as a beginning. Directly any really definite work is done, the value of a well-equipped air-corps will be so strikingly demonstrated that there should be little difficulty in extending the Government programme.

The ideal, undoubtedly, is a large and extremely skilful corps of pilots and observers, who do nothing save perfect themselves in their aerial duties. An airman cannot have too much actual flying practice; in every aerial voyage he makes, he learns some useful lesson. The French policy is: once a military airman, always a military airman.

Naturally, with the avowed policy of training these 100 military pilots, the War Office has found it necessary to acquire more machines. From time to time, therefore, since the announcement of this scheme, machines have been bought from famous French firms—notably a Breguet biplane, a Nieuport monoplane, and a Deperdussin monoplane.

But such purchases have only been made to meet the most pressing needs of the flying school. What will precede any large orders for war aeroplanes is a carefully-conducted and stringent test of military machines, which will be thrown open to the world.

The conditions for these trials, which will be held in England under the auspices of the War Office, probably some time in July this year, were issued in December last. Critical comment has granted their practicability, and it is agreed that the successful machines will represent all that is best in military aviation.

One criticism, however, is that the sum of money which will be expended in prizes, £11,000, is not sufficiently generous. In connection with the 1911 French military trials, a sum of more than £50,000 was earmarked by the Government to be expended in prizes, and in orders for successful machines.

But, in the forthcoming English contests, there is no definite financial offer save the £11,000 mentioned. It is stipulated, as a matter of fact, that the War Office shall have the option of purchasing successful machines for a sum of £1000; but there is no guarantee expressed that such purchases shall be made. Of course, it is expected that winning machines will be ordered in certain quantities, and no doubt such will be the policy adopted. But makers cannot count, definitely, upon this being done.

However, moderate though the financial inducements are, there is little doubt but that a satisfactory number of machines will be entered for the tests. English manufacturers, whose inducements to spend money have, in the past, been so few, are determined to make a good show. Both in connection with the main prize, and also in a subsidiary contest for British-built machines, in which the principal award is £1500, the home manufacturers are keen to demonstrate what their machines can do.

Already, it has been proved that English workmanship has nothing to fear from foreign competition. All that the industry in this country lacks is the steady, regular production which is maintained in France. The building of machines teaches lessons which are invaluable. What English manufacturers have not yet been able to acquire, is the confidence, and intimate knowledge of their business, which only come from a healthy state of demand and supply.

The details of the War Office contest have already been so fully discussed that it is only necessary, here, to refer to their principal features. One of the most important requirements is that the aeroplanes should be able to carry a live load of 350 lb., in addition to their equipment of instruments, and raise this weight, as well as sufficient fuel for a four-and-a-half hour’s flight.

A three-hour’s non-stop flight, fully loaded, will be required. Machines will also be called upon to maintain, for an hour’s voyage, a height of 4500 feet. They will, in addition, have to ascend to an altitude of 1000 feet, at the rate of 200 feet a minute.

These requirements are certainly hard to fulfil. A machine, very greatly in advance of anything yet produced, will be needed to pass through such ordeals successfully.

As regards speed, the competing aeroplanes will need to attain a rate of fifty-five miles an hour, when fully loaded. Another requirement is that they should plane down to the ground, in a calm, from a height of not more than 1000 feet, and traverse a horizontal distance of not less than 6000 feet before touching ground. They will be called upon to rise from long grass, clover, or harrowed land in a distance of 100 yards, when fully loaded.

The silencing of engines is to be regarded—and quite rightly—as an important advantage. Minor points are that machines must be easily dismantled; that parts must be interchangeable; and that the observer’s view, from a machine, must be as unobstructed as possible.

The importance of this interesting contest, to be held in England, cannot be over-estimated. It will be a revelation, to all concerned, as to the capabilities of the modern-type, war machine, and should open up a new and satisfactory era in military flying in this country.

_Note_

_The aerial programme of the War Office, for the year 1912-13, is dealt with on pages 181-187._

SIXTH SECTION WAR AEROPLANES AT THE PARIS AERONAUTICAL EXHIBITION, DECEMBER, 1911

I. Latest-type military monoplanes—Two-seated, reconnoitring machines—Single-seated, high-speed aircraft.

At the Paris aeroplane _salon_, which marked the close of the aeronautical season of 1911, a striking display of war machines was made. The year, as has been indicated, was full of progress; and the result of all the experience gained was clearly seen in the aircraft exhibited, and particularly in the military monoplanes staged.

As a type, the two-seated scouting machine, capable of high-speed flight for several hours, when carrying pilot and observer, was most interestingly represented. Many difficulties had been overcome in connection with this machine—primarily that of affording the observer a fairly-unobstructed view of the land below. In early-type military monoplanes, the spread of the wings had curtailed seriously the reconnoitring officer’s scope of vision. But, in the monoplanes seen at the Paris show, the wings had been so set back, and the observer’s seat so arranged, that it was possible for him to secure, when in flight, a thoroughly practical, bird’s-eye view of the country below him.

