American politics (non-partisan) from the beginning to date

[Illustration: Th Jefferson]

AMERICAN POLITICS (NON-PARTISAN) FROM THE BEGINNING TO DATE. EMBODYING A HISTORY OF ALL THE POLITICAL PARTIES, WITH THEIR VIEWS AND RECORDS ON ALL IMPORTANT QUESTIONS. GREAT SPEECHES ON ALL GREAT ISSUES, AND TABULATED HISTORY AND CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS.

BY HON. THOMAS V. COOPER, Member Pennsylvania House of Representatives, 1870–72. Senate, 1874–84. Chairman Republican State Committee of Pennsylvania, 1881–82–83–84–85–86–87.

And

HECTOR T. FENTON, ESQ., Of the Philadelphia Bar.

Fifteenth And Revised Edition.

Philadelphia: Fireside Publishing Company. 1892.

Entered according to Act of Congress in the year 1892, by the FIRESIDE PUBLISHING COMPANY, in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, D. C.

Altemus’ Book Bindery, Philadelphia.

Respectfully Dedicated

To The

Proposition

That All American Citizens Should Take An Interest In Public Affairs.

Preface.

The writer of this volume, in the pursuit of his profession as an editor, and throughout an active political life, has always felt the need of a volume from which any important fact, theory or record could be found at a moment’s glance, and without a search of many records. He has also remarked the singular fact that no history of the political parties of the country, as they have faced each other on all leading issues, has ever been published. These things prompted an undertaking of the work on his own part, and it is herewith presented in the hope that it will meet the wants not only of those connected with politics, but of all who take an interest in public affairs. In this work very material aid has been rendered by the gentleman whose name is also associated with its publication, and by many political friends, who have freely responded during the past year to the calls made upon them for records, which have been liberally employed in the writing and compilation of this work.

Thos. V. Cooper.

[Illustration: _A Hamilton_]

Table Of Contents

Book I.—History Of The Political Parties. Page.

Colonial Parties—Whig And Tory 3

Particularists And Strong Government Whigs 5

Federals And Anti-Federals 6

Republicans And Federals 8

Downfall Of The Federals 12

Democrats And Federals 17

Jefferson Democrats 19

Hartford Convention 20

Treaty Of Ghent 20

Congressional Caucus 21

Protective Tariff 21

Monroe Doctrine 23

Missouri Compromise 24

Tariff—American System 25

Tenure Of Office—Eligibility 27

Nullification—Democrats And Federals 29

United States Bank 31

Jackson’S Special Message On The United States Bank 33

Conception Of Slavery Question 35

Democrats And Whigs 37

The Hour Rule 39

National Bank Bill—First 41

„ „ „ Second 43

Oregon Treaty Of 1846 47

Treaty Of Peace With Mexico 49

Clay’S Compromise Resolutions 51

Abolition Party—Rise And Progress Of 53

Kansas-Nebraska Bill 55

Ritual Of The American Party 57

Kansas Struggle 71

Lincoln And Douglas Debate 73

Charleston Convention—Democratic, 1860 81

Douglas Convention, 1860, Baltimore 86

Breckinridge Convention, 1860, Baltimore 86

Chicago Republican Convention, 1860 86

American Convention, 1860 87

Secession—Preparing For 87

Secession—Virginia Convention, 1861 91

„ Inter-State Commissioners 96

„ Southern Congress, Proceedings Of 97

„ Confederate Constitution 97

„ Confederate States 98

Buchanan’S Views 99

Crittenden Compromise 104

Peace Convention 106

Actual Secession 109

„ „ Transferring Arms To The South 109

Fernando Wood’S Secession Message 112

Congress On The Eve Of The Rebellion 113

Lincoln’S Views 115

Judge Black’S Views 115

Alexander H. Stephens’ Speech On Secession 116

Lincoln’S First Administration 120

Confederate Military Legislation 128

Guerrillas 129

Twenty-Negro Exemption Law 130

Douglas On The Rebellion 130

Political Legislation Incident To The War 130

Thirty-Seventh Congress 131

Compensated Emancipation 135

Lincoln’S Appeal To The Border States 137

Reply Of The Border States 138

Border State Slaves 139

Emancipation 141

„ Preliminary Proclamation Of 141

„ Proclamation Of 143

Loyal Governors, The Address Of 144

Fugitive Slave Law, Repeal Of 145

Financial Legislation 149

Seward As Secretary Of State 149

Internal Taxes 151

Confederate Debt 152

Confederate Taxes 153

West Virginia—Admission Of 158

Color In War Politics 159

Thirteenth Amendment—Passage Of 167

Louisiana—Admission Of Representatives 168

Reconstruction 169

Arkansas—Admission Of 170

Reconstruction Measures—Text Of 171

Fourteenth Amendment 174

Mcclellan’S Political Letters 175

Lincoln’S Second Administration 177

Andrew Johnson And His Policy 178

„ „ —Impeachment Trial 179

Grant 191

Enforcement Acts 193

Readmission Of Rebellious States 193

Legal Tender Decision 194

Greenback Party 194

Prohibitory Party 196

San Domingo—Annexation Of 196

Alabama Claims 197

Force Bill 197

CIVIL Service—Order Of President Hayes 198

Amnesty 199

Liberal Republicans 199

Reform In The CIVIL Service 200

Credit Mobilier 200

Salary Grab 214

Returning Boards 217

Grangers 218

„ —Illinois Railroad Act Of 1873 218

CIVIL Rights Bill—Supplementary 221

Morton Amendment 222

Whisky Ring 222

Belknap Impeached 223

White League 223

Wheeler Compromise—Text Of 226

Election Of Hayes And Wheeler 228

Electoral Count 229

Title Of President Hayes 233

Cipher Despatches 234

The Hayes Administration 239

Negro Exodus 240

Campaign Of 1880 242

Three Per Cent. Funding Bill 244

History Of The National Loans 245

Garfield And Arthur—Inauguration Of 253

Republican Factions 253

The Caucus 256

Assassination Of Garfield 260

Arthur, President 261

Boss Rule 261

Readjusters 263

Mormonism—Suppression Of 264

„ Text Of The Bill 265

South American Question 269

Star Route Scandal 277

The Coming States 278

Chinese Question 281

„ „ —Speech Of Senator Miller On 281

„ „ —Reply Of Senator Hoar 285

Merchant Marine 296

Current Politics 298

Political Changes In 1882, 1883, 1884 304–318

Cleveland’S Administration 321

Contests Of 1885, 1886, 1887 321

The Campaigns Of 1884, 1886, 1887, 1888 318–335

The National Conventions Of 1888 336

The Presidential Election Of 1888 337

President Harrison’S Message On The Chilean Troubles 339

The National Conventions Of 1892 347

Book II.—Political Platforms. Virginia Resolutions, 1798 2003

Virginia Resolutions, 1798—Answers Of The State Legislatures 2006

Resolutions Of 1798 And 1799 2010

Washington’S Farewell Address 2014

All National Platforms From 1800 To 1892 2021–2079

Comparison Of Platform Planks On Great Questions 2079–2104

BOOK III.—GREAT SPEECHES ON GREAT ISSUES. JAMES WILSON’S VINDICATION OF THE COLONIES 3003

Patrick Henry Before Virginia Delegates 3007

John Adams On The Declaration 3008

Patrick Henry On The Federal Constitution 3010

John Randolph Against Tariff 3013

EDWARD EVERETT ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE NORTHERN TO THE SOUTHERN REPUBLICS OF AMERICA 3018

Daniel Webster On The Greek Question 3019

John Randolph’S Reply To Webster 3020

Robert Y. Hayne Against Tariff 3021

Henry Clay On His Land Bill 3023

John C. Calhoun’S Reply To Clay 3024

Robt. Y. Hayne On Sales Of Public Land—The Foote Resolution 3025

Daniel Webster’S Great Reply To Hayne 3048

John C. Calhoun On The Rights Of The States 3080

Henry Clay On The American Protective System 3086

James Buchanan On An Independent Treasury 3095

Lewis Cass On The Missouri Compromise 3096

Clement L. Vallandigham On Slavery 3097

Horace Greeley On Protection 3099

Henry A. Wise Against Know-Nothingism 3109

Kenneth Raynor On The Fusion Of Fremont And Fillmore Forces 3112

Religious Test—Debate On The Article In The Constitution In Regard To It 3114

Henry Winter Davis On The American Party 3115

Joshua R. Giddings Against The Fugitive Slave Law 3116

Robert Toombs In Favor Of Slavery 3117

Judah P. Benjamin On Slave Property 3119

William Lloyd Garrison On The Slavery Question 3120

Theodore Parker Against The Fugitive Slave Law And The Return Of Sims 3121

William H. Seward On The Higher Law 3122

Charles Sumner On The Fallibility Of Judicial Tribunals 3123

Galusha A. Grow On His Homestead Bill 3123

Lincoln And Douglas Debate—

„ „ „ Douglas’S Speech 3126

„ „ „ Lincoln’S Reply 3133

„ „ „ Douglas’S Rejoinder 3143

Jefferson Davis On Retiring From The United States Senate 3147

Henry Wilson On The Greeley Canvass 3149

Oliver P. Morton On The National Idea 3151

J. Proctor Knott On “Duluth” 3154

Henry Carey On The Rates Of Interest 3159

Simon Cameron On Internal Improvements 3163

John A. Logan On Self-Government 3165

James G. Blaine On The “False Issue” 3171

Roscoe Conkling On The Extra Session Of 1879 3176

Lincoln’S Speech At Gettysburg 3186

John M. Broomall On CIVIL Rights 3186

Charles A. Eldridge Against CIVIL Rights 3189

A. K. Mcclure On “What Of The Republic?” 3191

Robt. G. Ingersoll Nominating Blaine 3201

Roscoe Conkling Nominating Grant 3202

James A. Garfield Nominating Sherman 3203

Daniel Dougherty Nominating Hancock 3205

George Gray Nominating Bayard 3205

William P. Frye Nominating Blaine (At Chicago) 3206

Senator Hill’S Denunciation Of Mahone 3207

Senator Mahone’S Reply 3217

Justin S. Morrill On The Tariff Commission 3223

J. Don Cameron On Reduction Of Revenue As Affecting The Tariff 3233

Thomas H. Benton On The Election Of Presidents 3237

James G. Blaine’S Eulogy On President Garfield 3240

G. H. Pendleton On CIVIL Service 3251

John J. Ingalls Against CIVIL Service 3262

Samuel J. Randall On The Tariff 3274

William Mckinley, Jr., On The Tariff 3277

Chauncey M. Depew Nominating Harrison 3283

Leon Abbett Nominating Cleveland 3285

BOOK IV.—PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, Etc. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 4003

Articles Of Confederation 4006

Jefferson’S Manual 4022

BOOK V.—TABULATED HISTORY AND CHRONOLOGICAL POLITICS. STATISTICS OF GENERAL INFORMATION 5003–5024

Chronological Politics 5025

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American Politics.

Book I. History Of The Political Parties Of The United States.

Colonial Parties—Whig and Tory.

The parties peculiar to our Colonial times hardly have a place in American politics. They divided people in sentiment simply, as they did in the mother country, but here there was little or no power to act, and were to gather results from party victories. Men were then Whigs or Tories because they had been prior to their emigration here, or because their parents had been, or because it has ever been natural to show division in individual sentiment. Political contests, however, were unknown, for none enjoyed the pleasures and profits of power; the crown made and unmade rulers. The local self-government which our forefathers enjoyed, were secured to them by their charters, and these were held to be contracts not to be changed without the consent of both parties. All of the inhabitants of the colonies claimed and were justly entitled to the rights guaranteed by the Magna Charta, and in addition to these they insisted upon the supervision of all internal interests and the power to levy and collect taxes. These claims were conceded until their growing prosperity and England’s need of additional revenues suggested schemes of indirect taxation. Against these the colony of Plymouth protested as early as 1636, and spasmodic protests from all the colonies followed. These increased in frequency and force with the growing demands of King George III. In 1651 the navigation laws imposed upon the colonies required both exports and imports to be carried in British ships, and all who traded were compelled to do it with England. In 1672 inter-colonial duties were imposed, and when manufacturing sought to flank this policy, their establishment was forbidden by law.

The passage of the Stamp Act in 1765 caused high excitement, and for the first time parties began to take definite shape and manifest open antagonisms, and the words Whig and Tory then had a plainer meaning in America than in England. The Stamp Act was denounced by the Whigs as direct taxation, since it provided, that stamps previously paid for should be affixed to all legal papers. The colonies resented, and so general were the protests that for a time it seemed that only those who owed their livings to the Crown, or expected aid and comfort from it, remained with the Tories. The Whigs were the patriots. The war for the rights of the colonies began in 1775, and it was supported by majorities in all of the Colonial Assemblies. These majorities were as carefully organized then as now to promote a popular cause, and this in the face of adverse action on the part of the several Colonial Governors. Thus in Virginia, Lord Dunmore had from time to time, until 1773, prorogued the Virginia Assembly, when it seized the opportunity to pass resolves instituting a committee of correspondence, and recommending joint action by the legislatures of the other colonies. In the next year, the same body, under the lead of Henry, Randolph, Lee, Washington, Wythe and other patriots, officially deprecated the closing of the port of Boston, and set apart a day to implore Divine interposition in behalf of the colonies. The Governor dissolved the House for this act, and the delegates, 89 in number, repaired to a tavern, organized themselves into a committee, signed articles of association, and advised with other colonial committees the expediency of “appointing deputies to meet in a general correspondence”—really a suggestion for a Congress. The idea of a Congress, however, originated with Doctor Franklin the year before, and it had then been approved by town meetings in Providence, Boston and New York. The action of Virginia lifted the proposal above individual advice and the action of town meetings, and called to it the attention of all the colonial legislatures. It was indeed fortunate in the incipiency of these political movements, that the people were practically unanimous. Only the far-seeing realized the drift and danger, while nearly all could join their voices against oppressive taxes and imposts.

The war went on for colonial rights, the Whigs wisely insisting that they were willing to remain as colonists if their rights should be guaranteed by the mother country; the Tories, chiefly fed by the Crown, were willing to remain without guarantee—a negative position, and one which in the high excitement of the times excited little attention, save where the holders of such views made themselves odious by the enjoyment of high official position, or by harsh criticism upon, or treatment of the patriots.

The first Continental Congress assembled in Philadelphia in September, 1774, and there laid the foundations of the Republic. While its assemblage was first recommended by home meetings, the cause, as already shown, was taken up by the assemblies of Massachusetts and Virginia. Georgia alone was not represented. The members were called delegates, who declared in their official papers that they were “appointed by the good people of these colonies.” It was called the “revolutionary government,” because it derived its power from the people, and not from the functionaries of any existing government. In it each colony was allowed but a single vote, regardless of the number of delegates, and here began not only the unit rule, but the practice which obtains in the election of a President when the contest reaches, under the constitution and law, the National House of Representatives. The original object was to give equality to the colonies as colonies.

In 1776, the second Continental Congress assembled at Philadelphia, all the colonies being again represented save Georgia. The delegates were chosen principally by conventions of the people, though some were sent by the popular branches of the colonial legislatures. In July, and soon after the commencement of hostilities, Georgia entered the Confederacy.

The Declaration of Independence, passed in 1776, drew yet plainer lines between the Whigs and Tories. A gulf of hatred separated the opposing parties, and the Tory was far more despised than the open foe, when he was not such, and was the first sought when he was. Men who contend for liberty ever regard those who are not for them as against them—a feeling which led to the expression of a political maxim of apparent undying force, for it has since found frequent repetition in every earnest campaign. After the adoption of the Declaration by the Continental Congress, the Whigs favored the most direct and absolute separation, while the Tories supported the Crown. On the 7th of June, 1776, Richard Henry Lee, of Virginia, moved the Declaration in these words:

“_Resolved_, That these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.”

Then followed preparations for the formal declaration, which was adopted on the 4th of July, 1776, in the precise language submitted by Thomas Jefferson. All of the state papers of the Continental Congress evince the highest talent, and the evils which led to its exhibition must have been long but very impatiently endured to impel the study of the questions involved. Possibly only the best lives in our memory invite our perusal, but certain it is that higher capacity was never called to the performance of graver political duties in the history of the world.

It has been said that the Declaration is in imitation of that published by the United Netherlands, but whether this be true or false, the liberty-loving world has for more than a century accepted it as the best protest against oppression known to political history. A great occasion conspired with a great author to make it grandly great.

Dr. Franklin, as early as July, 1775, first prepared a sketch of articles of confederation between the colonies, to continue until their reconciliation with Great Britain, and in failure thereof to be perpetual. John Quincy Adams says this plan was never discussed in Congress. June 11, 1776, a committee was appointed to prepare the force of a colonial confederation, and the day following one member from each colony was appointed to perform the duty. The report was submitted, laid aside August 20, 1776, taken up April 7, 1777, and debated from time to time until November 15th, of the same year, when the report was agreed to. It was then submitted to the legislatures of the several states, these being advised to authorize their delegates in Congress to ratify the same. On the 26th of June, 1778, the ratification was ordered to be engrossed and signed by the delegates. Those of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and South Carolina signed July 9th, 1778; those of North Carolina July 21st; Georgia July 24th; Jersey November 26th, same year; Delaware February 22d and May 5th, 1779. Maryland refused to ratify until the question of the conflicting claims of the Union and of the separate States to the property of the crown-lands should be adjusted. This was accomplished by the cession of the lands in dispute to the United States, and Maryland signed March 1st, 1781. On the 2d of March, Congress assembled under the new powers, and continued to act for the Confederacy until the 4th of March, 1789, the date of the organization of the government under the Federal constitution. Our political life has therefore three periods, “the revolutionary government,” “the confederation,” and that of the “federal constitution,” which still obtains.

The federal constitution is the result of the labors of a convention called at Philadelphia in May, 1787, at a time when it was feared by many that the Union was in the greatest danger, from inability to pay soldiers who had, in 1783, been disbanded on a declaration of peace and an acknowledgment of independence; from prostration of the public credit and faith of the nation; from the neglect to provide for the payment of even the interest on the public debt; and from the disappointed hopes of many who thought freedom did not need to face responsibilities. A large portion of the convention of 1787 still clung to the confederacy of the states, and advocated as a substitute for the constitution a revival of the old articles of confederation with additional powers to Congress. A long discussion followed, and a most able one, but a constitution for the people, embodying a division of legislative, judicial and executive powers prevailed, and the result is now daily witnessed in the federal constitution. While the revolutionary war lasted but seven years, the political revolution incident to, identified with and directing it, lasted thirteen years. This was completed on the 30th of April, 1789, the day on which Washington was inaugurated as the first President under the federal constitution.

The Particularists.

As questions of government were evolved by the struggles for independence, the Whigs, who of course greatly outnumbered all others during the Revolution, naturally divided in sentiment, though their divisions were not sufficiently serious to excite the establishment of rival parties—something which the great majority of our forefathers were too wise to think of in time of war. When the war closed, however, and the question of establishing the Union was brought clear to the view of all, one class of the Whigs believed that state government should be supreme, and that no central power should have sufficient authority to coerce a state, or keep it to the compact against its will. All accepted the idea of a central government; all realized the necessity of union, but the fear that the states would lose their power, or surrender their independence was very great, and this fear was more naturally shown by both the larger and the smaller states. This class of thinkers were then called Particularists. Their views were opposed by the

Strong Government Whigs

who argued that local self-government was inadequate to the establishment and perpetuation of political freedom, and that it afforded little or no power to successfully resist foreign invasion. Some of these went so far as to favor a government patterned after that of England, save that it should be republican in name and spirit. The essential differences, if they can be reduced to two sentences, were these: The Particularist Whigs desired a government republican in form and democratic in spirit, with rights of local self-government and state rights ever uppermost. The Strong Government Whigs desired a government republican in form, with checks upon the impulses or passions of the people; liberty, sternly regulated by law, and that law strengthened and confirmed by central authority—the authority of the national government to be final in appeals.

As we have stated, the weakness of the confederation was acknowledged by many men, and the majority, as it proved to be after much agitation and discussion thought it too imperfect to amend. The power of the confederacy was not acknowledged by the states, its congress not respected by the people. Its requisitions were disregarded, foreign trade could not be successfully regulated; foreign nations refused to bind themselves by commercial treaties, and there was a rapid growth of very dangerous business rivalries and jealousies between the several states. Those which were fortunate enough, independent of congress, to possess or secure ports for domestic or foreign commerce, taxed the imports of their sister states. There was confusion which must soon have approached violence, for no authority beyond the limits of the state was respected, and Congress was notably powerless in its attempts to command aid from the states to meet the payment of the war debt, or the interest thereon. Instead of general respect for, there was almost general disregard of law on the part of legislative bodies, and the people were not slow in imitating their representatives. Civil strife became imminent, and Shay’s Rebellion in Massachusetts was the first warlike manifestation of the spirit which was abroad in the land.

Alive to the new dangers, the Assembly of Virginia in 1786, appointed commissioners to invite all the states to take part in a convention for the consideration of questions of commerce, and the propriety of altering the Articles of Confederation. This convention met at Annapolis, Sept. 11th, 1786. But five states sent representatives, the others regarding the movement with jealousy. This convention, however, adapted a report which urged the appointment of commissioners by all the states, “to devise such other provisions as shall, to them seem necessary to render the condition of the Federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Union; and to report such an act for that purpose to the United States in Congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them and afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every state, will effectually provide for the same.” Congress approved this action, and passed resolutions favoring a meeting in convention for the “sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, and report to Congress and the State legislatures.” The convention met in Philadelphia in May, 1787, and continued its sessions until September 17th, of the same year. The Strong Government Whigs had previously made every possible effort for a full and able representation, and the result did not disappoint them, for instead of simply revising the Articles of Confederation, the convention framed a constitution, and sent it to Congress to be submitted to that body and through it to the several legislatures. The act submitting it provided that, if it should be ratified by nine of the thirteen states, it should be binding upon those ratifying the same. Just here was started the custom which has since passed into law, that amendments to the national constitution shall be submitted after approval by Congress, to the legislatures of the several states, and after approval by three-fourths thereof, it shall be binding _upon all_—a very proper exercise of constitutional authority, as it seems now, but which would not have won popular approval when Virginia proposed the Annapolis convention in 1786. Indeed, the reader of our political history must ever be impressed with the fact that changes and reforms ever moved slowly, and that those of slowest growth seem to abide the longest.

The Federal and Anti-Federal Parties.

The Strong Government Whigs, on the submission of the constitution of 1787 to Congress and the legislatures, and indirectly through the latter to the people, who elect the members on this issue, became the Federal party, and all of its power was used to promote the ratification of the instrument. Its ablest men, headed by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, advocated adoption before the people, and their pens supplied much of the current political literature of that day. Eighty-five essays, still noted and quoted for their ability, under the _nom de plume_ of “Publius,” were published in “The Federalist.” They were written by Hamilton, Madison and Jay, and with irresistible force advocated the Federal constitution, which was ratified by the nine needed states, and Congress was officially informed of the fact July 2d, 1788, and the first Wednesday in March, 1789, was fixed as the time “for commencing proceedings under the constitution.”

This struggle for the first time gave the Federalists an admitted majority. The complexion of the State legislature prior to it showed them in fact to be in a minority, and the Particularist Whigs, or Anti-Federals opposed every preliminary step looking to the abandonment of the Articles of Confederation and the adoption of a Federal constitution. They were called Anti-Federals because they opposed a federal government and constitution and adhered to the rights of the States and those of local self-government. Doubtless party rancor, then as now, led men to oppose a system of government which it seems they must have approved after fighting for it, but the earlier jealousies of the States and the prevailing ideas of liberty certainly gave the Anti-Federals a popularity which only a test so sensible as that proposed could have shaken. They were not without popular orators and leaders. Patrick Henry, the earliest of the patriots, and “the-old-man-eloquent,” Samuel Adams, took special pride in espousing their cause. The war questions between Whig and Tory must have passed quickly away, as living issues, though the newspapers and contemporaneous history show that the old taunts and battle cries were applied to the new situation with a plainness and virulence that must still be envied by the sensational and more bitterly partisan journals of our own day. To read these now, and some of our facts are gathered from such sources, is to account for the frequent use of the saying touching “the ingratitude of republics,” for when partisan hatred could deride the still recent utterances of Henry before the startled assembly of Virginians, and of Adams in advocating the adoption of the Declaration, there must at least to every surface view have been rank ingratitude. Their good names, however, survived the struggle, as good names in our republic have ever survived the passions of the law. In politics the Americans then as now, hated with promptness and forgave with generosity.

The Anti-Federals denied nearly all that the Federals asserted. The latter had for the first time assumed the aggressive, and had the advantage of position. They showed the deplorable condition of the country, and their opponents had to bear the burdens of denial at a time when nearly all public and private obligations were dishonored; when labor was poorly paid, workmen getting but twenty-five cents a day, with little to do at that; when even the rich in lands were poor in purse, and when commerce on the seas was checked by the coldness of foreign nations and restricted by the action of the States themselves; when manufactures were without protection of any kind, and when the people thought their struggle for freedom was about to end in national poverty. Still Henry, and Adams and Hancock, with hosts of others, claimed that the aspirations of the Anti-Federals were the freest, that they pointed to personal liberty and local sovereignty. Yet many Anti-Federals must have accepted the views of the Federals, who under the circumstances must have presented the better reason, and the result was as stated, the ratification of the Federal constitution of 1787 by three-fourths of the States of the Union. After this the Anti-Federalists were given a new name, that of “Close Constructionists,” because they naturally desired to interpret the new instrument in such a way as to bend it to their views. The Federalists became “Broad Constructionists,” because they interpreted the constitution in a way calculated to broaden the power of the national government.