Another problem solved, was in regard to engine-power. In the first instance, with fifty horse-power "Gnomes," two-seated monoplanes had been underengined; and their flying capabilities had suffered in consequence. But the machines built towards the end of 1911 were equipped with seventy horse-power "Gnomes," and—in some instances—with motors of a hundred horse-power. The result was that a reserve of power was obtained, to say nothing of a very desirable increase in speed.

As regards the landing-chassis, a somewhat weak point with early-type, two-seated monoplanes, an improvement was observable in the machines constructed towards the close of the flying season of 1911. Not only had the landing gear been strengthened, but—in many cases—simplified as well, which meant a commendable lessening of head resistance, when in rapid flight. But, in this regard, military critics did not admit that they were altogether satisfied—even by the machines seen at the Paris show. A stronger, more rough-and-ready chassis is demanded; but it must be remembered, in fairness to existing military monoplanes, that they succeeded, in the French trials, in landing upon, and rising from, ground which was fairly rough.

So far as personal comfort is concerned, a point certainly worth consideration in long flights, the latest-type reconnoitring machine reveals interesting features. Pilot and observer are, for example, screened so far as is possible from the rush of wind. Their seats are comfortably placed. Map-holder, compass, engine-revolution indicator, and other fitments are neatly arranged. Dual control has become almost a standard device, thus enabling either occupant of the machine to take charge, while in flight, without change of seats.

Of two-seated, military monoplanes at the Paris exhibition, it is probable that the Nieuport, Blériot, and Deperdussin attracted most serious attention; and genuine interest was also aroused by the lonely prominence of one British exhibit—that of the Bristol passenger monoplane. As definite evidence of the capabilities of this machine, Mr James Valentine had, a day or so prior to the exhibition, piloted, in a flight over Paris, a sister monoplane to that which was shown.

Military authorities, who visited the Paris salon, directed very serious attention to the single-seated, high-speed war monoplanes which were on view. Here is to be found the emergence of a machine of a very definite and important type.

It was with great interest, and some surprise, during the progress of the French military trials, in October, 1911, that those interested in airmanship read of the ordering, by the French authorities, of a large number of single-seated monoplanes. The surprise, it should be mentioned, was occasioned by the fact that single-seated machines should have been purchased just at a time when passenger monoplanes were arousing most interest.

But the French military experts knew their own needs. They had mapped out, for the single-seated, almost racing-type machine, an important field of activity in war-time. They saw that, under actual service conditions, there would be definite demand for a scouting aeroplane which would make a very rapid, general survey of the position of the enemy’s troops.

[Illustration: MILITARY BIPLANE WITH TWO ENGINES. This exceedingly interesting machine, which possesses especial significance from the military point of view, is equipped with two Gnome motors. One drives two propellers placed in front of the main-planes, and the other actuates a single rear propeller. Normally, both engines run at easy speed; but, should one fail in flight, the other, by being accelerated, will maintain the machine in the air. Its designers and builders are Messrs. Short Brothers.]

In such a machine, they decided, speed would be the all-important requirement; and, seeing that the survey to be made would be comprehensive, and not detailed, it was reckoned that the pilot would be able to do all that was required, thereby saving the carrying of a passenger, and enabling greater pace to be obtained.

In several of the single-seated, high-speed monoplanes, as seen at the Paris show, it is possible to attain a flying rate of approximately eighty miles an hour. In such a machine, it is intended that the officer-pilot should, in war-time, effect a swift dash over the enemy’s lines, and fly back, without an instant’s delay, with whatever observations he has been able to make. Apart from being able to return very rapidly to Headquarters, the airman’s high speed would, of course, be an appreciable factor in his favour, when subjected to artillery fire.

Such quick reconnoitring, carried out by the pilot of a fast-flying monoplane, will only be efficacious in detecting the movements of considerable bodies of troops. For detailed reconnaissance, without doubt, the two-seated monoplane, carrying its highly-skilled observer, will be relied upon—as, also, will the weight-carrying biplane, to which reference will be made in our next section.

It may now, perhaps, be permissible to summarise some of the advantages of the latest-type military monoplanes. Primarily, of course, their value lies in their speed. In war-time, some reconnoitring flights will be more urgent than others; but it may be taken for granted that, in practically all circumstances, the speedy completion of a reconnaissance will be greatly to be desired. Thus, in the eyes of a Commander-in-Chief, the fast-flying monoplane will find the highest possible favour.