The Confederacy once dissolved, the Federal party entered upon the enjoyment of full political power, but it was not without its responsibilities. The government had to be organized upon the basis of the new constitution, as upon the success of that organization would depend not alone the stability of the government and the happiness of its people, but the reputation of the party and the fame of its leaders as statesmen.

Fortunately for all, party hostilities were not manifested in the Presidential election. All bowed to the popularity of Washington, and he was unanimously nominated by the congressional caucus and appointed by the electoral college. He selected his cabinet from the leading minds of both parties, and while himself a recognized Federalist, all felt that he was acting for the good of all, and in the earlier years of his administration, none disputed this fact.

As the new measures of the government advanced, however, the anti-federalists organized an opposition to the party in power. Immediate danger had passed. The constitution worked well. The laws of Congress were respected; its calls for revenue honored, and Washington devoted much of his first and second messages to showing the growing prosperity of the country, and the respect which it was beginning to excite abroad. But where there is political power, there is opposition in a free land, and the great leaders of that day neither forfeited their reputations as patriots, or their characters as statesmen by the assertion of honest differences of opinion. Washington, Adams, and Hamilton were the recognized leaders of the Federalists, the firm friends of the constitution. The success of this instrument modified the views of the anti-Federalists, and Madison of Virginia, its recognized friend when it was in preparation, joined with others who had been its friends—notably,[1] Doctor Williamson, of North Carolina, and Mr. Langdon, of Georgia, in opposing the administration, and soon became recognized leaders of the anti-Federalists. Langdon was the President _pro tem._ of the Senate. Jefferson was then on a mission to France, and not until some years thereafter did he array himself with those opposed to centralized power in the nation. He returned in November, 1789, and was called to Washington’s cabinet as Secretary of State in March, 1790. It was a great cabinet, with Jefferson as its premier (if this term is suited to a time when English political nomenclature was anything but popular in the land;) Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury; Knox, Secretary of War, and Edmund Randolph, Attorney-General. There was no Secretary of the Navy until the administration of the elder Adams, and no Secretary of the Interior.

The first session of Congress under the Federal constitution, held in New York, sat for nearly six months, the adjournment taking place September 29th, 1789. Nearly all the laws framed pointed to the organization of the government, and the discussions were able and protracted. Indeed, these discussions developed opposing views, which could easily find separation on much the same old lines as those which separated the founders of constitutional government from those who favored the old confederate methods. The Federalists, on pivotal questions, at this session, carried their measures only by small majorities.

Much of the second session was devoted to the discussion of the able reports of Hamilton, and their final adoption did much to build up the credit of the nation and to promote its industries. He was the author of the protective system, and at the first session gave definite shape to his theories. He recommended the funding of the war debt, the assumption of the state war debts by the national government, the providing of a system of revenue from the collection of duties on imports, and an internal excise. His advocacy of a protective tariff was plain, for he declared it to be necessary for the support of the government and _the encouragement of manufactures_ that duties be laid on goods, wares, and merchandise imported.

The third session of the same Congress was held at Philadelphia, though the seat of the national government had, at the previous one, been fixed on the Potomac instead of the Susquehanna—this after a compromise with Southern members, who refused to vote for the Assumption Bill until the location of the capital in the District of Columbia had been agreed upon; by the way, this was the first exhibition of log-rolling in Congress. To complete Hamilton’s financial system, a national bank was incorporated. On this project both the members of Congress and of the cabinet were divided, but it passed, and was promptly approved by Washington. By this time it was well known that Jefferson and Hamilton held opposing views on many questions of government, and these found their way into and influenced the action of Congress, and passed naturally from thence to the people, who were thus early believed to be almost equally divided on the more essential political issues. Before the close of the session, Vermont and Kentucky were admitted to the Union. Vermont was the first state admitted in addition to the original thirteen. True, North Carolina and Rhode Island had rejected the constitution, but they reconsidered their action and came in—the former in November, 1789, and the latter in May, 1790.

The election for members of the Second Congress resulted in a majority in both branches favorable to the administration. It met at Philadelphia in October, 1791. The exciting measure of the session was the excise act, somewhat similar to that of the previous year, but the opposition wanted an issue on which to rally, they accepted this, and this agitation led to violent and in one instance warlike opposition on the part of a portion of the people. Those of western Pennsylvania, largely interested in distilleries, prepared for armed resistance to the excise, but at the same session a national militia law had been passed, and Washington took advantage of this to suppress the “Whisky Rebellion” in its incipiency. It was a hasty, rash undertaking, yet was dealt with so firmly that the action of the authorities strengthened the law, and the respect for order. The four counties which rebelled did no further damage than to tar and feather a government tax collector and rob him of his horse, though many threats were made and the agitation continued until 1794, when Washington’s threatened appearance at the head of fifteen thousand militia settled the whole question.

The first session of the Second Congress also passed the first methodic apportionment bill, which based the congressional representation on the census taken in 1790, the basis being 33,000 inhabitants for each representative. The second session which sat from November, 1792, to March, 1793, was mainly occupied in a discussion of the foreign and domestic relations of the country. No important measures were adopted.

The Republican and Federal Parties.

The most serious objection to the constitution before its ratification was the absence of a distinct bill of rights, which should recognize “the equality of all men, and their rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” and at the first session of Congress a bill was framed containing twelve articles, ten of which were afterwards ratified as amendments to the constitution. Yet state sovereignty, then imperfectly defined, was the prevailing idea in the minds of the Anti-Federalists, and they took every opportunity to oppose any extended delegation of authority from the states of the Union. They contended that the power of the state should be supreme, and charged the Federalists with monarchical tendencies. They opposed Hamilton’s national bank scheme, and Jefferson and Randolph plainly expressed the opinion that it was unconstitutional—that a bank was not authorized by the constitution, and that it would prevent the states from maintaining banks. But when the Bill of Rights had been incorporated in and attached to the constitution as amendments, Jefferson with rare political sagacity withdrew all opposition to the instrument itself, and the Anti-Federalists gladly followed his lead, for they felt that they had labored under many partisan disadvantages. The constitution was from the first too strong for successful resistance, and when opposition was confessedly abandoned the party name was changed, also at the suggestion of Jefferson, to that of Republican. The Anti-Federalists were at first disposed to call their party the Democratic-Republicans, but finally called, it simply Republican, to avoid the opposite of the extreme which they charged against the Federalists. Each party had its taunts in use, the Federalists being denounced as monarchists, the Anti-Federalists as Democrats; the one presumed to be looking forward to monarchy, the other to the rule of the mob.

By 1793 partisan lines under the names of Federalists and Republicans, were plainly drawn, and the schism in the cabinet was more marked than ever. Personal ambition may have had much to do with it, for Washington had previously shown his desire to retire to private life. While he remained at the head of affairs he was unwilling to part with Jefferson and Hamilton, and did all in his power to bring about a reconciliation, but without success. Before the close of the first constitutional Presidency, however, Washington had become convinced that the people desired him to accept a re-election, and he was accordingly a candidate and unanimously chosen. John Adams was re-elected Vice-President, receiving 77 votes to 50 for Geo. Clinton, (5 scattering) the Republican candidate. Soon after the inauguration Citizen Genet, an envoy from the French republic, arrived and sought to excite the sympathy of the United States and involve it in a war with Great Britain. Jefferson and his Republican party warmly sympathized with France, and insisted that gratitude for revolutionary favors commanded aid to France in her struggles. The Federalists, under Washington and Hamilton, favored non-intervention, and insisted that we should maintain friendly relations with Great Britain. Washington showed his usual firmness, and before the expiration of the month in which Genet arrived, had issued his celebrated proclamation of neutrality. This has ever since been the accepted foreign policy of the nation.

Genet, chagrined at the issuance of this proclamation, threatened to appeal to the people, and made himself so obnoxious to Washington that the latter demanded his recall. The French government sent M. Fauchet as his successor, but Genet continued to reside in the United States, and under his inspiration a number of Democratic Societies, in imitation of the French Jacobin clubs, were founded, but like all such organizations in this country, they were short-lived. Secret political societies thrive only under despotisms. In Republics like ours they can only live when the great parties are in confusion and greatly divided. They disappear with the union of sentiment into two great parties. If there were many parties and factions, as in Mexico and some of the South American republics, there would be even a wider field for them here than there.

The French agitation showed its impress upon the nation as late as 1794, when a resolution to cut off intercourse with Great Britain passed the House, and was defeated in the Senate only by the casting vote of the Vice-President. Many people favored France, and to such silly heights did the excitement run that these insisted on wearing a national cockade. Jefferson had left the cabinet the December previous, and had retired to his plantation in Virginia, where he spent his leisure in writing political essays and organizing the Republican party, of which he was the acknowledged founder. Here he escaped the errors of his party in Congress, but it was a potent fact that his friends in official station not only did not endorse the non-intervention policy of Washington, but that they actively antagonized it in many ways. The Congressional leader in these movements was Mr. Madison. The policy of Britain fed this opposition. The forts on Lake Erie were still occupied by the British soldiery in defiance of the treaty of 1783; American vessels were seized on their way to French ports, and American citizens were impressed. To avoid a war, Washington sent John Jay as special envoy to England. He arrived in June, 1794, and by November succeeded in making a treaty. It was ratified in June, 1795, by the Senate by the constitutional majority of two-thirds, though there was much declamatory opposition, and the feeling between the Federal and Republican parties ran higher than ever before. The Republicans denounced while the Federals congratulated Washington. Under this treaty the British surrendered possession of all American ports, and as Gen’l Wayne during the previous summer had conquered the war-tribes and completed a treaty with them, the country was again on the road to prosperity.

In Washington’s message of 1794, he plainly censured all “self-created political societies,” meaning the democratic societies formed by Genet, but this part of the message the House refused to endorse, the speaker giving the casting vote in the negative. The Senate was in harmony with the political views of the President. Party spirit had by this time measurably affected all classes of the people, and as subjects for agitation here multiplied, the opposition no longer regarded Washington with that respect and decorum which it had been the rule to manifest. His wisdom as President, his patriotism, and indeed his character as a man, were all hotly questioned by political enemies. He was even charged with corruption in expending more of the public moneys than had been appropriated—charges which were soon shown to be groundless.

At the first session of Congress in December, 1795, the Senate’s administration majority had increased, but in the House the opposing Republicans had also increased their numbers. The Senate by 14 to 8 endorsed the message; the House at first refused but finally qualified its answers.

In March, 1796, a new political issue was sprung in the House by Mr. Livingstone of New York, who offered a resolution requesting of the President a copy of the instructions to Mr. Jay, the envoy who made the treaty with Great Britain. After a debate of several days, more bitter than any which had preceded it, the House passed the resolution by 57 to 35, the Republicans voting aye, the Federals no. Washington in answer, took the position that the House of Representatives was not part of the treaty-making power of the government, and could not therefore be entitled to any papers relating to such treaties. The constitution had placed this treaty-making and ratifying power in the hands of the Senate, the Cabinet and the President.

This answer, now universally accepted as the proper one, yet excited the House and increased political animosities. The Republicans charged the Federals with being the “British party,” and in some instances hinted that they had been purchased with British gold. Indignation meetings were called, but after much sound and fury, it was ascertained that the people really favored abiding by the treaty in good faith, and finally the House, after more calm and able debates, passed the needed legislation to carry out the treaty by a vote of 51 to 48.

In August, 1796, prior to the meeting of the Congressional caucus which then placed candidates for the Presidency in nomination, Washington issued his celebrated Farewell Address, in which he gave notice that he would retire from public life at the expiration of his term. He had been solicited to be a candidate for re-election (a third term) and told that all the people could unite upon him—a statement which, without abating one jot, our admiration for the man, would doubtless have been called in question by the Republicans, who had become implacably hostile to his political views, and who were encouraged to believe they could win control of the Presidency, by their rapidly increasing power in the House. Yet the address was everywhere received with marks of admiration. Legislatures commended it by resolution and ordered it to be engrossed upon their records; journals praised it, and upon the strength of its plain doctrines the Federalists took new courage, and prepared to win in the Presidential battle which followed. Both parties were plainly arrayed and confident, and so close was the result that the leaders of both were elected—John Adams, the nominee of the Federalists, to the Presidency, and Thomas Jefferson, the nominee of the Republicans, to the Vice-Presidency. The law which then obtained was that the candidate who received the highest number of electoral votes, took the first place, the next highest, the second. Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina was the Federal nominee for Vice-President, and Aaron Burr of the Republicans. Adams received 71 electoral votes, Jefferson 68, Pinckney 59, Burr 30, scattering 48. Pinckney had lost 12 votes, while Burr lost 38—a loss of popularity which the latter regained four years later. The first impressions which our forefathers had of this man were the best.

John Adams was inaugurated as President in Philadelphia, at Congress Hall, March 4th, 1797, and in his inaugural was careful to deny the charge that the Federal party had any sympathy for England, but reaffirmed his endorsement of the policy of Washington as to strict neutrality. To this extent he sought to soften the asperities of the parties, and measurably succeeded, though the times were still stormy. The French revolution had reached its highest point, and our people still took sides. Adams found he would have to arm to preserve neutrality and at the same time punish the aggression of either of the combatants. This was our first exhibition of “armed neutrality.” An American navy was quickly raised, and every preparation made for defending the rights of Americans. An alliance with France was refused, after which the American Minister was dismissed and the French navy began to cripple our trade. In May, 1797, President Adams felt it his duty to call an extra session of Congress, which closed in July. The Senate approved of negotiations for reconciliation with France. They were attempted but, proved fruitless; in May, 1798, a full naval armament was authorized, and soon several French vessels were captured before there was any declaration of war. Indeed, neither power declared war, and as soon as France discovered how earnest the Americans were she made overtures for an adjustment of difficulties, and these resulted in the treaty of 1800.

The Republicans, though warmly favoring a contest, did not heartily support that inaugurated by Adams, and contended after this that the militia and a small naval force were sufficient for internal defense. They denounced the position of the Federals, who favored the enlargement of the army and navy, as measures calculated to overawe public sentiment in time of peace. The Federals, however, through their prompt resentment of the aggressions of France, had many adherents to their party. They organized their power and sought to perpetuate it by the passage of the alien and sedition, and a naturalization law.

The alien and sedition law gave the President authority “to order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government thereof, to depart out of the territory of the United States, within such time as shall be expressed in such order.” The provisions which followed were in keeping with that quoted, the 3d section commanding every master of a ship entering a port of the United States, immediately on his arrival, to make report in writing to the collector of customs, the names of all aliens on board, etc. The act was to continue in force for two years from the date of its passage, and it was approved June 25th, 1798.

A resolution was introduced in the Senate on the 25th of April, 1798, by Mr. Hillhouse of Connecticut, to inquire what provision of law ought to be made, &c., as to the removal of such aliens as may be dangerous to the peace of the country, &c. This resolution was adopted the next day, and Messrs. Hillhouse, Livermore and Read were appointed the committee, and subsequently reported the bill. It passed the Senate by 16 to 7, and the House by 46 to 40, the Republicans in the latter body resisting it warmly. The leading opposing idea was that it lodged with the Executive too much power, and was liable to great abuse. It has frequently since, in arguments against centralized power, been used for illustration by political speakers.

The Naturalization law, favored by the Federalists, because they knew they could acquire few friends either from newly arrived English or French aliens, among other requirements provided that an alien must reside in the United States _fourteen years_ before he could vote. The Republicans denounced this law as calculated to check immigration, and dangerous to our country in the fact that it caused too many inhabitants to owe no allegiance. They also asserted, as did those who opposed Americanism later on in our history, that America was properly an asylum for all nations, and that those coming to America should freely share all the privileges and liberties of the government.

These laws and the political resentments which they created gave a new and what eventually proved a dangerous current to political thought and action. They were the immediate cause of the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1798, Jefferson being the author of the former and Madison of the latter.

These resolutions were full of political significance, and gave tone to sectional discussion up to the close of the war for the Union. They first promulgated the doctrine of nullification or secession, and political writers mistake who point to Calhoun as the father of that doctrine. It began with the old Republicans under the leadership of Jefferson and Madison, and though directly intended as protests against the alien and sedition, and the naturalization laws of Congress, they kept one eye upon the question of slavery—rather that interest was kept in view in their declarations, and yet the authors of both were anything but warm advocates of slavery. They were then striving, however, to reinforce the opposition to the Federal party, which the administration of Adams had thus far apparently weakened, and they had in view the brief agitation which had sprung up in 1793, five years before, on the petition to Congress of a Pennsylvania society “to use its powers to stop the traffic in slaves.” On the question of referring this petition to a committee there arose a sectional debate. Men took sides not because of the party to which they belonged, but the section, and for the first time the North and South were arrayed against each other on a question not then treated either as partisan or political, but which most minds then saw must soon become both partisan and sectional. Some of the Southern debaters, in their protests against interference, thus early threatened civil war. With a view to better protect their rights to slave property, they then advocated and succeeded in passing the first fugitive slave law. This was approved February 12, 1793.

The resolutions of 1798 will be found in the book devoted to political platforms. So highly were these esteemed by the Republicans of that day, and by the interests whose support they so shrewdly invited, that they more than counterbalanced the popularity acquired by the Federals in their resistance to France, and by 1800 they caused a rupture in the Cabinet of Adams.

In the Presidential election of 1800 John Adams was the nominee for President and C. C. Pinckney for Vice-President. A “Congressional Convention” of Republicans, held in Philadelphia, nominated Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr as candidates for these offices. On the election which followed the Republicans chose 73 electors and the Federalists 65. Each elector voted for two persons, and the Republicans so voted that they unwisely gave Jefferson and Burr each 73 votes. Neither being highest, it was not legally determined which should be President or Vice-President, and the election had to go to the House. The Federalists threw 65 votes to Adams and 64 to Pinckney. The Republicans could have done the same, but Burr’s intrigue and ambition prevented this, and the result was a protracted contest in the House, and one which put the country in great peril, but which plainly pointed out some of the imperfections of the electoral features of the Constitution. The Federalists proposed to confess the inability of the House to agree through the vote by States, but to this proposition the Republicans threatened armed resistance. The Federalists next attempted a combination with the friends of Aaron Burr, but this specimen of bargaining to deprive a nominee of the place to which it was the plain intention of his party to elect him, really contributed to Jefferson’s popularity, if not in that Congress, certainly before the people. He was elected on the 36th ballot.

The bitterness of this strife, and the dangers which similar ones threatened, led to an abandonment of the system of each Elector voting for two, the highest to be President, the next highest Vice-President, and an amendment was offered to the Constitution, and fully ratified by September 25, 1804, requiring the electors to ballot separately for President and Vice-President.

Jefferson was the first candidate nominated by a Congressional caucus. It convened in 1800 at Philadelphia, and nominated Jefferson for President and Burr for Vice-President. Adams and Pinckney were not nominated, but ran and were accepted as natural leaders of their party, just as Washington and Adams were before them.

Downfall of the Federal Party.

This contest broke the power of the Federal party. It had before relied upon the rare sagacity and ability of its leaders, but the contest in the House developed such attempts at intrigue as disgusted many and caused all to quarrel, Hamilton having early showed his dislike to Adams. As a party the Federal had been peculiarly brave at times when high bravery was needed. It had framed the Federal Government and stood by the powers given it until they were too firmly planted for even newer and triumphant partisans to recklessly trifle with. It stood for non-interference with foreign nations against the eloquence of adventurers, the mad impulses of mobs, the generosity of new-born freemen, the harangues of demagogues, and best of all against those who sought to fan these popular breezes to their own comfort, It provided for the payment of the debt, had the courage to raise revenues both from internal and external sources, and to increase expenditures, as the growth of the country demanded. Though it passed out of power in a cloud of intrigue and in a vain grasp at the “flesh-pots,” it yet had a glorious history, and one which none untinctured with the better prejudices of that day, can avoid admiring.

The defeat of Adams was not unexpected by him, yet it was greatly regretted by his friends, for he was justly regarded as second to no other civilian in the establishment of the liberties of the colonies. He was eloquent to a rare degree, possessed natural eloquence, and made the most famous speech in advocacy of the Declaration. Though the proceedings of the Revolutionary Congress were secret, and what was said never printed, yet Webster gives his version of the noted speech of Adams, and we reproduce it in Book III. of this volume as one of the great speeches of noted American orators.

Mr. Jefferson was inaugurated the third President, in the new capitol at Washington, on the 4th of March, 1801, and Vice-President Burr took his seat in the Senate the same day. Though Burr distinctly disavowed any participancy in the House contest, he was distrusted by Jefferson’s warm friends, and jealousies rapidly cropped out. Jefferson endeavored through his inaugural to smooth factious and party asperities, and so well were his words chosen that the Federalists indulged, the hope that they would not be removed from office because of their political views.

Early in June, however, the first question of civil service was raised. Mr. Jefferson then removed Elizur Goodrich, a Federalist, from the Collectorship of New Haven, and appointed Samuel Bishop, a Republican, to the place. The citizens remonstrated, saying that Goodrich was prompt, reliable and able, and showed that his successor was 78 years old, and too infirm for the duties of the office. To these remonstrances Mr. Jefferson, under date of July 12th, replied in language which did not then, as he did later on, plainly assert the right of every administration to have its friends in office. We quote the following:

“Declarations by myself, in favor of political tolerance, exhortations to harmony and affection in social intercourse, and respect for the equal rights of the minority, have, on certain occasions, been quoted and misconstrued into assurances that the tenure of office was not to be disturbed. But could candor apply such a construction? When it is considered that, during the late administration, those who were not of a particular sect of politics were excluded from all office; when, by a steady pursuit of this measure, nearly the whole offices of the United States were monopolized by that sect; when the public sentiment at length declared itself, and burst open the doors of honor and confidence to those whose opinions they approved; was it to be imagined that this monopoly of office was to be continued in the hands of the minority? Does it violate their equal rights to assert some rights in the majority also? Is it political intolerance to claim a proportionate share in the direction of the public affairs? If a due participation of office is a matter of right, how are vacancies to be obtained? Those by death are few, by resignation none. Can any other mode than that of removal be proposed? This is a painful office; but it is made my duty, and I meet it as such. I proceed in the operation with deliberation and inquiry, that it may injure the best men least, and effect the purposes of justice and public utility with the least private distress, that it may be thrown as much as possible on delinquency, on oppression, on intolerance, on ante-revolutionary adherence to our enemies.

“I lament sincerely that unessential differences of opinion should ever have been deemed sufficient to interdict half the society from the rights and the blessings of self-government, to proscribe them as unworthy of every trust. It would have been to me a circumstance of great relief, had I found a moderate participation of office in the hands of the majority. I would gladly have left to time and accident to raise them to their just share. But their total exclusion calls for prompter corrections. I shall correct the procedure; but that done, return with joy to that state of things when the only questions concerning a candidate shall be: Is he honest? Is he capable? Is he faithful to the constitution?”

Mr. Adams had made few removals, and none because of the political views held by the incumbents, nearly all of whom had been appointed by Washington and continued through good behavior. At the date of the appointment of most of them, Jefferson’s Republican party had no existence; so that the reasons given in the quotation do not comport with the facts. Washington’s rule was integrity and capacity, for he could have no regard for politics where political lines had been obliterated in his own selection. Doubtless these office-holders were human, and adhered with warmth to the administration which they served, and this fact, and this alone, must have angered the Republicans and furnished them with arguments for a change.

Mr. Jefferson’s position, however, made his later conduct natural. He was the acknowledged leader of his party, its founder indeed, and that party had carried him into power. He desired to keep it intact, to strengthen its lines with whatever patronage he had at his disposal, and he evidently regarded the cause of Adams in not rewarding his friends as a mistake. It was, therefore, Jefferson, and not Jackson, who was the author of the theory that “to the victors belong the spoils.” Jackson gave it a sharp and perfectly defined shape by the use of these words, but the spirit and principle were conceived by Jefferson, who throughout his life showed far greater originality in politics than any of the early patriots. It was his acute sense of just what was right for a growing political party to do, which led him to turn the thoughts of his followers into new and popular directions. Seeing that they were at grave disadvantage when opposing the attitude of the government in its policy with foreign nations; realizing that the work of the Federalists in strengthening the power of the new government, in providing revenues and ways and means for the payment of the debt, were good, he changed the character of the opposition by selecting only notoriously arbitrary measures for assault—and changed it even more radically than this. He early saw that simple opposition was not progress, and that it was both wise and popular to be progressive, and in all his later political papers he sought to make his party the party favoring personal freedom, the one of liberal ideas, the one which, instead of shirking, should anticipate every change calculated to enlarge the liberties and the opportunities of citizens. These things were not inconsistent with his strong views in favor of local self-government; indeed, in many particulars they seemed to support that theory, and by the union of the two ideas he shrewdly arrayed political enthusiasm by the side of political interest. Political sagacity more profound than this it is difficult to imagine. It has not since been equalled in the history of our land, nor do we believe in the history of any other.