A definite advantage of the monoplane’s speed will lie in its ability to fly in high, gusty winds. It will, indeed, require very adverse conditions to prevent the flight of a bold and expert airman, piloting an eighty-mile-an-hour machine. This point, naturally, will have especial significance during the progress of an actual campaign.

In the forthcoming trials of military aeroplanes, to be conducted by the War Office, it is certain that powerful, two-seated monoplanes, propelled by seventy and hundred horse-power engines, will play an important part.

II. Latest developments in biplane construction—The engine-in-front, weight-carrying machine.

The varied experience of the year 1911, so far as the use of military biplanes was concerned, revealed very definite results at the Paris aeroplane exhibition in December.

The influence of monoplane construction, upon the design of many of the biplanes shown, was marked. Clearly revealed, for example, was the comparatively new school—initiated by the Breguet—in which the engine is fixed in the bow of the biplane, as in monoplane practice, and a form of body almost identical with that of a monoplane is adopted.

Such machines, seeing that they employ rear elevating planes, as do monoplanes, are biplanes only in the sense that they are fitted with two main-planes, set one above another. As a matter of fact, in regard to the Breguet—a notable representative of this type—the description "biplane" is occasionally dropped, and the machine called a "double-monoplane."

One of the practical advantages of the engine-in-front system is in regard to the possibility of a bad descent. In the event of an abrupt dive to the ground, with a machine of this construction, the engine, and strengthened forepart of the body, take the brunt of the shock. In machines where the power-plant is fixed behind the main-planes, a danger has revealed itself of the motor being wrenched from its wooden bed, and falling forward upon the pilot—with disastrous results.

Two notable exceptions to this new method of construction are those of Henry and Maurice Farman. They still maintain the system of placing engines behind the main-planes, and of setting pilots in front of them.

But the Henry Farman military biplane, as seen at the end of 1911, was a very different machine from that, for example, upon which Louis Paulhan made his flight from London to Manchester in April, 1910.

Probably the most obvious of the new features introduced was that of placing both pilot and observer in seats set upon a wooden framework, which projected in front of the main-planes. The object of this innovation was to provide a pilot, or reconnoitring officer, with the most unobstructed view possible of the ground below him. The objection to the scheme was that the exposed position made it highly probable that the occupants of the machine would bear the full brunt of the impact, in the case of a bad descent.

Another feature of the Henry Farman military biplane, which is under review, was the "staggering" of the planes. Farman adopted the plan of setting his upper main-plane appreciably in advance of the lower one. The "staggering" of planes is seriously criticised, by technical experts, on many grounds. But, in this case, Farman seems to have decided upon the system, in regard to his military machine, in order to facilitate a descent on rough ground, and also to assist the heavily-laden aircraft in getting away from the ground, and in "climbing." The biplane certainly performed meritoriously in the French military trials.

At first operating individually, but now in partnership with his brother Henry, Maurice Farman constructed, towards the end of 1911, an interesting type of military biplane. The Maurice Farman machine may be said to have come first into definite prominence when Tabutean flew for more than eight hours in it in 1910, securing the Michelin Cup.

A large machine, with extensions to its main-planes, capable of carrying a very heavy load, and of remaining in the air for a long time, but being an awkward craft in a high wind, save for the most expert pilot—in such terms, one may describe the Maurice Farman. What a skilled airman can do with such a big, slow-flying machine, has been shown by Renaux, who piloted his Maurice Farman right round the 1030-miles course of the Circuit of Europe; but there were, of course, times when the monoplanes flew in a wind which kept him in his shed. It should be stated, to the credit of the Maurice Farman, that it achieved excellent results in the French trials.

Reference has been made to the Breguet. This is a biplane of a most progressive type. Steel enters largely into its construction. It has a tapering body, with controlling planes at the tail, such as the monoplane possesses; and, in addition, it is equipped with two main supporting planes, such as characterise the biplane. These are fitted above and below the body of the machine.

Constructionally, its outstanding feature is its simplicity. Instead of a number of wooden supports between the main-planes, held in place by much wiring, the Breguet biplane dispenses with all save four struts; and these are maintained in position by a minimum of wiring.

The result, from the point of view of portability, is that a great stride forward is effected. The main-planes of the machine, which represent its bulky feature, can be unshipped in a few minutes. Nor is this all; by an ingenious system of hinging the main-planes to the body of the biplane, these planes may be turned back, after they are un-wired, and folded beside the body of the machine.

A result is thus achieved which would not have been considered possible, in the early stages of aeroplane construction. When the planes are folded at the sides of the machine, it can be made to move down a road like a motor-car, with its engine running, and its propeller drawing it forward. The steering-wheel, used when the machine is in flight, is connected with a small front running-wheel. When he is on the ground, therefore, the pilot sits in his driving-seat, and controls his craft like a m