After the New Haven episode, so jealous was Jefferson of his good name, that while he confided all new appointments to the hands of his political friends, he made few removals, and these for apparent cause. The mere statement of his position had proved an invitation to the Federalists in office to join his earlier friends in the support of his administration. Many of them did it, so many that the clamorings of truer friends could not be hushed. With a view to create a new excuse, Jefferson declared that all appointments made by Adams after February 14th, when the House began its ballotings for President, were void, these appointments belonging of right to him, and from this act of Adams we date the political legacies which some of our Presidents have since handed down to their successors. One of the magistrates whose commission had been made out under Adams, sought to compel Jefferson to sign it by a writ of mandamus before the Supreme Court, but a “profound investigation of constitutional law” induced the court not to grant the motion. All commissions signed by Adams after the date named were suppressed.

Jefferson’s apparent bitterness against the Federalists is mainly traceable to the contest in the House, and his belief that at one time they sought a coalition with Burr. This coalition he regarded as a violation of the understanding when he was nominated, and a supposed effort to appoint a provisional office he regarded as an usurpation in fact. In a letter to James Monroe, dated February 15th, speaking of this contest, he says:

“Four days of balloting have produced not a single change of a vote. Yet it is confidently believed that to-morrow there is to be a coalition. I know of no foundation for this belief. If they could have been permitted to pass a law for putting the government in the hands of an officer, they would certainly have prevented an election. But we thought it best to declare openly and firmly, one and all, that the day such an act passed, the Middle States would arm, and that no such usurpation, even for a single day, should be submitted to.”

It is but fair to say that the Federalists denied all such intentions, and that James A. Bayard, of Delaware, April 3, 1806, made formal oath to this denial. In this he says that three States, representing Federalist votes, offered to withdraw their opposition if John Nicholas, of Virginia, and the personal friend of Jefferson, would secure pledges that the public credit should be supported, the navy maintained, and that subordinate public officers, employed only in the execution of details, established by law, should not be removed from office on the ground of their public character, nor without complaint against their conduct. The Federalists then went so far as to admit that officers of “high discretion and confidence,” such as members of the cabinet and foreign ministers, should be known friends of the administration. This proposition goes to show that there is nothing very new in what are called our modern politics; that the elder Bayard, as early as 1800, made a formal proposal to bargain. Mr. Nicholas offered _his_ assurance that these things would prove acceptable to and govern the conduct of Jefferson’s administration, but he declined to consult with Jefferson on the points. General Smith subsequently engaged to do it, and Jefferson replied that the points given corresponded with his views and intentions, and that Mr. Bayard and his friends might confide in him accordingly. The opposition of Vermont, Maryland and Delaware was then immediately withdrawn, and Mr. Jefferson was made President. Gen’l Smith, twelve days later, made an affidavit which substantially confirmed that of Bayard. Latimer, the collector of the port of Philadelphia, and M’Lane, collector of Wilmington, (Bayard’s special friend) were retained in office. He had cited these two as examples of his opposition to any change, and Jefferson seemed to regard the pledges as not sacred beyond the parties actually named in Bayard’s negotiations with Gen’l Smith.

This misunderstanding or misconstruction of what in these days would be plainly called a bargain, led to considerable political criticism, and Jefferson felt it necessary to defend his cause. This he did in letters to friends which both then and since found their way into the public prints. One of these letters, written to Col. Monroe, March 7th, shows in every word and line the natural politician. In this he says:

“Some (removals) I know must be made. They must be as few as possible, done gradually, and bottomed on some malversation or inherent disqualification. Where we shall draw the line between all and none, is not yet settled, and will not be till we get our administration together; and perhaps even then we shall proceed _ā talons_, balancing our measures according to the impression we perceive them to make. This may give you a general view of our plan.”

A little later on, March 28, he wrote to Elbridge Gerry:

“Officers who have been guilty of gross abuses of office, such as marshals packing juries, etc., I shall now remove, as my predecessor ought in justice to have done. The instances will be few, and governed by strict rule, not party passion. The right of opinion shall suffer no invasion from me.”

Jefferson evidently tired of this subject, and gradually modified his views, as shown in his letter to Levi Lincoln, July 11, wherein he says:

“I am satisfied that the heaping of abuse on me personally, has been with the design and the hope of provoking me to make a general sweep of all Federalists out of office. But as I have carried no passion into the execution of this disagreeable duty, I shall suffer none to be excited. The clamor which has been raised will not provoke me to remove one more, nor deter me from removing one less, than if not a word had been said on the subject. In the course of the summer, all which is necessary will be done; and we may hope that, this cause of offence being at an end, the measures we shall pursue and propose for the amelioration of the public affairs, will be so confessedly salutary as to unite all men not monarchists in principle.” In the same letter he warmly berates the monarchical federalists, saying, “they are incurables, to be taken care of in a madhouse if necessary, and on motives of charity.”

The seventh Congress assembled. Political parties were at first nearly equally divided in the Senate, but eventually there was a majority for the administration. Jefferson then discontinued the custom established by Washington of delivering in person his message to Congress. The change was greatly for the better, as it afforded relief from the requirement of immediate answers on the subjects contained in the message. It has ever since been followed.

The seventh session of Congress, pursuant to the recommendation of President Jefferson, established a uniform system of naturalization, and so modified the law as to make the required residence of aliens five years, instead of fourteen, as in the act of 1798, and to permit a declaration of intention to become a citizen at the expiration of three years. By his recommendation also was established the first sinking fund for the redemption of the public debt. It required the setting apart annually for this purpose the sum of seven millions and three hundred thousand dollars. Other measures, more partisan in their character, were proposed, but Congress showed an aversion to undoing what had been wisely done. A favorite law of the Federalists establishing circuit courts alone was repealed, and this only after a sharp debate, and a close vote. The provisional army had been disbanded by a law of the previous Congress. A proposition to abolish the naval department was defeated, as was that to discontinue the mint establishment.

At this session the first law in relation to the slave trade was passed. It was to prevent the importation of negroes, mulattoes and other persons of color into any port of the United States within a state which had prohibited by law the admission of any such person. The penalty was one thousand dollars and the forfeiture of the vessel. The slave trade was not then prohibited by the constitution, nor was the subject then generally agitated, though it had been as early as 1793, when, as previously stated, an exciting sectional debate followed the presentation of a petition from Pennsylvania to abolish the slave trade.

Probably the most important occurrence under the first administration of Jefferson was that relating to the purchase and admission of Louisiana. There had been apprehensions of a war with Spain, and with a view to be ready Congress had passed an act authorizing the President to call upon the executives of such of the states as he might deem expedient, for detachments of militia not exceeding eighty thousand, or to accept the services of volunteers for a term of twelve months. The disagreement arose over the southwestern boundary line and the right of navigating the Mississippi. Our government learned in the spring of 1802, that Spain had by a secret treaty made in October, 1800, actually ceded Louisiana to France. Our government had in 1795 made a treaty with Spain which gave us the right of deposit at New Orleans for three years, but in October, 1802, the Spanish authorities gave notice by proclamation that this right was withdrawn. Excitement followed all along the valley of the Mississippi, and it was increased by the belief that the withdrawal of the privilege was made at the suggestion of France, though Spain still retained the territory, as the formalities of ceding it had not been gone through with. Jefferson promptly took the ground that if France took possession of New Orleans, the United States would immediately become allies of England, but suggested to Minister Livingston at Paris that France might be induced to cede the island of New Orleans and the Floridas to the United States. It was his belief, though a mistaken one, that France had also acquired the Floridas. Louisiana then comprised much of the territory west of the Mississippi and south of the Missouri.

The Federalists in Congress seized upon this question as one upon which they could make an aggressive war against Jefferson’s administration, and resolutions were introduced asking information on the subject. Jefferson, however, wisely avoided all entangling suggestions, and sent Monroe to aid Livingston in effecting a purchase. The treaty was formed in April, 1803, and submitted by Jefferson to the Senate in October following. The Republicans rallied in favor of this scheme of annexation, and claimed that it was a constitutional right in the government to acquire territory—a doctrine widely at variance with their previous position, but occasions are rare where parties quarrel with their administrations on pivotal measures. There was also some latitude here for endorsement, as the direct question of territorial acquisition had not before been presented, but only hypothetically stated in the constitutional disputations then in great fashion. Jefferson would not go so far as to say that the constitution warranted the acquisition to foreign territory, but the scheme was nevertheless his, and he stood in with his friends in the political battle which followed.

The Federalists claimed that we had no power to acquire territory, and that the acquirement of Louisiana would give the South a preponderance which would “continue for all time (poor prophets they!), since southern would be more rapid than northern development;” that states created west of the Mississippi would injure the commerce of New England, and they even went so far as to say that the “admission of the Western World into the Union would compel the Eastern States to establish an eastern empire.” Doubts were also raised as to the right of Louisianians, when admitted to citizenship under our laws, as their lineage, language and religion were different from our own. Its inhabitants were French and descendants of French, with some Spanish creoles, Americans, English and Germans—in all about 90,000, including 40,000 slaves. There were many Indians of course, in a territory then exceeding a million of square miles—a territory which, in the language of First Consul Napoleon, “strengthens forever the power of the United States, and which will give to England a maritime rival that will sooner or later humble her pride”—a military view of the change fully justified by subsequent history. Napoleon sold because of needed preparations for war with England, and while he had previously expressed a willingness to take fifty million francs for it, he got sixty through the shrewd diplomacy of his ministers, who hid for the time their fear of the capture of the port of New Orleans by the English navy.

Little chance was afforded the Federalists for adverse criticism in Congress, for the purchase proved so popular that the people greatly increased the majority in both branches of the eighth Congress, and Jefferson called it together earlier for the purpose of ratification. The Senate ratified the treaty on the 20th of October, 1803, by a vote of 24 to 7, while the House adopted a resolution for carrying the treaty into effect by a vote of 90 to 25. Eleven million dollars of the purchase money was appropriated, the remaining four millions being reserved for the indemnity of American citizens who had sustained losses by French assaults upon our commerce—from which fact subsequently came what is known as the French Spoliation Bill.

Impeachment trials were first attempted before the eighth Congress in 1803. Judge Pickering, of the district court of the United States for New Hampshire, was impeached for occasional drunkenness, and dismissed from office. Judge Chase of the U. S. Supreme Court, and Judge Peters of the district court of Pennsylvania, both Federalists, were charged by articles proposed in the House with illegal and arbitrary conduct in the trial of parties charged with political offenses. The Federalists took alarm at these proceedings, and so vehement were their charges against the Republicans of a desire to destroy the judiciary that their impeachments were finally abandoned.

The Republicans closed their first national administration with high prestige. They had met several congressional reverses on questions where defeat proved good fortune, for the Federalists kept a watchful defence, and were not always wrong. The latter suffered numerically, and many of their best leaders had fallen in the congressional contest of 1800 and 1802, while the Republicans maintained their own additions in talent and number.

In 1804, the candidates of both parties were nominated by congressional caucuses. Jefferson and Clinton were the Republican nominees; Charles C. Pinckney and Rufus King, the nominees of the Federalists, but they only received 14 out of 176 electoral votes.

The struggle of Napoleon in Europe with the allied powers now gave Jefferson an opportunity to inaugurate a foreign policy. England had forbidden all trade with the French and their allies, and France had in return forbidden all commerce with England and her colonies. Both of these decrees violated our neutral rights, and were calculated to destroy our commerce, which by this time had become quite imposing.

Congress acted promptly, and on the 21st of December passed what is known as the Embargo Act, under the inspiration of the Republican party, which claimed that the only choice of the people lay between the embargo and war, and that there was no other way to obtain redress from England and France. But the promised effects of the measure were not realized, and so soon as any dissatisfaction was manifested by the people, the Federalists made the question a political issue. They declared it unconstitutional because it was not limited as to time; that it helped England as against France (a cunning assertion in view of the early love of the Republicans for the cause of the French), and that it laid violent hands on our home commerce and industries. Political agitation increased the discontent, and public opinion at one time turned so strongly against the law that it was openly resisted on the eastern coast, and treated with almost as open contempt on the Canadian border. The bill had passed the House by 87 to 35, the Senate by 19 to 9. In January, 1809, the then closing administration of Jefferson had to change front on the question, and the law was repealed on the 18th of March. The Republicans when they changed, went all the way over, and advocated full protection by the use of a navy, of all our rights on the high seas. If the Federals could have recalled their old leaders, or retained even a considerable portion of their power, the opportunity presented by the embargo issue could have brought them back to full political power, but lacking these leaders, the opportunity passed.

Democrats and Federals.

During the ninth Congress, which assembled on the second of December, 1805, the Republicans dropped their name and accepted that of “Democrats.” In all their earlier strifes they had been charged by their opponents with desiring to run to the extremes of the democratic or “mob rule,” and fear of too general a belief in the truth of the charge led them to denials and rejection of a name which the father of their party had ever shown a fondness for. The earlier dangers which had threatened their organization, and the recollection of defeats suffered in their attempts to establish a government anti-federal and confederate in their composition, had been greatly modified by later successes, and with a characteristic cuteness peculiar to Americans they accepted an epithet and sought to turn it to the best account. In this they imitated the patriots who accepted the epithets in the British satirical song of “Yankee Doodle,” and called themselves Yankees. From the ninth Congress the Jeffersonian Republicans called themselves Democrats, and the word Republican passed into disuse until later on in the history of our political parties, the opponents of the Democracy accepted it as a name which well filled the meaning of their attitude in the politics of the country.

Mr. Randolph of Roanoke, made the first schism in the Republican party under Jefferson, when he and three of his friends voted against the embargo act. He resisted its passage with his usual earnestness, and all attempts at reconciling him to the measure were unavailing. Self-willed, strong in argument and sarcasm, it is believed that his cause made it even more desirable for the Republicans to change name in the hope of recalling some of the more wayward “Democrats” who had advocated Jacobin democracy in the years gone by. The politicians of that day were never short of expedients, and no man so abounded in them as Jefferson himself.

Randolph improved his opportunities by getting most of the Virginia members to act with him against the foreign policy of the administration, but he was careful not to join the Federalists, and quickly denied any leaning that way. The first fruit of this faction was to bring forth Monroe as a candidate for President against Madison—a movement which proved to be quite popular in Virginia, but which Jefferson flanked by bringing about a reconciliation between Monroe and Madison. The now usual Congressional caucus followed at Washington, and although the Virginia Legislature in its caucus previously held had been unable to decide between Madison and Monroe, the Congressional body chose Madison by 83 to 11, the minority being divided between Clinton and Monroe, though the latter could by that time hardly be considered as a candidate. This action broke up Randolph’s faction in Virginia, but left so much bitterness behind it that a large portion attached themselves to the Federalists. In the election which followed Madison received 122 electoral votes against 47 for C. C. Pinckney, of South Carolina, and 6 for Geo. Clinton of New York.

Before Jefferson’s administration closed he recommended the passage of an act to prohibit the African slave trade after January 1st, 1808, and it was passed accordingly. He had also rejected the form of a treaty received from the British minister Erskine, and did this without the formality of submitting it to the Senate—first, because it contained no provision on the objectionable practice of impressing our seamen; second,[2] “because it was accompanied by a note from the British ministers, by which the British government reserved to itself the right of releasing itself from the stipulations in favor of neutral rights, if the United States submitted to the British decree, or other invasion of those rights by France.” This rejection of the treaty by Jefferson caused public excitement, and the Federalists sought to arouse the commercial community against his action, and cited the fact that his own trusted friends, Monroe and Pinckney had negotiated it. The President’s party stood by him, and they agreed that submission to the Senate was immaterial, as its advice could not bind him. This refusal to consider the treaty was the first step leading to the war of 1812, for embargoes followed, and Britain openly claimed the right to search American vessels for her deserting seamen. In 1807 this question was brought to issue by the desertion of five British seamen from the _Halifax_, and their enlistment on the U. S. frigate _Chesapeake_. Four separate demands were made for these men, but all of the commanders, knowing the firm attitude of Jefferson’s administration against the practice, refused, as did the Secretary of State refuse a fifth demand on the part of the British minister. On the 23d of June following, while the _Chesapeake_ was near the capes of Virginia, Capt. Humphreys of the British ship _Leopard_ attempted to search her for deserters. Capt. Barron denied the right of search, but on being fired into, lowered his flag, Humphreys then took four men from the _Chesapeake_, three of whom had previously entered the British service, but were Americans by birth, and had been formally demanded by Washington. The act was a direct violation of the international law, for a nation’s ship at sea like its territory is inviolable. The British government disavowed the act of its officer and offered apology and reparation, which were accepted. This event, however, strengthened Jefferson’s rejection of the Monroe-Pinckney treaty, and quickly stopped adverse political criticism at home, Foreign affairs remained, however, in a complicated state, owing to the wars between England and the then successful Napoleon, but they in no wise shook the firm hold which Jefferson had upon the people, nor the prestige of his party. He stands in history as one of the best politicians our land has ever seen, and then as now no one could successfully draw the line between the really able politician and the statesman. He was accepted as both. His administration closed on the 3d of March, 1809, when he expressed great gratification at being able to retire to private life.

Mr. Madison succeeded at a time when the country, through fears of foreign aggression and violence, was exceedingly gloomy and despondent—a feeling not encouraged in the least by the statements of the Federalists, some of whom then thought political criticism in hours of danger not unpatriotic. They described our agriculture as discouraged, our fisheries abandoned, our commerce restrained, our navy dismantled, our revenues destroyed at a time when war was at any moment probable with either France, England or Spain.

Madison, representing as he did the same party, from the first resolved to follow the policy of Jefferson, a fact about which there was no misunderstanding. He desired to avert war as long as possible with England, and sought by skilful diplomacy to avert the dangers presented by both France and England in their attitude with neutrals. England had declared that a man who was once a subject always remained a subject, and on this plea based her determination to impress again into her service all deserters from her navy. France, because of refusal to accede to claims equally at war with our rights, had authorized the seizure of all American vessels entering the ports of France. In May, 1810, when the non-intercourse act had expired, Madison caused proposals to be made to both belligerents, that if either would revoke its hostile edict, the non-intercourse act should be revived and enforced against the other nation. This act had been passed by the tenth Congress as a substitute for the embargo. France quickly accepted Madison’s proposal, and received the benefits of the act, and the direct result was to increase the growing hostility of England. From this time forward the negotiations had more the character of a diplomatic contest than an attempt to maintain peace. Both countries were upon their mettle, and early in 1811, Mr. Pinckney, the American minister to Great Britain, was recalled, and a year later a formal declaration of war was made by the United States.

Just prior to this the old issue, made by the Republicans against Hamilton’s scheme for a National Bank, was revived by the fact that the charter of the bank ceased on the 4th of March, 1811, and an attempt was made to re-charter it. A bill for this purpose was introduced into Congress, but on the 11th of January, 1811, it was indefinitely postponed in the House, by a vote of 65 to 64, while in the Senate it was rejected by the casting vote of the Vice-President, Geo. Clinton, on the 5th of February, 1811—this notwithstanding its provisions had been framed or approved by Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury. The Federalists were all strong advocates of the measure, and it was so strong that it divided some of the Democrats who enjoyed a loose rein in the contest so far as the administration was concerned, the President not specially caring for political quarrels at a time when war was threatened with a powerful foreign nation. The views of the Federalists on this question descended to the Whigs some years later, and this fact led to the charges that the Whigs were but Federalists in disguise.

The eleventh Congress continued the large Democratic majority, as did the twelfth, which met on the 4th of November, 1811, Henry Clay, then an ardent supporter of the policy of Madison, succeeding to the House speakership. He had previously served two short sessions in the U. S. Senate, and had already acquired a high reputation as an able and fluent debater. He preferred the House, at that period of life, believing his powers better calculated to win fame in the more popular representative hall. Calhoun was also in the House at this time, and already noted for the boldness of his views and their assertion.

In this Congress jealousies arose against the political power of Virginia, which had already named three of the four Presidents, each for two terms, and De Witt Clinton, the well-known Governor of New York, sought through these jealousies to create a division which would carry him into the Presidency. His efforts were for a time warmly seconded by several northern and southern states. A few months later the Legislature of New York formally opened the ball by nominating DeWitt Clinton for the Presidency. An address was issued by his friends, August 17th, 1812, which has since become known as the Clintonian platform, and his followers were known as Clintonian Democrats. The address contained the first public protest against the nomination of Presidential candidates by Congressional caucuses. There was likewise declared opposition to that “official regency which prescribed tenets of political faith.” The efforts of particular states to monopolize the principal offices was denounced, as was the continuance of public men for long periods in office.

Madison was nominated for a second term by a Congressional caucus held at Washington, in May, 1812. John Langdon was nominated for Vice-President, but as he declined on account of age, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, took his place. In September of the same year a _convention_ of the opposition, representing eleven states, was held in the city of New York, which nominated De Witt Clinton, with Jared Ingersoll for Vice-President. This was the first national convention, partisan in character, and the Federalists have the credit of originating and carrying out the idea. The election resulted in the success of Madison, who received 128 electoral votes to 89 for Clinton.

Though factious strife had been somewhat rife, less attention was paid to politics than to the approaching war. There were new Democratic leaders in the lower House, and none were more prominent than Clay of Kentucky, Calhoun, Cheves and Lowndes, all of South Carolina. The policy of Jefferson in reducing the army and navy was now greatly deplored, and the defenceless condition in which it left the country was the partial cause, at least a stated cause of the factious feuds which followed. Madison sought to change this policy, and he did it at the earnest solicitation of Clay, Calhoun and Lowndes, who were the recognized leaders of the war party. They had early determined that Madison should be directly identified with them, and before his second nomination had won him over to their more decided views in favor of war with England. He had held back, hoping that diplomacy might avert a contest, but when once convinced that war was inevitable and even desirable under the circumstances, his official utterances were bold and free. In the June following the caucus which renominated him, he declared in a message that our flag was continually insulted on the high seas; that the right of searching American vessels for British seamen was still in practice, and that thousands of American citizens had in this way been impressed in service on foreign ships; that peaceful efforts at adjustment of the difficulties had proved abortive, and that the British ministry and British emissaries had actually been intriguing for the dismemberment of the Union.

The act declaring war was approved by the President on the 18th of June, 1812, and is remarkably short and comprehensive. It was drawn by the attorney-general of the United States, William Pinckney, and is in the words following:—

“_An act declaring war between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and their territories._

“_Be it enacted, &c._ That war be, and the same is hereby declared to exist between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America, and their territories; and that the President of the United States is hereby authorized to use the whole land and naval force of the United States to carry the same into effect, and to issue to private armed vessels of the United States commissions, or letters of marque and general reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper, and under the seal of the United States, against the vessels, goods, and effects, of the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the subjects thereof.”

This was a soul-stirring message, but it did not rally all the people as it should have done. Political jealousies were very great, and the frequent defeats of the Federalists, while they tended to greatly reduce their numbers and weaken their power, seemed to strengthen their animosity, and they could see nothing good in any act of the administration. They held, especially in the New England states, that the war had been declared by a political party simply, and not by the nation, though nearly all of the Middle, and all of the Southern and Western States, warmly supported it. Clay estimated that nine-tenths of the people were in favor of the war, and under the inspiration of his eloquence and the strong state papers of Madison, they doubtless were at first. Throughout they felt their political strength, and they just as heartily returned the bitterness manifested by those of the Federalists who opposed the war, branding them as enemies of the republic, and monarchists who preferred the reign of Britain.

Four Federalist representatives in Congress went so far as to issue an address, opposing the war, the way in which it had been declared, and denouncing it as unjust. Some of the New England states refused the order of the President to support it with their militia, and Massachusetts sent peace memorials to Congress.

A peace party was formed with a view to array the religious sentiment of the country against the war, and societies with similar objects were organized by the more radical of the Federalists. To such an extreme was this opposition carried, that some of the citizens of New London, Conn., made a practice of giving information to the enemy, by means of blue lights, of the departure of American vessels.

The Hartford Convention.

This opposition finally culminated in the assembling of a convention at Hartford, at which delegates were present from all of the New England states. They sat for three weeks with closed doors, and issued an address which will be found in this volume in the book devoted to political platforms. It was charged by the Democrats that the real object of the convention was to negotiate a separate treaty of peace, on behalf of New England, with Great Britain, but this charge was as warmly denied. The exact truth has not since been discovered, the fears of the participants of threatened trials for treason, closing their mouths, if their professions were false. The treaty of Ghent, which was concluded on December 14th, 1814, prevented other action by the Hartford convention than that stated. It had assembled nine days before the treaty, which is as follows:

Treaty of Ghent.

This treaty was negotiated by the Right Honorable James Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, Esq., and William Adams, Esq., on the part of Great Britain, and John Quincy Adams, James A. Bayard, Henry Clay, Jonathan Russell, and Albert Gallatin, on behalf of the United States.

The treaty can be found on p. 218, vol. 8, of Little & Brown’s Statutes at Large. The first article provided for the restoration of all archives, records, or property taken by either party from the other during the war. This article expressly provides for the restoration of “slaves or other private property.” The second article provided for the cessation of hostilities and limitation of time of capture. The third article provided for the restoration of prisoners of war.

The fourth article defined the boundary established by the treaty of 1783, and provided for commissioners to mark the same.

The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth articles established rules to govern the proceedings of the commissioners.

The ninth article bound the United States and His Britannic Majesty to end all hostilities with Indian tribes, with whom they were then respectively at war.

The tenth article reads as follows:—

“Whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice; and, whereas, both His Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object.”

The eleventh and last article provides for binding effect of the treaty, upon the exchange of ratifications.

The position of New England in the war is explained somewhat by her exposed position. Such of the militia as served endured great hardships, and they were almost constantly called from their homes to meet new dangers. Distrusting their loyalty, the general government had withheld all supplies from the militia of Massachusetts and Connecticut for the year 1814, and these States were forced to bear the burden of supporting them, at the same time contributing their quota of taxes to the general government—hardships, by the way, not greater than those borne by Pennsylvania and Ohio in the late war for the Union, nor half as hard as those borne by the border States at the same time. True, the coast towns of Massachusetts were subjected to constant assault from the British navy, and the people of these felt that they were defenceless. It was on their petition that the legislature of Massachusetts finally, by a vote of 226 to 67, adopted the report favoring the calling of the Hartford Convention. A circular was then addressed to the Governors of the other States, with a request that it be laid before their legislatures, inviting them to appoint delegates, and stating that the object was to deliberate upon the dangers to which the eastern section was exposed, “and to devise, if practicable, means of security and defence which might be consistent with the preservation of their resources from total ruin, _and not repugnant to their obligations as members of the Union_.” The italicized portion shows that there was at least then no design of forming a separate treaty, or of promoting disunion. The legislatures of Connecticut and Rhode Island endorsed the call and sent delegates. Those of New Hampshire and Vermont did not, but delegates were sent by local conventions. These delegates, it is hardly necessary to remark, were all members of the Federal party, and their suspected designs and action made the “Hartford Convention” a bye-word and reproach in the mouths of Democratic orators for years thereafter. It gave to the Democrats, as did the entire history of the war, the prestige of superior patriotism, and they profited by it as long as the memory of the war of 1812 was fresh. Indeed, directly after the war, all men seemed to keep in constant view the reluctance of the Federalists to support the war, and their almost open hostility to it in New England. Peace brought prosperity and plenty, but not oblivion of the old political issues, and this was the beginning of the end of the Federal party. Its decay thereafter was rapid and constant.

The eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth Congresses had continued Democratic. The fourteenth began Dec. 4, 1815, with the Democratic majority in the House increased to 30. Clay had taken part in negotiating the treaty, and on his return was again elected to the House, and was for the third time elected speaker. Though 65 Federalists had been elected, but 10 were given to Federal candidates for speaker, this party now showing a strong, and under the circumstances, a very natural desire to rub out party lines. The internal taxes and the postage rates were reduced.

The Protective Tariff.

President Madison, in his message, had urged upon Congress a revision of the tariff, and pursuant to his recommendation what was at the time called a protective tariff was passed. Even Calhoun then supported it, while Clay proclaimed that protection must no longer be secondary to revenue, but of primary importance. The rates fixed, however, were insufficient, and many American manufactures were soon frustrated by excessive importations of foreign manufactures. The position of Calhoun and Lowndes, well known leaders from South Carolina, is explained by the fact that just then the proposal of a protective tariff was popular in the south, in view of the heavy duties upon raw cotton which England then imposed. The Federalists in weakness changed their old position when they found the Democrats advocating a tariff, and the latter quoted and published quite extensively Alexander Hamilton’s early report in favor of it. Webster, in the House at the time and a leading Federalist, was against the bill. The parties had exchanged positions on the question.

Peace brought with it another exchange of positions. President Madison, although he had vetoed a bill to establish a National Bank in 1815, was now (in 1816) anxious for the establishment of such an institution. Clay had also changed his views, and claimed that the experiences of the war showed the necessity for a national currency. The bill met with strong opposition from a few Democrats and nearly all of the Federalists (the latter having changed position on the question since 1811), but it passed and was signed by the President.

A bill to promote internal improvements, advocated by Clay, was at first favored by Madison, but his mind changed and he vetoed the measure—the first of its kind passed by Congress.

The Democratic members of Congress, before the adjournment of the first session, held a caucus for the nomination of candidates to succeed Madison and Gerry. It was understood that the retiring officers and their confidential friends favored James Monroe of Virginia. Their wishes were carried out, but not without a struggle, Wm. H. Crawford of Georgia receiving 54 votes against 65 for Monroe. The Democrats opposed to Virginia’s domination in the politics of the country, made a second effort, and directed it against Monroe in the caucus. Aaron Burr denounced him as an improper and incompetent candidate, and joined in the protest then made against any nomination by a Congressional caucus; he succeeding in getting nineteen Democrats to stay out of the caucus. Later he advised renewed attempts to break down the Congressional caucus system, and before the nomination favored Andrew Jackson as a means to that end. Daniel B. Tompkins was nominated by the Democrats for Vice-President. The Federalists named Rufus King of New York, but in the election which followed he received but 24 out of 217 electoral votes. The Federalists divided their votes for Vice-President.

Monroe was inaugurated on the 14th of March, 1817, the oath being administered by Chief Justice Marshall. The inaugural address was so liberal in its tone that it seemed to give satisfaction to men of all shades of political opinion. The questions which had arisen during the war no longer had any practical significance, while the people were anxious to give the disturbing ones which ante-dated at least a season of rest. Two great and opposing policies had previously obtained, and singularly enough each seemed exactly adapted to the times when they were triumphant. The Federal power had been asserted in a government which had gathered renewed strength during what was under the circumstances a great and perilous war, and the exigencies of that war in many instances compelled the Republicans or Democrats, or the Democratic-Republicans as some still called them, to concede points which had theretofore been in sharp dispute, and they did it with that facility which only Americans can command in emergencies: yet as a party they kept firm hold of the desire to enlarge the scope of liberty in its application to the citizens, and just here kept their original landmark.

It is not singular then that the administration of Monroe opened what has ever since been known in politics as the “Era of Good Feeling.” Party differences rapidly subsided, and political serenity was the order of the day. Monroe made a tour of the States, with the direct object of inspecting fortifications and means of defence, and in this way spread the good feeling, without seeming to have any such object. He was everywhere favorably greeted by the people, and received by delegations which in many instances were specially made up of all shades of opinion.

The Cabinet was composed of men of rare political distinction, even in that day of great men. It was probably easier to be great then than now, just as it is easier to be a big political hero in the little State of Delaware than it is in the big States of New York or Pennsylvania. Yet these men were universally accepted as great without regard to their localities. All were Republicans or Democrats, with John Quincy Adams as Secretary of State, Wm. H. Crawford (Monroe’s competitor for the nomination) as Secretary of the Treasury, John C. Calhoun as Secretary of War, William Wirt as Attorney-General. All of these united with the President in the general desire to call a halt upon the political asperities which were then recognized as a public evil. On one occasion, during his tour, the citizens of Kennebunk and its vicinity, in Maine, having in their address alluded to the prospects of a political union among the people in support of the administration, the President said in reply:

“You are pleased to express a confident hope that a spirit of mutual conciliation may be one of the blessings which may result from my administration. This indeed would be an eminent blessing, and I pray it may be realized. Nothing but union is waiting to make us a great people. The present time affords the happiest presage that this union is fast consummating. It cannot be otherwise; I daily see greater proofs of it. The further I advance in my progress in the country, the more I perceive that we are all Americans—that we compose but one family—that our republican institutions will be supported and perpetuated by the united zeal and patriotism of all. Nothing could give me greater satisfaction than to behold a perfect union among ourselves—a union which is necessary to restore to social intercourse its former charms, and to render our happiness, as a nation, unmixed and complete. To promote this desirable result requires no compromise of principle, and I promise to give it my continued attention, and my best endeavors.”

Even General Jackson, since held up to public view by historians as the most austere and “stalwart” of all politicians, caught the sweet infection of peace, and thus advised President Monroe:—

“Now is the time to exterminate that monster, called party spirit. By selecting [for cabinet officers] characters most conspicuous for their probity, virtue, capacity, and firmness, without regard to party, you will go far to, if not entirely, eradicate those feelings, which, on former occasions, threw so many obstacles in the way of government. The chief magistrate of a great and powerful nation should never indulge in party feelings. His conduct should be liberal and disinterested; always bearing in mind, that he acts for the whole and not a part of the community.”

This advice had been given with a view to influence the appointment of a mixed political Cabinet, but while Monroe professed to believe that a free government could exist without political parties, he nevertheless sought to bring all of the people into one political fold, and that the Democratic. Yet he certainly and plainly sought to allay factions in his own party, and with this view selected Crawford for the Treasury—the gentleman who had been so warmly supported in the nominating struggle by the Clintonians and by all who objected to the predominating influence of Virginia in national politics.

Monroe, like his immediate predecessor, accepted and acted upon the doctrines of the new school of Republicans as represented by Clay and Calhoun, both of whom still favored a tariff, while Clay had become a warm advocate of a national system of internal improvements. These two statesmen thus early differed on some questions, but they were justly regarded as the leading friends and advisers of the administration, for to both still clung the patriotic recollections of the war which they had so warmly advocated and supported, and the issue of which attested their wisdom. Clay preferred to be called a Republican; Calhoun preferred to be called a Democrat, and just then the terms were so often exchanged and mingled that history is at fault in the exact designation, while tradition is colored by the bias of subsequent events and lives.

Monroe’s first inaugural leaned toward Clay’s scheme of internal improvements, but questioned its constitutionality. Clay was next to Jefferson the most original of all our statesmen and politicians. He was prolific in measures, and almost resistless in their advocacy. From a political standpoint he was the most direct author of the war of 1812, for his advocacy mainly brought it to the issue of arms, which through him and Calhoun were substituted for diplomacy. And Calhoun then stood in broader view before the country than since. His sectional pride and bias had been rarely aroused, and like Clay he seemed to act for the country as an entirety. Subsequent sectional issues changed the views held of him by the people of both the North and South.

We have said that Monroe leaned toward internal improvements, but he thought Congress was not clothed by the Constitution with the power to authorize measures supporting it, and when the opportunity was presented (May 4, 1822) he vetoed the bill “for the preservation and repair of the Cumberland road,” and accompanied the veto with a most elaborate message in which he discussed the constitutional aspects of the question. A plain majority of the friends of the administration, under the leadership of Clay, supported the theory of internal improvements from the time the administration began, but were reluctant to permit a division of the party on the question.

Mississippi and Illinois were admitted to the Union during the “Era of Good Feeling,” without serious political disturbance, while Alabama was authorized to form a state constitution and government, and Arkansas was authorized as a separate territorial government from part of Missouri. In 1819 President Monroe made a tour through the Southern States to examine their defenses and see and get acquainted with the people. From the first inauguration of Monroe up to 1819 party lines can hardly be said to have existed, but in the sixteenth session of Congress, which continued until May, 1820, new questions of national interest arose, prominent among which were additional protective duties for our manufactures; internal improvements by the government; acknowledgments of the independence of the South American States.

The Monroe Doctrine.

Upon the question of recognizing the independence of the South American States, the President made a record which has ever since been quoted and denominated “The Monroe Doctrine.” It is embodied in the following abstract of his seventh annual message, under date of Dec. 2d, 1823:

“It was stated, at the commencement of the last session, that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been, so far, very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when rights are invaded or seriously menaced, that we resent injuries, or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare, that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration, and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new governments and Spain, we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

“The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced, than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on a principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question to which all independent powers, whose governments differ from theirs, are interested; even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government, _de facto_, as the legitimate government for us: to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy; meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe, that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course.”

The second election of Monroe, in 1820, was accomplished without a contest. Out of 231 electoral votes, but one was cast against him, and that for John Quincy Adams. Mr. Tompkins, the candidate for Vice-President, was only a little less fortunate, there being 14 scattering votes against him. Neither party, if indeed there was a Federalist party left made any nominations.

The Missouri Compromise.

The second session of the 17th Congress opened on the 4th day of March, 1820, with James Monroe at the head of the Executive Department of the Government, and the Democratic party in the majority in both branches of the Federal Legislature. The Cabinet at that time was composed of the most brilliant minds of the country, indeed as most justly remarked by Senator Thomas H. Benton in his published review of the events of that period, it would be difficult to find in any government, in any country, at any time, more talent and experience, more dignity and decorum, more purity of private life, a larger mass of information, and more addiction to business, than was comprised in the list of celebrated names then constituting the executive department of the government. The legislative department was equally impressive. The exciting and agitating question then pending before Congress was on the admission of the State of Missouri into the Federal Union, the subject of the issue being the attempted tacking on of conditions restricting slavery within her limits. She was admitted without conditions under the so-called compromise, which abolished it in certain portions of the then province of Louisiana. In this controversy, the compromise was sustained and carried entirely by the Democratic Senators and members from the Southern and slaveholding States aided and sanctioned by the Executive, and it was opposed by fifteen Senators from non-slaveholding States, who represented the opposite side on the political questions of the day. It passed the House by a close vote of 86 to 82. It has been seriously questioned since whether this act was constitutional. The real struggle was political, and for the balance of power. For a while it threatened the total overthrow of all political parties upon principle, and the substitution of geographical parties discriminated by the slave line, and thus destroying the proper action of the Federal government, and leading to a separation of the States. It was a federal movement, accruing to the benefit of that party, and at first carried all the Northern democracy in its current, giving the supremacy to their adversaries. When this effect was perceived, democrats from the northern non-slaveholding States took early opportunity to prevent their own overthrow, by voting for the admission of the States on any terms, and thus prevent the eventual separation of the States in the establishment of geographical parties divided by a slavery and anti-slavery line.

The year 1820 marked a period of financial distress in the country, which soon became that of the government. The army was reduced, and the general expenses of the departments cut down, despite which measures of economy the Congress deemed it necessary to authorize the President to contract for a loan of five million dollars. Distress was the cry of the day; relief the general demand, the chief demand coming from debtors to the Government for public lands purchased under the then credit system, this debt at that time aggregating twenty-three millions of dollars. The banks failed, money vanished, instalments were coming due which could not be met; and the opening of Congress in November, 1820, was saluted by the arrival of memorials from all the new States praying for the relief to the purchaser of the public lands. The President referred to it in his annual message of that year, and Congress passed a measure of relief by changing the system to cash sales instead of credit, reducing the price of the lands, and allowing present debtors to apply payments already made to portions of the land purchased, relinquishing the remainder. Applications were made at that time for the establishment of the preemptive system, but without effect; the new States continued to press the question and finally prevailed, so that now the preemptive principle has become a fixed part of our land system, permanently incorporated with it, and to the equal advantage of the settler and the government.

The session of 1820–21, is remarkable as being the first at which any proposition was made in Congress for the occupation and settlement of our territory on the Columbia river—the only part then owned by the United States on the Pacific coast. It was made by Dr. Floyd, a representative from Virginia, who argued that the establishment of a civilized power on the American coast of the Pacific could not fail to produce great and wonderful benefits not only to our own country, but to the people of Eastern Asia, China and Japan on the opposite side of the Pacific Ocean, and that the valley of the Columbia might become the granary of China and Japan. This movement suggested to Senator Benton, to move, for the first time publicly in the United States, a resolution to send ministers to the Oriental States.

At this time treaties with Mexico and Spain were ratified, by which the United States acquired Florida and ceded Texas; these treaties, together with the Missouri compromise—a measure contemporaneous with them—extinguished slave soil in all the United States territory west of the Mississippi, except in that portion which was to constitute the State of Arkansas; and, including the extinction in Texas consequent upon its cession to a non-slaveholding power, constituted the largest territorial abolition of slavery that was ever up to that period effected by any political power of any nation.

The outside view of the slave question in the United States, at this time, is that the extension of slavery was then arrested, circumscribed, and confined within narrow territorial limits, while free States were permitted an almost unlimited expansion.

In 1822 a law passed Congress abolishing the Indian factory system, which had been established during Washington’s administration, in 1796, under which the Government acted as a factor or agent for the sale of supplies to the Indians and the purchase of furs from them; this branch of the service then belonged to the department of the Secretary of War. The abuses discovered in it led to the discontinuance of that system.

The Presidential election of 1824 was approaching, the candidates were in the field, their respective friends active and busy, and popular topics for the canvass in earnest requisition. Congress was full of projects for different objects of internal improvement, mainly in roads and canals, and the friends of each candidate exerted themselves in rivalry of each other, under the supposition that their opinions would stand for those of their principals. An act for the preservation of the Cumberland Road, which passed both houses of Congress, met with a veto from President Monroe, accompanied by a state paper in exposition of his opinions upon the whole subject of Federal interference in matters of inter state commerce and roads and canals. He discussed the measure in all its bearings, and plainly showed it to be unconstitutional. After stating the question, he examined it under every head of constitutional derivation under which its advocates claimed the power, and found it to be granted by no one of them and virtually prohibited by some of them. This was then and has since been considered to be the most elaborate and thoroughly considered opinion upon the general question which has ever been delivered by any American statesman. This great state paper, delivered at a time when internal improvement by the federal government had become an issue in the canvass for the Presidency and was ardently advocated by three of the candidates and qualified by two others, had an immense current in its power, carrying with it many of the old strict constructionists.

The revision of the tariff, with a view to the protection of home industry, and to the establishment of what was then called “The American System,” was one of the large subjects before Congress at the session of 1823–24, and was the regular commencement of the heated debates on that question which afterwards ripened into a serious difficulty between the federal government and some of the Southern States. The presidential election being then depending, the subject became tinctured with party politics, in which so far as that ingredient was concerned, and was not controlled by other considerations, members divided pretty much on the line which always divided them on a question of constructive powers. The protection of domestic industry not being among the powers granted, was looked for in the incidental; and denied by the strict constructionists to be a substantive term, to be exercised for the direct purpose of protection; but admitted by all at that time and ever since the first tariff act of 1789, to be an incident to the revenue raising power, and an incident to be regarded in the exercise of that power. Revenue the object, protection the incident, had been the rule in the earlier tariffs; now that rule was sought to be reversed, and to make protection the object of the law, and revenue the incident. Mr. Henry Clay was the leader in the proposed revision and the champion of the American system; he was ably supported in the House by many able and effective speakers; who based their argument on the general distress then alleged to be prevalent in the country. Mr. Daniel Webster was the leading speaker on the other side, and disputed the universality of the distress which had been described; and contested the propriety of high or prohibitory duties, in the present active and intelligent state of the world, to stimulate industry and manufacturing enterprise.

The bill was carried by a close vote in both Houses. Though brought forward avowedly for the protection of domestic manufactures, it was not entirely supported on that ground; an increase of revenue being the motive with some, the public debt then being nearly ninety millions. An increased protection to the products of several States, as lead in Missouri and Illinois, hemp in Kentucky, iron in Pennsylvania, wool in Ohio and New York, commanded many votes for the bill; and the impending presidential election had its influence in its favor.

Two of the candidates, Messrs. Adams and Clay, voted for and avowedly supported General Jackson, who voted for the bill, was for it, as tending to give a home supply of the articles necessary in time of war, and as raising revenue to pay the public debt; Mr. Crawford was opposed to it, and Mr. Calhoun had withdrawn as a Presidential candidate. The Southern planting States were dissatisfied, believing that the new burdens upon imports which it imposed, fell upon the producers of the exports, and tended to enrich one section of the Union at the expense of another. The attack and support of the bill took much of a sectional aspect; Virginia, the two Carolinas, Georgia, and some others, being unanimous against it. Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, and Kentucky being unanimous for it. Massachusetts, which up to this time had no small influence in commerce, voted, with all, except one member, against it. With this sectional aspect, a tariff for protection, also began to assume a political aspect, being taken under the care of the party, afterwards denominated as Whig. The bill was approved by President Monroe; a proof that that careful and strict constructionist of the constitution did not consider it as deprived of its revenue character by the degree of protection which it extended.

A subject which at the present time is exciting much criticism, viz: proposed amendments to the constitution relative to the election of President and Vice-President, had its origin in movements in that direction taken by leading Democrats during the campaign of 1824. The electoral college has never been since the early elections, an independent body free to select a President and Vice-President; though in theory they have been vested with such powers, in practice they have no such practical power over the elections, and have had none since their institution. In every case the elector has been an instrument, bound to obey a particular impulsion, and disobedience to which would be attended with infamy, and with every penalty which public indignation could inflict. From the beginning they have stood pledged to vote for the candidate indicated by the public will; and have proved not only to be useless, but an inconvenient intervention between the people and the object of their choice. Mr. McDuffie in the House of Representatives and Mr. Benton in the Senate, proposed amendments; the mode of taking the direct vote to be in districts, and the persons receiving the greatest number of votes for President or Vice-President in any district, to count one vote for such office respectively which is nothing but substituting the candidates themselves for their electoral representatives.

In the election of 1824 four candidates were before the people for the office of President, General Jackson, John Quincy Adams, William H. Crawford and Henry Clay. None of them received a majority of the 261 electoral votes, and the election devolved upon the House of Representatives. John C. Calhoun had a majority of the electoral votes for the office of Vice-President, and was elected. Mr. Adams was elected President by the House of Representatives, although General Jackson was the choice of the people, having received the greatest number of votes at the general election. The election of Mr. Adams was perfectly constitutional, and as such fully submitted to by the people; but it was a violation of the _demos krateo_ principle; and that violation was equally rebuked. All the representatives who voted against the will of their constituents, lost their favor, and disappeared from public life. The representation in the House of Representatives was largely changed at the first general election, and presented a full opposition to the new President. Mr. Adams himself was injured by it, and at the ensuing presidential election was beaten by General Jackson more than two to one.

Mr. Clay, who took the lead in the House for Mr. Adams, and afterwards took upon himself the mission of reconciling the people to his election in a series of public speeches, was himself crippled in the effort, lost his place in the democratic party, and joined the Whigs (then called the national republicans). The democratic principle was victor over the theory of the Constitution, and beneficial results ensued. It vindicated the people in their right and their power. It re-established parties upon the basis of principle, and drew anew party lines, then almost obliterated under the fusion of parties during the “era of good feeling,” and the efforts of leading men to make personal parties for themselves. It showed the conservative power of our government to lie in the people, more than in its constituted authorities. It showed that they were capable of exercising the function of self-government, and lastly, it assumed the supremacy of the democracy for a long time, and until lost by causes to be referred to hereafter. The Presidential election of 1824 is remarkable under another aspect—its results cautioned all public men against future attempts to govern presidential elections in the House of Representatives; and it put an end to the practice of caucus nominations for the Presidency by members of Congress. This mode of concentrating public opinion began to be practiced as the eminent men of the Revolution, to whom public opinion awarded a preference, were passing away, and when new men, of more equal pretensions, were coming upon the stage. It was tried several times with success and general approbation, because public sentiment was followed—not led—by the caucus. It was attempted in 1824 and failed; all the opponents of Mr. Crawford, by their joint efforts, succeeded, and justly in the fact though not in the motive, in rendering these Congress caucus nominations odious to the people, and broke them down. They were dropped, and a different mode adopted—that of party nominations by conventions of delegates from the States.

The administration of Mr. Adams commenced with his inaugural address, in which the chief topic was that of internal national improvement by the federal government. This declared policy of the administration furnished a ground of opposition against Mr. Adams, and went to the reconstruction of parties on the old line of strict, or latitudinous, construction of the Constitution. It was clear from the beginning that the new administration was to have a settled and strong opposition, and that founded in principles of government—the same principles, under different forms, which had discriminated parties at the commencement of the federal government. Men of the old school—survivors of the contest of the Adams and Jefferson times, with some exceptions, divided accordingly—the federalists going for Mr. Adams, the republicans against him, with the mass of the younger generation. The Senate by a decided majority, and the House by a strong minority, were opposed to the policy of the new President.

In 1826 occurred the famous debates in the Senate and the House, on the proposed Congress of American States, to contract alliances to guard against and prevent the establishment of any future European colony within its borders. The mission though sanctioned was never acted upon or carried out. It was authorized by very nearly a party vote, the democracy as a party being against it. The President, Mr. Adams, stated the objects of the Congress to be as follows: “An agreement between all the parties represented at the meeting, that each will guard, by its own means, against the establishment of any future European colony within its own borders, may be advisable. This was, more than two years since, announced by my predecessor to the world, as a principle resulting from the emancipation of both the American continents. It may be so developed to the new southern nations, that they may feel it as an essential appendage to their independence.”

Mr. Adams had been a member of Mr. Monroe’s cabinet, filling the department from which the doctrine would emanate. The enunciation by him as above of this “Monroe Doctrine,” as it is called, is very different from what it has of late been supposed to be, as binding the United States to guard all the territory of the New World from European colonization. The message above quoted was written at a time when the doctrine as enunciated by the former President through the then Secretary was fresh in the mind of the latter, and when he himself in a communication to the American Senate was laying it down for the adoption of all the American nations in a general congress of their deputies. According to President Adams, this “Monroe Doctrine” (according to which it has been of late believed that the United States were to stand guard over the two Americas, and repulse all intrusive colonists from their shores), was entirely confined to our own borders; that it was onl